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ABSTRACT
National Sovereignty and Economic Globalization: 
An Analysis of the Role of the IMF 
in the Changing World
by
Olga Vladimirovna Kuznetsova
Dr. Mehran Tamadonfar, Examination Committee Chair 
Assoc. Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Chapter 1 outlines empirical and normative theories of national sovereignty. A 
comprehensive analysis of the origins and evolution of sovereignty is offered. We 
suggest that the notion of absolute sovereignty is antiquated and needs scientific 
reassessment. Recent scholarly discourse indicates that students of international 
relations are divided as to the role of soverefgntyand the nation-state in the modem 
world. On the one hand, scholars who we call the critics of sovereignty are ready to 
abandon the notion of sovereignty as outmoded for the lack of effectiveness and 
viability. They contend that national sovereignty is being diffused, eroded, threatened, 
and challenged, and that national boundaries are being dwindled, diminished, and 
dissolved by sweeping forces of globalization. Others contend that the concepts of 
sovereignty and the nation-state are very much “alive" and relevant in the modem 
world. We hypothesize, submit and test empirical evidence that national sovereignty 
is a viable and relevant institution, while being transformed by the on-going process 
of globalization.
Chapter 2 discusses theories o f the nation-state, while keeping in mind that the 
conceptualization of thenation-state is intertwined with that of sovereignty. We show
iii
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the areas of weakness and vulnerability which the nation-state is experiencing due 
to the changes in the economic milieu. We emphasize the necessity for strong 
domestic institutions during the age of globalization which will be indispensable in 
the face of potential market fluctuations and financial crises. States will have to 
strengthen their institutions to be better prepared to face globalization and its negative 
effects. We show that the nation-state still has an important role to play in the modem 
context and that it will remain the center of gravity in the international arena.
Chapter3 gives a comprehensive oven/iew of contending theories of globalization 
and definitional confusion associated with the concept. We conceptualize 
globalization in general and economic globalization in particular. We outline myths 
and realities associated with the concept of globalization. We submit the empirical 
evidence that illustrates various aspects of gfobafization. We analyze how 
globalization affects and transforms sovereignty. Globalization calls into question 
outmoded views and dogmas about international relations; it calls for a profound 
scientific rethinking of the concept of sovereignty. Having said that, sovereignty and 
the state are no less important and no less viable in the modem world than they 
used to be. Once again, sovereignty is being transformed due to globalization while 
holding its ground. It is taking on a new dimension with the ever-present globalizing 
trends, i.e., new advances in technology, internationalization of financial markets, 
new developments in telecommunications, and the ascendancy of supranational 
institutions and regimes such as the International Monetary Fund, WTO, and the 
World Bank.
Chapter 4 takes the Intemational Monetary Fund as a case study and as one of 
the manifestations of globalization. We describe the principles and the rationale 
behind the creation of the IMF, its achievements and failures since its founding in 
1945. Just as national sovereignty is being transformed by globalizing trends, the 
IMF itself is facing the need for a profound change and structural reform. After the
IV
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general discussion of the (MR we focus on the effects of economic globalization on 
national sovereignty and the role of the Intemational Monetary Fund in that process. 
We outline the recent critiques of the IMF and its changing role after the collapse of 
the Bretton-Woods system. The IMF is considered as a vehicle of economic 
globalization and as a means of economic intervention through conditionality, which 
could pose a threat to national sovereignty. We address problems and dilemmas 
associated with the IMF conditionality for the present and for the future. We give our 
recommendations for the reform of the IMF.
Chapter V(Conclusion) discusses recent developments which point at the erosion 
of state-centered Realism, a theoretical construct, that views states as the dominant 
and unitary actors on the intemational level. Although theories of globalization and 
globalism are gaining grounds, it is early to speak of a world state and a global 
village. A comprehensive theory is needed, a theory that will encompass the viability 
of national sovereignty, the state and the effects of globalization, a theory that will 
reflect the realities of our times. These realities indicate the necessity for an eclectic, 
pluralistic and comprehens/vetheory of intemational relations where state and non­
state actors are given equal consideration and are analyzed in relation with each 
other. This thesis is an attempt at that theory.
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CHAPTER I
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
A ll associations are instituted for the purpose o f attaining some good.
The Politics of Aristotle 1 (Ernest Baker Translation. 1961)
No man is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece o f the continent, a part o f the main. I f  a clod be 
washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if  a promontory were, as well as i f  a manor o f thy 
friend's or ofthine own were. Any man ÿ death diminishes me, because I  am involved in mankind. And therefore 
never send to know fo r whom the bell tolls: it tollsfor thee.
John Donne
The ultimate explanation o f the binding force o f all taw is that man, whether he is a single individual or 
whether he is associated with other men in a state, is constrained, in so fa r as he is a reasonable being, to 
believe that order and not chaos is the governing principle of the world in which he has to live.
J. L. Brierly (The Law o f Nations 1963.56)
Sovereignty in both theory and practice is aimed at establishing order and clarity in an otherwise turbulent 
and incoherent world. Its historicalfunction has been to act as 'a fundamental source o f truth and meaning', 
to distinguish between order and anarchy, security and danger, identity and difference.
J. Falk and J. A. CamHleri (The End o f Sovereignty? 1992,11)
A world order is a stool on three legs: the political, the normative, and the institutionaL
Samuel K. Mutumba (‘Giappling with the Croatian Moment*' 1993,867)
Law within the individual state is not a mere accident o f historical development: it is an essential element 
of human association. Man, as Aristotle put, is by his very nature a  social being: and he is by his very nature 
in need o f law. Ubi sodetas, ibi jus. In like manner, urukr the coruiitions o f modem times, the state, 
notwithstanding its corporate character, has become itself “a social being " in relation to other members o f 
the intematiorutl community. .JThe itaerdependence o f states is a  fact: a community o f interests between 
states exists in as retd a sense as a community o f interests between individual men. The need o f law between 
state and state is as great, although less obviously so, as the need o f law between man and man.
Charles G. Fenwick (International Law 1948,31)
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Introduction
General fascination with the concept of sovereignty could be explained by 
numerous contradictions inherent in the evolution and the meaning of the concept. 
Students of law and politics attempt to resolve these contradictions by asking a 
seemingly straightforward question — What does “sovereignty” really mean? A 
researcher setting out to give the “true meaning” of sovereignty in the environment 
of the prevailing definitional confusion would be engaging in a fruitless and hopeless 
endeavor. To give a concrete definition of the concept that captures its multiple 
meanings since the thirteenth century is a truly Herculean task.' The “puzzle of 
sovereignty” is fascinating in itself because the concept carries so many meanings, 
associations, and connotations, it has so many levels of analysis and brings forth 
multiple layers of understanding. To grasp the “true and only meaning” of such a 
broad concept is to fight windmills in a Quixotic fashion.
In this thesis, we take an eclectic, holistic approach to the study of sovereignty. 
This approach combines both normative and empirical dimensions of sovereignty. 
We will describe and analyze theories that view sovereignty in purely normative 
and juristic terms as well as the ones based on a positivist and empirical footing. 
Having analyzed the normative theories on “what ought to be”, the understanding 
of sovereignty based on empiricism is offered; it is a view of sovereignty based on 
“what is” in a given historical context. This positivist understanding of sovereignty 
will be explained with the help of two guiding principles— histoncism and empiricism. 
However, it is necessary to keep in mind that theory and practice, the normative 
and the empirical dimensions of any scientific endeavor, determine and complement 
each other in a dynamic relationship.
'The oldest reference to sovereigntycan be found in the Oxford English Dlctfonaiy which dates 
back to 12901
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When the concept of sovereignty is addressed one cannot but discern a prevailing 
conceptual confusion. Like so many terms in our political lexicon, sovereignty is 
ambiguous, broad, frequently criticized, misapplied, overgeneralized, and 
misunderstood. “Sovereignty” brings multi-tiered associations— the sovereignty of 
a monarch, the monarchical absolutism, absolute sovereignty, ruler sovereignty, 
popular sovereignty, state sovereignty, relative sovereignty, divided sovereignty, 
dual sovereignty, limited sovereignty, mixed sovereignty, positive sovereignty, 
negative sovereignty, political sovereignty, economic sovereignty, and so forth. It is 
not the objective of this paper to reconcile numerous theories, understandings, and 
contradictions associated with the concept. The objective is to give a comprehensive 
analysis of sovereignty, its continuity and change, to better understand what aspects 
of it are being “challenged” and “transformed” due to globalization, and what particular 
facets preserve status quo at the present historical moment.
Historically and linguistically, sovereignty is related to a wide range of connotations 
and associations —  it is associated with statehood, independence, supremacy, 
freedom, legitimacy, and final authority. In the abstract, it implies supreme and 
absolute power, exclusive jurisdiction, total control, and exclusive legal competence. 
Sovereignty, thus, possesses political and legal dimensions. Furthermore, 
sovereignty has a territorial dimension which denotes exclusive jurisdiction within 
or over a territory, also described as demarcated or exclusive territoriality. In practice, 
the constraints of international law dictate that sovereignty is “reducible” through 
the allocation/delegation of power or the transfer of sovereign “sticks,” (when a 
state joins an international organization, for instance).
Over the course of the centuries, the concept of sovereignty acquired various 
interpretations and usages, myths and misunderstandings. Sovereignty has many 
rich and overlapping layers which are associated with different periods and different 
historical circumstances. As a result, sovereignty is a contentious concept in political
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theory. It has developed and evolved within a certain political environment. When it 
became impossible to identify the location of sovereignty in a single person (natural 
or corporate) or a definite body within the state, it began to personify the state itself. 
Subsequently, controversies over the loci of sovereignty subsided and sovereignty 
is now thought to reside with the state. As the state evolved, sovereignty evolved 
with it and acquired various connotations and interpretations. Theorizations of 
sovereignty have undergone reassessment and re-conceptualization as historical 
events unfolded and as new political and social realities took shape.
Thus, sovereignty is not an abstract or an ahistorical quantity detached from 
reality and the people who exercise it. Sovereignty did not evolve in a vacuum or in 
some mystical, abstract environment. It evolved within a historical context as a 
result of a dynamic and changing environment. Thus, empiricism and historicism 
are the proper tools for the analysis of the institution of sovereignty. A concept, an 
idea, is like an empty container or an empty vessel, filled with different personalities 
and different contents rooted in a historical reality. What was understood by 
sovereignty in the seventeenth or the eighteenth century during absolutism, where 
the monarch was conceived as the source o f sovereignty, the supreme law-giver 
and above the man-made, positive law, would differ from a more recent perception 
of the state as the personification o f sovereignty. The state is now conceived as the 
carrier of sovereign powers, which are dispersed among various organs of the 
govemment, limited by the constitution, and other domestic and intemational laws. 
In short, the semantics of sovereignty represent a fascinating puzzle for political 
science. Truly, the acknowledgment and acceptance that sovereignty has multiple 
meanings can be liberating and enriching in explainingthis fascinating concept.
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Sovereignty as a Stabilizing and Legitimizing Force
Sovereignty is an assumption about political power, a theory based on the idea
that there is an ultimate, final, and independent authority in the political community. 
It is based on the assumption that somewhere within the body politic there is a final 
and absolute authority and no other superior authority exists outside it. Sovereignty 
is a type of legitimate authority; it is a framework for legitimization or the way of 
exercising legitimate power. Sovereignty by its definition precludes the existence of 
any higher legal authority above the state (the state being the ultimate embodiment 
of sovereignty). As an ideal, sovereignty means an absolute, supreme and final 
right o f the state to determine the lawfulness o f a ll acts done within its territory. It 
implies a complete freedom of control, which does not exist in reality. As an ideal, 
territorial sovereignty is understood as an absolute, final, and supreme legitimate 
authority within a fixed territory. In short, “a sovereign person is one who belongs to 
none other" (Frank van Dun 1998,51).
The definition of sovereignty described in terms of absolute supremacy and 
absolute power is a juristic, legalistic theorization, of what it should be. At a normative 
level, sovereignty requires absoluteness; it is rigid, static, monolithic, and indivisible. 
As an ideal, sovereignty Is an ultimate absolute authority. It is based on the belief 
that there is an absolute and final political power within the community, which 
corresponds to the internal aspect of sovereignty. This principle is extended to the 
international sphere, where no supreme authority exists over the collection of 
independent and autonomous states. In theory, sovereign states are free from the 
authority of other states. Each state is an independent and self-sustained unit, self- 
sufficing, all in itself and by itself, containing a unified legal personality, and free of 
any supervision from a higher intemational authority. In theory, states are thought 
to be fully independent, which is essential to the principle of sovereign equality of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
all states- The two aspects of sovereignty, internal and external, are complementary 
and express two dimensions of the same principle.
According to the absolutist view, fully independent states exist in the state of 
nature, and the world is essentially in an anarchical state of affairs, each sovereign 
state carrying on by itself. This community of states is an artificial, legally constructed 
concept, where essentially each state is on its own, a veritable Hobbesian wildemess. 
Needless to say, this conception of sovereignty is nondemocratic and does not 
reflect reality. The principle that there ought, somewhere in the state, to be a 
repository of absolute power smacks of autocracy and absolutism. States do not 
exist in isolation, they are interconnected and their needs are intertwined. If 
sovereignty means absolute power and absolute control, and if states are sovereign 
in that sense, then they are above the law and international law is a delusion. If 
states possess absolute sovereignty (which they do not), they cannot be above 
intemational law and bound by it at the same time. States are simultaneously the 
creators and subjects of international law after all. In short, the perception of 
sovereignty in absolute terms is full of reconcilable contradictions.
What is the source and the locus of sovereignty? Is it the king? The state? The 
parliament? The political community? The representative assembly? The 
constitution? The sovereign does not need to be an individual (king or monarch); 
sovereignty could lie in a committee, a parliament, an assembly, a constitution, a 
triumvirate, orthe united will of the people. Theoretically and historically, sovereignty 
o f die kingwas premised on the idea that all legal and political authority was derived 
directly or indirectly from the king. The doctrine that all political right and all legal 
legitimacy may be traced back to a delegation of authority by the governed (or by a 
substantial portion of them) was the doctrine of popular sovereignty. The evolution 
of the notion of sovereignty parallels the development of the modern state. 
Sovereignty, as a legitimizer of political authority, has been used by men, kings,
6
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monarchs, leaders, and states In different contexts and within different political 
parameters, to justify authority and to legitimize the exercise of power.
Inherent in the theories of sovereignty is the dualism between the ruler and the 
ruled, the governing authority and the governed, civil society and the state. In short, 
the body politic is characterized by dualism between the community and the state. 
The task of resolving the dualism whether the community or the state should be 
regarded as the sole source of legitimate power (sovereignty) is impossible and 
futile. The modem notion of sovereignty rests on the idea that there is a separation 
of powers between the state and the community. It has been accepted that in all 
body-politics it is the state that actually wields sovereignty. Within the state itself, 
political power is widely dispersed. Within a state, which is a corporate entity in 
itself, sovereignty has many sites and many locations. Even if the community is to 
be regarded as the whole or partial source of sovereignty, the state is the sole 
instrument that exercises it. In the modern context, it is a govemment that does the 
actual work of governing; it dispenses sovereign powers for the benefit of the people. 
To sum up, if  the political community is the initiai source o f sovereignty, it is further 
delegated to the state and is exercised through the govemment Thus, it has become 
conventional wisdom to associate sovereignty with the sovereignty of the state. 
The following definitions of sovereignty can be helpful in complementing the 
preceding discussion.
In Sovereignty Through interdependence Harry Gelber describes the sovereign 
status in this fashion:
Sovereign status implies, at least in principle, the delusiveness of that sovereign's 
authority within its own territory, a right to non-intervention in the affairs of one’s 
state and the equality of states in terms of status and law. It involves the unique 
right of every independent state entity to control its own destiny, without
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
acknowledging any superiorsecular authority and without undue dtemal pressure. 
This sovereign state is the protector of territorial and economic security, the provider 
of safety, continuity and stability, and the supreme lawgiver. If a state is a complete 
legal order, and the writ of its municipal law runs through its territory, it is legally and 
formally sovereign. (Gelber 1997,74)
In Sovereignty and Intemational Order Thomas May offers this definition of 
sovereignty:
... sovereignty requires the authority not be subject to, or limited by, other powers, 
it is difficult for people to conceive of several ruling bodies, however separate their 
jurisdictions, without conceiving of one of these ruling bodies as ultimately 
“sovereign".... (May 1995,288)
This realistic, practical definition of sovereignty implies that it is not plausible to 
conceive of two or three governments effectively ruling within one state and all 
claiming to be the ultimate authority simultaneously. For the purposes of order, 
practicality, rationality, and uniformity, citizens of a state need to have an ultimate 
authority in the form of one govemment that can have the last and final word in the 
multiple affairs of the state. (The state will not always have the final word, however. 
Consider, for instance, the decline in the economic power of the state due to 
economic globalization. Global market integration and internationalization of financial 
markets diminish political and economic prowess states are able to exercise.)
F.H. Hinsley thus defines sovereignty:
It is the concept which maintains no more — if also no less — than that there 
must be an ultimate authority within the political society if the socieV is to exist at 
ail, or at least if it is to be able to function effectiveiy. (Sovere/gniy1986,217)
8
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Phillip Trimble gives the following overview of sovereignty from an American 
perspective:
From an American perspective, sovereignty ultimately rests in the people. The 
protection of national sovereignty is important because national sovereignty 
incorporates the terms under which popular sovereignty was ceded to the national 
govemment. In the United States, popular sovereignty includes, inter alia, specified 
delegations and allocations of authority to different levels and branches of 
govemment; direct elections of govemment officials; popular participation in 
govemment decisions through the press, lobbying, opinion polls, legislative and 
administrative hearings; and accountability of govemment officials to the people for 
their decisions. The delegation of popular sovereignty to the federal govemment 
was subject to the terms of democratic govemance. iGlobalization, Internationa! 
Institutions, and ttie Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy 1997,1966)
As we can see from these definitions and the preceding discussion, sovereignty 
has undergone profound transformations as a concept and as an institution. It is 
evolving and will continue to evolve. Sovereignty is a reflection of a certain political 
and social reality. Broadly speaking, sovereignty reflects relationships between 
authority and political community; it underscores the state’s strength and capacity 
to impose its will on the citizenry. It is also the locus of legitimacy and accountability. 
These intricate relationships of power, legitimacy, and authority closely link 
sovereignty to the state. They are aiso a consequence of so much confusion 
associated with the state and sovereignty. In varying degrees, sovereignty is a 
source of authority, order, legitimacy, stability, security, and identity. Sovereignty is 
the power, will, and capacity inherent in the state. As Hermann Heller succinctly put 
it:
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... the sovereignty of the state is nothing more than the necessary consequence 
of its social function. The state power must be the political power which in its territory 
is supreme in regard to the law and, as a rule, the strongest in regard to power; 
otherwise it is neither a sovereign nor a state power. (“The Nature and Structure of 
the State”, reprinted in translation in Cardozo Law Reviewvol 18,1996, p. 1181)
As an organizing principle, sovereignty is the justification and the legal and political 
framework for the creation and maintenance of order and stability in the society. As 
an organizing and legitimizing force, it is predicated on the principle that a final 
source o f authority and site of supreme coercive power exists in the state, which 
reflects the political aspect of sovereignty. It also refers to the existence of a supreme 
law-making authority, which is associated with its legal dimension. In sum, the 
political and legal dimensions of sovereignty embody the intricate relationships of 
power and legitimacy within the state between the govemment and the political 
community.
For instance, political systems that are based on the principle of the separation 
of powers represent governments in which sovereignty is divided (i.e., divided 
sovereignty). In such political systems, sovereignty is dispersed between different 
branches of the government (executive, legislative, and judicial). It is not always 
the same branch of the govemment that has the final word. In the modem context, 
sovereignty is about a legitimate government being the ultimate repository of 
legitimate authority. In the real world, states are not fully but relatively independent 
In sum, in any type of state, sovereignty is shared; it is dispersed and diffused 
among many bodies and entities; it is allocable and divisible. We believe that the 
same principle applies on the intemational arena.
But how does sovereignty manifest itself as a social reality? As mentioned earlier, 
the juristic conception of sovereignty is an abstraction and a legal construct In
10
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reality, sovereignty is hardly absolute, monolithic, and indivisible - absolute power 
and absolute sovereignty are but myths. The necessities of intemational cooperation, 
maintenance of peace, the interconnectedness of states, and the constraints imposed 
by international law call for the partial relinquishment and the delegation of 
sovereignty to some international or supranational authority. In the modern context, 
our understanding of territorial sovereignty and the state as the sole carrier of 
sovereign powers is being transformed due to the powerful forces of globalization. 
Globalization and internationalization call for further allocation of sovereign powers. 
The antiquated and idealistic notion of absolute sovereignty requires careful 
reconsideration and reassessment when put against the test of political and social 
reality.
Sovereignty: A Conceptual and Theoretical Assessment
As mentioned earlier, various connotations related to sovereignty indubitably 
lead to definitional confusion. The prevailing conceptual confusion manifests itself 
in a debate, which is characterized by dichotomies and taxonomies based on 
contentious assumptions. One such dichotomy deals with two opposites. They 
represent the dichotomy between Ideal, Normative, “what ought to be"veTsus Real, 
Positivist, “what is" Can the normative and the empirical be reconciled? Is the 
dynamic between them a struggle, the antithesis between the two irreconcilable 
understandings? Is sovereignty a societal reality, a concrete manifestation, or is it 
simply a fiction, an abstraction? When we address sovereignty, do we perceive it 
as an idealized. Juristic, legalistic concept or as a concrete political and social reality, 
as an institutionalized phenomenon? Do we treat sovereignty from the position of 
natural law or positive, man-made law?
One opposing side of this dichotomy treats sovereignty as an absolute, an ideal 
construct, what it should be. The other understanding treats sovereignty as an
11
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empirical and historical phenomenon, as an evolving political institution. But even 
in light of this seemingly irreconcilable, antithetical antagonism, sovereignty should 
be treated in terms of a reciprocal dynamic between the normative and the empirical. 
In sum, this dialectical antithesis, this dualism between the normative and the 
positivist, is inherent in the evolution of sovereignty. Normativity and existentiality 
are part of our understanding of the world. To paraphrase Hermann Heller, 
existentiality and normativity o f sovereignty do not contradict each other, rather, 
they determine each others 
In short, reality and normativity, theory and practice feed on each other, existing 
in a reciprocal relationship. Sovereignty is both an evolving concept and an institution, 
where the normative and the positive exist in a dynamic relationship. Let us illustrate 
this reciprocal dynamic with two quotes from the distinguished experts on the subject. 
F. H. Hinsley offers his understanding of sovereignty strictly as an abstract concept, 
as an idea:
Although we talk of it loosely as something concrete which may be iost or acquired, 
eroded or increased, sovereignty is not a fact. It is a concept which men in certain 
circumstances have appiied — a qualify they have attributed or a claim they have 
counterposed — to the poiiticai power which they or other men were exercising. 
{Sovereignty 1986,1)
Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk retort to Hinsle/s remarks with their own positivist 
understanding of sovereignty:
 ^Hermann Heller in The Nature said Structure of the State thus defines the basis for the state 
authority and the legitimization of sovereign powers: The existentêalify and normativity of the 
constitution-giving power do not contradict each other; rather, they determine each other. A 
constitution-gwing power, which is not bound by common fundamental principles of law to the 
strata who are decisive for the power structure, has neither power nor autfmrify. and hence does 
not exisL”
12
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...it [sovereignty] reflects the evolving relationship between state and civii society, 
between political authority and the community. Hinsley, one of the foremost 
contemporary exponents of the principle of sovereignty, rightly reminds us that 
despite loose talk about the way it is acquired, lost or eroded, sovereignty is not a 
fact. Rather it is a concept or a claim about the way poiiticai power is or should be 
exercised....
Yet sovereignty is not just an idea, it is a way of speaking about the world, a way 
of acting in the world, it is central to the language of politics but also to the politics 
of language, it is part of the more general discourse of power whose function is not 
only to describe political and economic arrangements but to explain and justify 
them as if they belonged to the natural order of things. {The End of Sovereignty? 
1992,11)
Another dichotomy associated with sovereignty separates two approaches termed 
the “chunk" approach and the “basket" approach. The “chunk” approach views 
sovereignty as monolithic and indivisible. It is absolute, and not relative. An entity 
cannot possess more or less sovereignty, be more or less sovereign, according to 
this approach. Michael R. Fowler and Julie M. Bunck thus describe the “chunk” 
approach:
No matter how large or small the state, each sovereign receives from the 
intemational community an identical gift upon attaining sovereign status—a package 
of rights and duties the same as those presented to every other entity gaining 
sovereignty in that same era. {Law, Power, and the Sovereign State 1995,67)
Thus, the principle of sovereign equality flows from this conception (i.e., equality 
in law). Interestingly enough, the “chunk” approach is identical to the normative, 
legalistic conception of sovereignty, also termed de Jure sovereignty. As a legal 
concept, sovereignty is monolithic and indivisible, signifying the formai claim, the
13
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status of an entity as sovereign. In line with this legalistic “chunk” conception, as 
legal personalities, strong states and weak states have equal rights, duties, and 
obligations, regardless of their size, power or influence.
According to the “basket” approach, sovereignty is variable, allocable, divisible, 
and changeable. It is based on the “basket” of rights a particular state received, 
negotiated, or obtained, including limitations and restrictions imposed voluntarily, 
by consent or otherwise. Sovereignty could be ceded, delegated, allocated, 
transferred, diminished, enlarged, reduced, or increased, essentially expressing 
the qualitative and quantitative degree o f sovereignty, not a fixed set of 
circumstances.
As Gregory H. Fox describes:
In the basket theorists’ view, the nature of the sovereignty enjoyed by any given 
entity... is explained not simply by the status of that entity as a sovereign but also 
by the network of relations buttressing and circumscribing the entity’s capacity to 
act. When a state, for ©cample, commits itself by treaty to a particular course of 
action a cfiunkttieorist would describe that state's surrender of prior discretion as a 
positive exercise of sovereignty, while a basket theorist would regard its action as a 
qualitative diminution of sovereign authority. (Emphasis added. The State and the 
Law 1995,465)
Differences in power and resources imply (in line with the basket approach) that 
states do not possess “an equal core of sovereignty but have varied competences 
depending on the nature and quality of intemational relations" (Fox 1995,465). The 
degree of sovereignty (depending on the qualitative sum of rights and resources) 
will determine the state’s effectiveness in the actual application of power; the degree 
of effectiveness will vary depending on a state's military power, econom ic prowess, 
leadership, etc. This approach essentially underscores the actual exercise of
14
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sovereignty, also termed de facto sovereignty; It deals with the state’s effectiveness 
and its ability to efficiently apply its sovereign powers.
Here the distinction has to be drawn between equality in law and equality in fact 
(de jure vs. de facto sovereignty). Formal status as sovereign and actual exercise 
of sovereignty should be delineated in the “chunk" and the “basket" approaches. 
There is no argument that there exist strong and weak states. But from a legal 
perspective, the state is either sovereign or not States are sovereign in their status 
and their claim to sovereignty, having in possession formal attributes that satisfy 
that claim. Having ceded some sovereign powers to the International Monetary 
Fund or World Trade Organization does not make states more or less sovereign in 
their formal status or their formal claim as sovereign. They still hold the formal title 
as sovereign, they still possess de Jure sovereignty i.e. the formal claim as sovereign. 
What varies in this equation from state to state is the degree, the effectiveness with 
which they exercise their de facto sovereignty, i.e. the actual exercise of sovereign 
authority. That is why we distinguish between equality in law and equality in fact, 
that is, the normative vs. the empirical, the legalistic vs. the political, de Jure vs. de 
facto. Some states are able to exercise sovereign powers more effectively than 
others due to a set of circumstances and conditions - a country's physical size, 
economic power, wealth, political institutions, leadership, legal framework, historical 
development, customs, cultural traditions, the size of the population, geography, 
etc.
As mentioned earlier, sovereignty, as a concept and an institution, is dynamic 
and variable; it is not static. Legal, political, and economic processes are evolving, 
thus the content of sovereign rights and powers will change over time. But do the 
changes in the content of sovereign rights make states less sovereign? Whether 
they do or not might be a debatable point. The question might arise as to the point 
of reference in deciding what makes a state more or less sovereign, that is, more or
15
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less sovereign In comparison to what? There is not in existence a perfectly sovereign 
or ideal state which all other states are compared or referenced to. For centuries, 
sovereign powers have been negotiated, relinquished, ceded, delegated, taken 
away, diminished, increased, allocated, or transferred. In short, the difficulty in 
quantifying the degree of sovereignty and/or sovereign authority is self-evident.
The content of sovereignty has undergone qualitative and quantitative 
modifications to reflect the changes in a given historical context. The content of 
sovereignty has been transformed over time. The denunciation of states’ legal rights 
to torture and to wage an aggressive war changed the content of sovereignty after 
World War II. The right to wage war, which refers to one of the “sacred” rights of the 
state, has been transformed and modified. An aggressive war has been transformed 
from a natural expression of nationalism and sovereignty into an international crime. 
General acceptance of intemational human rights including the condemnation of 
genocide, murder, slavery, and torture is a political reality, which reflects changes in 
the content and the exercise of states’ sovereign powers. The denunciation of the 
right to wage an aggressive war is a prerequisite for membership in the United 
Nations, for instance. “War has ceased to be a legalized and sanctified form of 
force” (Hinsley 1986,232). In sum, without infringing on its sovereignty, a sovereign 
authority may choose to exercise its sovereignty by subscribing to such prudential 
limitations without ceasing to be sovereign (or without becoming quantitatively less 
sovereign). Such self-limitations and constraints form a major part of intemational 
law, which is developed by states out of necessity to meet the needs of states.
Celia Taylor in “A Modest Proposal: A Statehood and Sovereignty in a Global 
Age”offers a functionaiistconcepiuali^tion of sovereignty, what she terms a “bundle 
of sticks” approach. She regards sovereignty “as a combination of several powers, 
rights, and obligations just as property ownership is a 'bundle of sticks’ that are 
divisible and transferrable between original and subsequent owners” (Taylor 1997,
16
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754). She hopes that this understanding would conceive of sovereignty as “an elastic 
term”. “Recognizing that sovereignty, like ownership, contains many constituent 
elements may help explain why and how ‘sovereign sticks' can be passed to non­
state actors in the growing ranks of players in the intemational arena” (Taylor 1997,
755).
Essential to Taylor’s conceptualization of sovereignty are the formal “claim’’ 
elements of sovereignty (which were briefly mentioned in the earlier discussion). 
These “claim" elements could be grouped under the heading of de jure sovereignty. 
It is paramount to keep in mind that sovereignty and the state are intertwined in a 
symbiotic relationship. Sovereignty is the essence of statehood. A state is not 
complete without sovereignty. For all practical purposes, fundamental attributes of 
sovereignty and statehood include:
1 ) “...[Tjhe physical independence of a state continues to act as a central defining 
charactenstic” (Taylor ^ 997,759). The first element includes physical independence, 
distinct physical identity, and separateness. Demarcated geographic territory creates 
the sphere of control by one state. Existence of a distinguishable and definable 
territory is one of the claims of statehood. Notwithstanding sweeping forces of 
globalization, demarcated boundaries are still significant in the intemational legal 
structure, giving a state the ability to act legitimately within those boundaries with 
political independence.
2) Identifiable government is another essential formal element to the claim of 
statehood. “...[S]ome identifiable group must exist to represent the entity claiming 
statehood” (Taylor 1997,759).
3) The existence of a determinate population is another prerequisite to the claim 
of statehood. Agroup of people govemed by an identifiable government will comprise 
a state.
17
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4) And lastly, the personhood, whereby a state is treated as a legal “person”, 
having in possession legal rights, duties, and obligations. This signifies that the 
state has the ability and legal status to engage in transactions with other states.
These formal prerequisites confer on an entity the status of a sovereign state 
and allow the entry into the intemational community. According to Celia Taylor, 
apart from “claim” elements of sovereignty, the “exercise" elements of sovereignty 
are allocable. She distinguishes autonomy, impermeability, and equaiity as the 
“exercise” elements of sovereignty. They are the legalistic ideals of intemational 
law; in reality, they manifest themselves in various degrees. Autonomy refers to the 
freedom to act independently, to choose a course of action without constraints. Full 
unfettered autonomy does not exist today (just as it did not manifest itself in the 
past), impermeability is another ideal of intemational law, but borders have always 
been porous, especially now, during the advent of globalization. As mentioned earlier, 
equality in law does not make states equal in fact. States are not equal in size and 
power; they have different histories, economies, developmental processes, 
demographics, geography, wealth, resources, etc. Thus, the sovereign equality of 
the states is a formal legalistic construct which denotes that in theory ail states are 
equal before the law, each having an equal status in reference to other states. A 
weak state deserves as much respect for its territorial integrity and independence 
as a strong state. There is a profound difference between possessing sovereign 
rights and the ability to exercise them; it is the distinction between the claim to 
sovereignty and the actual exercise of sovereignty. It is the distinction between 
equality in law and equality in fact. Both weak and strong states possess the same 
fundamental rights and duties of self-preservation, self-defense, mutual respect for 
each others' borders, and territorial integrity.
It should be remembered that sovereignty, as an idea and an institution, has 
evolved for centuries. It is over four hundred years old in its institutionalized form.
18
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
But theorizations of sovereignty date back even to the early sixteenth century. The 
evolution and the origins of sovereignty will be outlined in the next section to provide 
a deeper understanding of its meaning and application in the modern context. We 
will shed some light on sovereignty’s colorful and dynamic evolution through the 
historical prism. Political scientists and students of the law commonly agree that 
the institution of sovereignty was formalized and institutionalized at the wake of the 
Thirty Years’ War with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). It became the 
starting point of the European state system. Here is the story how sovereignty 
came into “existence.”
The Evolution of Sovereignty 
The Peace of Westphalia (treaties signed at Osnabruck and Munster in 1648) 
ended the bloody Thirty Years’ War of religion. It marked the beginning of the new 
European political order— the modem state system based on the principle that in 
each separate state the civii authority was supreme and independent within its own 
definite territory. In short, there could be only one sovereign -  a final, ultimate, and 
independent secular authority -  within a given territory, signifying just one legitimate 
source of authority. The Thirty Years’ War of religion was fought between the Holy 
Roman Emperor and the princes who tried to contest the faith with arms. The Thirty 
Years’ War (1618-1648) originally fought between German Catholics and German 
Protestants, later involved the Swedish, the French, and the Spanish.
The Peace of Westphalia freed the princes from the yoke of the Holy Roman 
Empire and the universal Catholic authority (the Catholic Church and the Pope) - 
they gained sovereignty over faith, they were authoritative over religion. It should 
be noted that, although the 1555 Treaty of Augsburg provided the princes with 
independence in choosing faith, this settlement proved acceptable neither to the 
Protestant German princes nor to the Catholic Emperor. They continued to contest
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sovereignty over faith through arms; and the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War in 
1618 was the culmination of that conflict. The signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648 marked the acceptance of a new norm of sovereignty by contending powers. 
The princes now had the right to determine the faith within their own realms and 
could put the principle cujus regio, efus religio (whose the region, his the religion) 
into practice. Apart from sovereignty over faith, the princes also possessed legal 
and political jurisdiction within their territories.
The medieval system of Christendom with its dualism (dual rulership) and rivalry 
for divine supremacy between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope was short­
lived after Westphalia. The process of the secularization of state power was 
accelerated by the institutionalization of sovereignty, which gave supremacy to a 
secular authority within a given territory. However, deeply religious and God-fearing, 
princes and monarchs continued to derive legitimacy in the ancient doctrine of the 
Divine Right o f Kings (Ihe right divine to govern wrong”), which made them uphold 
the theocratic function. They claimed their position as the vice-regent, the 
consecrated representatives of God. A monarch (a prince) was a divinely appointed 
ruler of his community to perform secular and religious duties, thus, combining two 
functions — secular, taking care of the community (his/her subjects) and theocratic 
,i.e., being the mouthpiece of divine and natural law. The king had the divine right 
(the divine ordination from God) to make the human, positive law. The king, even 
though deriving legitimacy from a divinely instituted authority of kingship, was the 
protector of the law of the community and of the community itself. Indeed, monarchs 
used their hereditary divinity and sanctity (the Divine Right of Kings) to strengthen 
their absolutist hold on power, to resist popular unrest, and to suppress civil war 
and opposition from the community.
Jean Bodin in 1576 theorized that the sovereign power came from God (De 
Republica, lib. I, cap. 8). His idea was used by the advocates of strong monarchy to
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strengthen the Divine Right of Kings. They argued that the supreme and absolute 
nature of sovereign government authority was “further proof that it could be held 
only by a monarch who could be subject only to God” (Hinsley 1986, 132). Some 
advocates of divine monarchy and divine sovereignty continued to rely solely on its 
theocratic justification -  the advocates of divine royal power used “the concept of 
sovereignty to strengthen the older theocratic defence of the authority of the state” 
(Hinsley 1986,133). The Divine Right of Kings, coupled with the new concept of 
sovereignty as an absolute and supreme authority, prepared the fertile soil for the 
further development of absolutism and the doctrine of absolute obedience. The 
monarch’s extreme supporters of the Divine Right argued in absolutist terms that 
the sovereign monarch was appointed by God, was subject solely to God, and was 
answerable to God alone; thus, the Crown’s power was absolute and unlimited. 
These theocratic justifications of the monarch’s sovereignty notwithstanding, by 
the time Westphalian states came into existence, the increasing efficiency of secular 
political organization was accepted, and the secularization of thought and political 
activity was underway.
The modern secular state (vs. the ritualistic community of Christendom) was 
destined to become the source and the symbol of unity, and sovereignty became 
the essence of statehood. A prince, monarch, or king was endowed with a crucial 
task of state unification and was to become the source of state unity (or disunity 
depending on his/her “performance” - revolts and riots became the indicators of the 
public’s discontent).
Machfavelirs Pr/nce (written in 1513) envisaged the world as comprised of states 
that were entirely self-sufficing and non-moral entities. Monarchs were thought to 
be the source of law and all power in their realm. A single monarch had to be the 
ultimate authority within his defined territory with the authority to exclusively control 
his subjects. Machiavelli gave his monarch absolute freedom - he was freed of any
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restraint such as external religious considerations or internal customary limitations, 
which resulted in amoral absolutism.
But even after Westphalia, when newly created states were trying to return to 
normalcy after a long, savage and bloody war, complete isolation, absolute 
separateness and non-morality of every state were impossible. The necessity for 
cooperation in commercial and political spheres resulted in the rise of intemational 
law. The recognition that there was a wider international community precluded the 
existence of the state as an absolute separate and non-moral entity. This wider 
community would consist of secular, national, territorial states bound to one another 
by the supremacy of law.
Jean Bodin (French philosopher, jurist and politician) introduced the concept of 
sovereignty to the discipline of political science in his acclaimed work Six livres de 
la République in 1576. He defined sovereignty as supreme power over citizens and 
subjects, unrestrained by the laws. The sovereign was above human law and was 
the source of it. He/she was checked only by the fundamental law, the divine and 
natural law. But Bodin argued that the sovereign has the divine right to make the 
human law, divine ordination was the basis for his prerogative. Bodin was writing 
during the time when there was a need for strong, unified states as opposed to 
loosely organized feudal entities, engaged in rivalry and war.
James L  Brierly thus describes the environment in which the formation of new 
modern states took place:
... unified states were emerging out of the loosely compacted states of mediaeval 
times, and the central authority was everywhere [throughout western Europe] taking 
the form of a strong personal monarchy supreme overall rival claimants to power, 
secular or ecclesiastical. {The Law of Nations 1963,8)
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Bodin equated the essence of statehood with the unity of government. A state 
would possess a summa potestas, or majestas, souveraineté, or what we call 
sovereignty. According to Bodin, a state was a multitude of families and possessions 
that it has in common ruled by a supreme power and by reason. What is crucial to 
his conception of sovereignty is the idea that in a state there must be one final 
source from which its iaws proceed, not a multitude of independent sources. The 
essential manifestation of sovereignty was the power to make the laws, and since 
the sovereign makes the laws, logically he cannot be bound by the laws that he 
makes. Thus, he is above the laws that he makes. Bodin made the sovereign a 
legislator, which was a new idea at the time. It is important to emphasize that, 
although Bodin’s sovereign was above the positive man-made law that he was the 
source of, his sovereignty was constrained® and bound by divine law, the law of 
nature or reason, the law that is common to all nations, the laws of the government, 
the property rights of citizens, and customary law.
James L  Brierly further comments how Bodin’s conception of sovereignty was 
misunderstood and distorted over the course of time: “Sovereignty for him was an 
essential principle of internal political order” (Brierly 1963,10). Some theorists thought 
of Bodin’s monarch as an absolutist, having in his possession sovereign prerogatives, 
which manifest themselves in supreme, absolute, incontestable, and unconditional 
authority. Later writers distorted Bodin’s theory into a principle of intemational disorder 
and used it to prove that, by their very nature, states are above the law. One of 
these distortions was the tendency to identify sovereignty with absolute power above 
the law. It might have been an easy mistake to make because Bodin did go too far 
in theorizing that the supreme power of law-making must always be concentrated
'  Bodin, ‘White an absolutist in the internal aspect of sovereignty, viewed external sovereignty as 
subject to the Law of Nations," writes Borchard (1924). See in History of PalltKsU Theories, ed. 
Merrtam and Barnes, 1924, p.125.
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in a single hand. Another distortion of Bodin’s ideas claimed that a state was above 
the law in its relations to other states. Bodin’s government is “one in which the 
highest power, however strong and unified, is still neither arbitrary nor irresponsible, 
but derived from, and defined by, a law which is superior to itse lf (Brierly 1963,9). 
Bodin’s sovereign was intended to be “a constitutional ruler subordinate to the 
fundamental law of the state" (Brierly 1963,11-12). Essentially, Bodin’s sovereignty 
was limited, and he argued not for an absolute but a limited or constitutional form of 
monarchy.
Hugo Grotius (Dutch scholar, theologian, jurist, and statesman) wrote one of the 
most influential books of all times in 1625. He was writing his masterpiece On the 
Law of War and Peace against the background of the Thirty Years' War. He was 
imprisoned in 1618 but later escaped to Paris. His De Jure belli et pads published in 
1625 laid the foundation and became the recipe for the Treaty of Westphalia. He 
envisioned a world comprised of internally and extemally sovereign monarchs, united 
only by a natural law, which was valid even if there were no God. Grotius also tried 
to reconcile the inherent dualism between the ruler and the ruled by arguing that 
the ruler’s sovereignty was the personification of the sovereignty of the people. He 
drew a line between morality and law, and argued thatthere was a distinction between 
natural and positive law, where positive law was derived from the will and practice 
of sovereign states. Later, the dualism between the ruler and the ruled (the state vs. 
civil society) was treated and reconciled in different ways. The proponents of popular 
sovereignty placed sovereignty with the People, the advocates of double sovereignty 
make the ruler and the people each theownerof oneof two sovereignties; in theories 
of limited sovereignty, the people retained the ownership of certain rights that limited 
the Ruler's sovereignty. Grotius believed in a strong monarchy but with limitations 
imposed by natural law. However, the fundamental law of higher binding force (the
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divine and natural law for Bodin, and natural law for Grotius) was no defense to the 
rise of absolutism.
Absolutism became the extreme expression of the doctrine of absolute 
sovereignty, which implied “the complete freedom of the state from the control of 
any higher power claiming authority to regulate its acts" (Fenwick 1948,29). Thus, 
there was this chimerical community of sovereign monarchs who were above the 
law in their own states as well as above the law in their mutual relations. This 
doctrine became a convenient argument to justify arbitrary conduct in the name of 
independence. Thus, a doctrine of legal anarchy developed from this line of 
reasoning. Absolute sovereignty implied omnicompetence and omnipotence.
Thomas Hobbed conception of sovereignty, depicted in Leviathan (1651), came 
to be associated with pure absolutism and totalitarianism. Hobbes, an English political 
philosopher, was writing his masterpiece against the background of the civil war 
and general political upheaval. Like Bodin and Grotius, he believed in the necessity 
for a strong sovereign. For Hobbes, sovereignty was an essential principle of order. 
But he took his vision to the extreme. Hobbes did not depict sovereignty from a 
legal perspective, as did Jean Bodin. Hobbes’ absolutism deemed the sovereign as 
the holder of the strongest power in the state. It conceived of the law as man-made, 
as “the manifestation of a ruler’s superior will" (Brierly 1963,12). The tradition of the 
Roman law only reinforced the idea. According to the Roman legal tradition, the will 
o f the prince was the law. Hobbes identified sovereignty with might and power. 
Where Bodin identified it with legal right and supreme law-giving authority, Hobbes 
believed that might, power, and strength made the sovereign. He believed that men 
needed for their security “a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their 
actions to the common benefif (Leviathan 1651, ch. xvii). The person or body that 
possesses this power, no matter how it had been acquired, is the sovereign. James 
L  Brierly thus describes Hobbes’ vision; “Law neither makes the sovereign, nor
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limits his authority; it is might that makes the sovereign, and law is merely what he 
commands” (Brierly 1963,12-13).
According to the Hobbesian scheme, the sovereignty of the state was absolute, 
unrestrained, unlimited, irresponsible, omnipotent, and concentrated in a single 
center. It was unlimited, unrestrained, and omnipotent because how can the power 
that is the strongest be limited by anything outside itself? And this is how Hobbes 
pictured the relations of sovereigns with each other.
In all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their 
independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; 
their forts, and garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual 
spies upon their neighbors; which is the posture of war. {Leviathan 1651, ch. xlli)
This is a veritable Hobbesian wilderness, where everyone is against every one, 
and where sovereigns enjoy unfettered independence internally and externally.
Great minds such as Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes saw the need for a strong 
unified authority against the background of unrest, civil war, bloodshed, and upheaval. 
Their writings reflected the realities of their times, but they also offered a vision. 
Bodin, Hobbes, and Grotius are usually associated with theories of absolute 
sovereignty. But it was Hobbes, more than any other philosopher, who endowed his 
sovereign with supreme authority over all matters. Having said that, we have to 
accept that absolute sovereignty (i.e., supreme authority over all matters) is but a 
theory, a myth, although formulated by such a great thinker as Thomas Hobbes.
John Locke (1632-1704) and later Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) were 
writing during the advent of constitutional governments. They were the harbingers 
of a novel idea of popular sovereignty, where the people as a whole were the 
sovereign; thus, sovereignty lay with the united will of the people. For Locke, the 
authority of the state was derived from the individual, and its powers were the sum
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of individual rights. Rousseau took this idea further and focused on a notion of 
rights which led to the omnipotent sovereignty of people. Rousseau’s vision of 
sovereignty lies in the idea that supreme authority lies with the united wili of the 
people. Generally speaking, the Enlightenment idea of popular sovereignty rests 
on the belief that sovereignty resides in the political community.
Political Versus Legal Aspects of Sovereignty 
Is sovereignty a political or a juristic concept? It is both. The distinction between 
legal and political authority within a state is partly the reason thatthere is a prevailing 
confusion whether sovereignty is a politicai or a Juristic construct. The legalistic 
definition of sovereignty is described in terms of supreme iegai authority or a supreme 
law-making power. This definition could be traced back to Jean Bodin. Bodin 
described his sovereign as the supreme legislator, the creator of all man-made law, 
i.e. the highest iegai authority. Bodin introduced sovereignty as a formal juristic 
concept, it was the quality, the legal right of a single “personal monarch entrusted 
by the constitution with supreme authority over the ordinary laws of the state" (Brierly 
1963, 45). From Bodin’s writings, sovereignty, as a juridical (legalistic) concept, 
evolved into supreme legal authority or a supreme law-making power.
One of the essential characteristics of the state falls within the juristic category 
— the state is regarded as an instrumentality for the creation and enforcement of 
law. The juristic doctrine of sovereignty ascribes to the sovereign state the attribute 
of legal omnicompetence. Sovereignty under the rise of absolutism came to be 
regarded as power absolute and above the law. Hobbes described his sovereign 
as the strongest, mightiest authority. According to his construct, the actual power of 
the sovereign (political or legal) has no limits. Viewed as a legal construct, sovereignty 
belongs to the sphere of jurisprudence and should be identified with legal right; the 
sovereign should be conceived as the highest legal {lasu-makmg) authority.
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Is sovereignty a political concept? How can we identify the strongest power? 
Viewed in terms of coercive power and strength, sovereignty then rightfully belongs 
in the political sphere. Intemational lawyers and political scientists can hunt and 
search for the location of sovereignty either in jurisprudence or in the political realm.
The fact is that sovereignty has become both a political and juristic concept, and 
it should be understood and analyzed as such. That is why we make a distinction 
between de jure and de facto sovereignty, mainly a legal and political distinction. 
Thus, we can distinguish between the format claim to sovereignty vs. the actual 
exercise of sovereignty. The de Jure sovereignty {the iegai right to command and 
make iaws) is the formal claim, and de facto sovereignty {the ability to command, to 
enforce and to apply coercive power) is the actual exercise of sovereign power. It is 
well-known that legal power cannot survive long estranged from coercive power. In 
sum, legal sovereignty vs. de facto sovereignty is the distinction between legal and 
political aspects of sovereignty. Sovereign states have the right, by definition, to 
induce compliance through coercion. But can they always exercise that right in 
practice? Do they always have that ability? That is another issue.
Internal and External Aspects of Sovereignty. Myths and Realities.
According to conventional intemational law, it is possible to distinguish between 
intemai and external sovereigntywhich comprise the totality o f nationaf sovereignty. 
The state, as the holder of sovereignty and as a legal intemational person, possesses 
territorial and personal supremacy. It signifies that the state has immunity from 
extemal interference and possesses supreme authority within its borders and over 
its citizenry, both domestically and abroad, internaisovereigntysigndies that a state 
is free to manage its affairs without interference. A state can design its govemmental 
institutions to achieve its goals. It can adopt a constitution and write laws to suit its 
needs, it can levy taxes, organize the military, pass rules and regulations to determine
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property rights, personal rights and liberties of its citizenry, and so on. It can regulate 
the conduct of its citizens and dispose of its resources to realize the purpose for 
which the state exists.
A sovereign state is the master of its domain, figuratively speaking. I n theory it is 
subject only to limitations imposed by a domestic constitution, treaties signed with 
other states or by the rules of general intemational law, i.e., the doctrine of the legal 
equality of the states, the right of self-defense, the principle of comity and respect 
for other states, and so on. Generally speaking, interference from other states (direct 
or indirect) would violate the sovereignty of a state. But if the states are wholly 
autonomous and no outside authority is above them, intemational relations have 
the appearance of anarchy. It does not imply that the Hobbesian wildemess really 
exists, where intemational cooperation is nonexistent, and where chaos, riot, and 
violence prevail. (Remember, Hobbes himself admitted that his theory was but a 
construct.) Extemal independence simply implies that there is no higher government 
or higher authority. Internai and extemal aspects of sovereignty are complementary 
and coexistent.
Extemal sovereignty relates to the conduct of foreign affairs. In theory, a state is 
free to conduct its foreign affairs the way it sees suitable without any supervisory 
control or interference from other states. This freedom allows a state to fulfill 
obligations assumed at the signing of treaties with other states. As mentioned above, 
the conventional definition of sovereignty refers to the supreme, independent, and 
final authority. It is the attribute of a state that refers to its rigfit to exercise complete 
Jurisdiction over its own territory. In intemational relations, states as sovereign units 
have the right to be independent and autonomous with respect to other states. 
States may differ in their power, but, as sovereign entities, all are legal equals.
Very often sovereignty and independence are used synonymously and 
interchangeably. The juristic conception of independence means “freedom from
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the influence, guidance, or control of another or others” {American Heritage Dictionary 
1992, 3rd edition, 917). In practice, a state may be strongly influenced or even 
coerced by other state or non-state actors. Take, for instance, the overwhelming 
leverage the Intemational Monetary Fund exercises when it provides conditionality 
loans to developing countries. A borrower state delegates (or surrenders) its 
sovereignty when accepting a conditionality loan. And this is just one of many 
examples. Needless to say, the concept of total political independence does not 
correspond to reality. A state can pass “sticks” of political independence to other 
entities (international or regional). A state, signing a treaty, partially relinquishes its 
sovereignty by self-imposing limitations and restrictions (what has been termed 
auto-limitations).
Absolute sovereignty is nowhere to be found, it is a myth, an abstraction, a 
construct. In actuality, we have relative, limited, partial, dispersed, or divided 
sovereignty. We have states that relinquish a measure of their intemai and extemal 
sovereignty because of the treaties signed with other states and due to the limitations 
imposed by the rules of international law and international custom. The subsequent 
allocation of power is not an accident, it is based on concrete circumstances of the 
intemational community and the need for cooperation. To paraphrase John Donne, 
no state is “an island entire of itself;” every state is “a piece of the continent, a part 
of the main.”
Traditionally, the inter-national (i.e. inter-state) system has been characterized 
as “a system of discrete autonomous entities based on their defined territories, 
each exercising plenary authority over persons and things in that territory” (Schachter 
1997,7). It is also well accepted that the juridical and abstract conception of a state 
possessing absolute sovereignty falls short of reality. From Oscar Schachter:
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No State, not even the most powerful, is wholly autonomous, free of constraints 
and Influences from outside its borders. Nor is its autonomy (orsovereignty) absolute 
in law. it is limited by intemational law, which in the prevalent positivist conception 
is viewed as the collective expression of sovereign wills. States are equal in law, 
with the same rights and duties, but they of course vary widely in size, power, and 
values. There have always been weak and strong states. (Schachter 1997,7)
In short, absolute sovereignty is a myth which is unrealizable and impractical. 
Domestic constitutions and intemational agreements define the scope and put limits 
on the exercise of sovereign powers. The theory of absolute sovereignty is 
misleading, inaccurate, and antiquated at best It has been the cause of confusion, 
misperception, and justification of totalitarianism. If sovereignty of the state only 
denotes supremacy and absoluteness, then the whole body of intemational law 
would be a delusion. All attempts by scientists to reconcile the existence of 
intemational law (of which states are the subjects) with the doctrine of absolute 
sovereignty are doomed to failure. The way out of this conundrum is to abandon 
the antiquated version of sovereignty as absolute. Whether one might believe that 
international law is the law above the states or between the states; whether 
intemational law has primacy over municipal law or vice versa {monist vs. dualist 
approach); whether it is a law of coordination or subordination, sovereignty is always 
limited and relative in nature, and the state is never fully independent and supreme 
within the domestic or international realms.
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CHAPTER II
THE NATION-STATE — FULLY SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT?
The history and the development of sovereignty is deeply intertwined with the 
evolution of the state. It is the history of man-made institutions that society has 
inherited since ancient times. Sovereignty and statehood, regarded as the 17th- 
century European creations which became formalized and institutionalized at 
Westphalia in 1648, extend their roots into the distant past, into the Greek and 
Roman traditions.
What is a state? What is meant by statehood? Statehood is a quality that makes 
an association of human beings a state. It is said that the state is the strongest 
human association which performs essential stabilizing and legitimizing functions. 
It is a comprehensive framework and a fundamental organizing principle of the 
world order. Definitions and theories of the nation-state abound in political science 
and Jurisprudence. We do not have ample space in this thesis to outline all of them. 
Definitions will be used that have relevance and substance for the subject at hand. 
Over the centuries, the concept o f the state has undergone a profound 
transformation. As F. H. Hinsley describes:
What was once equated with the monarch, or with some physical body of men 
who exercised rulership, has acquired an impersonal, a legal, even a metaphysical 
connotation since the rise of legislatures, the expansion of electorates and the 
emergence of modem bureaucracies began to demand that all the elements invoNed
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in the business of governing a communify should come to be regarded as so many 
organs of the state. ( Sovereignty1986,219-220)
What are the characteristics that make a state a legal “person”, a Juridical 
“personality,” in the true legal sense of the term? Public international law outlines 
the following components that comprise formal requirements of statehood. First, a 
state must occupy a certain fixed territory over which it exercises an exclusive 
Jurisdiction. As long as a state retains identifiable physical territory, it has its physical 
independence. Secondly, a state must have a people (other terms are used 
intermittently such as a population, a political community) whose existence helps 
bring about the state itself. Thirdly, a state must have an assurer of order and stability. 
That function is entrusted with a govemmentwhich performs as an internal stabilizer 
within the territory and fulfills international obligations. And, lastly, the fourth essential 
component is so vere/ignfy which signifies an ultimate and final control over the state’s 
intemai affairs, the derivative of which is independence from higher or outside control.
The conventional view regards the exercise of independent politicai and legal 
authority over a definite territory as one of the essentials of the state’s existence, 
which in tum is one of the vital characteristics of sovereignty. Gerhard von Glahn 
calls it “the ability to regulate its intemai affairs without outside interference or control... 
This necessary ingredient, independence, must be as absolute as the modem legal 
order of the world permits it to be: even nominal subordination to an outside 
govemmental authority must be absent” (Von Glahn 1970,65).
As a legalistic, juristic concept (which is an ideal) a state is a supreme legislator 
and no authority legislates over it. A state viewed as a legalistic concept is a body 
possessing legally supreme or sovereign legal power. The term ‘state’ denotes the 
political entity which possesses the law-making authority and the right to command 
its coercive machinery. The state is the sole source of legality and performs a
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legitimization function. It creates and validates laws of the land through its law­
making bodies and enforces them through its coercive machinery. But the state no 
longer possesses the monopoly over the legislating function in many cases even 
within its own territory due to globalization and intemationalization (this point will be 
discussed in the next chapter). As a result of certain globalizing trends, the historical 
unity of law and state is called into question.
Hal Draper thus elaborated the characteristics of the modem state: 1) the state 
exercises power over a territory; 2) it wields power through institutions or instruments 
of coercion; 3) it is financed through taxes imposed upon its citizens; 4) it maintains 
its power through the establishment of a bureaucracy, which stands apart from and 
above the population as a whole. (Draper, 1977)
Max Weber defined the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims 
the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber 
1958, 78).
Westel Willoughby gives his definition of this much debated concept: “...by a 
state is understood a group of human individuals viewed as an organized corporate 
community over which exists a ruling authority which is recognized as the source of 
commands legally and, in general, ethically, binding upon the individuals composing 
the community" (Willoughby 1924,3).
Amos Hershe/s definition of the state is both functionalist and realistic; it reflects 
the realities of the political and social environment, it views the state and sovereignty 
not in absolute but relative terms. He defines the state as “ a permanent association 
of people politically organized upon a definite territory and habitually obeying the 
same autonomous govemment" (Hershey 1927,158). Hershey outlines “essential 
and distinguishing characteristics" of the state which include “ a people permanently 
organized for political purposes, i.e., the maintenance of law, liberty, and a relative 
equality of opportunity as conditions necessary for individual and social well-being.
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A definite territory containing inhabitants... and resources.... A certain degree of 
sovereignty or autonomy and independence (i.e., relative freedom from a higher or 
an extemal control), and a govemment which is habitually obeyed" (Hershey 1927, 
159).
As mentioned earlier, legal and coercive/political power cannot survive long 
estranged or detached from each other. Legal and political aspects of sovereignty 
find their embodiment in the state. As F.H. Hinsley succinctly puts it:
...no political or legal system can function unless it possesses coercive machine 
with which it can ultimately enforce compliance with the decrees of the regulating 
authority, that authority, whether it be notional or tangible, is by definition the state, 
and it is the concept of sovereignty which authorizes andjustifies its acts. (Emphasis 
added. Sovereignty\986,223)
From the point of view of intemational law, a state has a iegai corporate personality 
of its own. Having a legal identity implies that a state is subject to iaw. As a sovereign 
and independent entity, a state possesses rights, privileges, and duties attached to 
that status. The Fundamental Rights and Duties of States include:
-  the right of self-preservation;
-  the right to preserve the integrity and inviolability of its territory;
-  respect for territorial inviolability (integrity) of other states;
-  the right of independence;
-  the right of defensive war,
-  the right of legal equality,
-  the right to respect;
-  the right to commerce; and
-  the right of jurisdiction.
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From these follow the duties such as to observe treaty obligations, to abide by 
rules and principles of intemational law, the duty to respect another state’s territory 
and integrity, to name a few.
Transformation of Sovereignty and the Nation-State 
It seems in vogue among political scientists to talk of the transformation of 
sovereignty and the nation-state. Vogue and fashion aside, it is the fact that 
sovereignty is being transformed due to the powerful forces of globalization. Does 
globalization change the meaning and the purpose of the state? Is the nation-state 
declining, withering away, disappearing? Has the state completely exhausted its 
usefulness? Does the state still count?
Though in its “transformed” capacity, the state is far from “dying.” In fact, it is 
much “alive,” although some of its economic powers have undergone profound 
transformation. Take, for instance, the state’s “weakened” (or modified) position in 
international trade and investment areas. Critics of the state hastily equate 
“transformation” and “change” with “death” and “decline.” Conceptual short­
sightedness of this sort does not help any rigorous scientific endeavor. The state 
has undergone changes due to globalization and institutionalization, that is a fact. 
But that does not automatically render it obsolete; that does not mean that political 
science is ready to relegate the nation-state to obscurity and painful oblivion. 
Intellectuals can theorize from high planes and from their ivory towers, often 
obfuscating reality, but people on the “ground” still look up to the state for protection, 
order, and stability.
The debate over the demise or survival of the state is closely linked to the debate 
over the end or relevance of sovereignty. If the state is in “demise”, then sovereignty 
is following suit. Subsumed within that debate is the dichotomy between the critics 
and defenders of sovereignty, which essentially reflects the struggle between
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conflicting ideologies. When the role of the state is addressed, two dichotomous 
positions are distinguishable. One of the positions could be placed under the rubric 
of the “decline-of-the-state” camp. The other position could be termed the 
“supremacy-of-the-state” camp. “Decline-of-the-state" proponents declare 
globalization and intemationalization the ultimate assassins of the state. This view 
posits that the state-centric model of the world order should be discarded as 
outmoded and useless. They point to the formation of a new world order -  a 
borderless global village characterized by a global system of law and global 
federalism.
The “supremacy-of-the-sfate’'theorists emphasize that the state is and will remain 
the principal actor in the international arena. The formation of new states after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc, claiming statehood and sovereignty, 
points to the relevance of the state. The continued fight of the Palestinians, Basques, 
the Quebec province, and the Kurds for autonomy and independence only shows 
that the claim to formal statehood matters. How can both of these contradictory 
views be true? How can the state display irrelevance and continued significance at 
the same time? The fact is, both positions reflect certain facets of reality in the 
modem world. They also reflect various changes on the international stage.
The interconnection o f states has always been recognized as a fact, since the 
states were created. Isolation has never been practical or beneficial. However, 
globalization and intemationalization change the dynamic between state and non­
state actors on the intemational stage. Instant global communications is a reality. 
Whether national governments recognize it or not, money traders grasp the 
possibilities by trading over a new global electronic infrastructure, regardless of 
national boundaries. These powerful economic players have launched a new 
international monetary system governed by the Information Standard. Rapid 
advances in technology, instant communication, increasing openness of deregulated
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markets, and the mobility of capital usher new powerful non-state actors to the 
world stage. The importance of powerful non-state economic actors is also a fact 
and should be recognized as such, especially at this juncture. Technology, 
deregulated markets, financial flows, and instant communication modify the dynamic 
in the areas where the state is perceived as “weakened" or losing its pertinence.
But because the economic power of the state is being transformed by the forces 
of globalization, the state is hastily declared entering the state of demise, decline, 
on its way out, or simply dead. “Demise-of-the-state” proponents take this view to 
the extreme. Recent revolutionary innovations in communications, they claim, have 
linked the states and their operations so much that national boundaries will be 
increasingly insignificant and will eventually disappear. They further argue that the 
global flow of goods and services and mobile capital will deprive the state of its 
ability to exercise independent control traditionally within its realm. Metaphors and 
the declarations of this sort abound. “The decline of the state” theories declare the 
state an entity that has lost its salience and relevance in the modem world. It is a 
bygone, a historical relic relegated to the past, a vulnerable and weakened creature 
of no use for the present or the future. An oversimplification? Indeed. But it is not 
just the state that is being buried alive. Sovereignty is being buried in the same 
coffin.
Sovereignty and the state are proclaimed to be tired political orthodoxies. The 
end of sovereignty is inevitable, announce the critics; sovereignty is pronounced 
lost or eroded. But if  the state is dying, what element of it is dying? The term 
“transformation” could be more appropriate. And again, transformation does not 
imply death, irrelevance, or a complete loss of control. The intemational world order 
has been going through profound transformation due to globalization and 
revolutionary technological innovations; thus, the state and sovereignty are subject 
to change and transformation along the way. The transformations, caused by the
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increasing interdependency and the integration of the world, does not render the 
state and sovereignty obsolete. The state and sovereignty, viable political and legal 
institutions, manifest resilience and persistence, and retain their vitality in the modern 
era.
As mentioned earlier, the modem state is the repository of sovereignty, it is the 
site and the locus of sovereignty. The state is the vehicle through which sovereignty 
is exercised. It is said that sovereignty is the essence of statehood. What is the 
state of the state in the modem era? When we talk of the transformation of the 
state, we understandably refer to the transformation of sovereignty as well. They 
are being transformed in tandem. (In terms of the causal relationship, it would 
probably be safe to attribute the cause to the state, and the effect to sovereignty.) 
They exist in a symbiosis characterized by the dynamic of exchange and interplay. 
They are dynamic, not static. The state is a fundamental human association that 
serves an organizational, stabilizing, and legitimizing purpose. The state comes 
into existence to become the source of order and stability, to carry out the social 
contract with its citizenry (the polis). The state is a living political phenomenon, an 
evolving political institution. It is a civil association and a viable form of political 
activity. Included with the fundamental purpose of creating order, stability, uniformity, 
and predictability are numerous sub-purposes. Let us enumerate the most essential 
ones (the degree of effectiveness, the exercise and the implementation of these 
functions may vary from state to state):
1) the provider of physical protection and safeguard of security of its citizens, 
defense of the territory, property, and individuals; protection of individuals and 
fundamental human rights;
2) the promotion of general welfare— the provider of the social safety net{heaWt\, 
nourishment, education, environment) through general welfare policies;
3) the provider of educational and employment opportunities;
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4) has the monopoly over the coerc/Ve (violent) force; in charge of the organization 
for the management of power and use of force; has control over the army and the 
police;
5) has the monopoly over the minting of money and coinage (money creation 
function);
6) has the power o f taxation (power to tax capital) and economic regulatory 
powers;
7) has control over the Interest rates;
8) the provider of the Infrastructure;
9) primary source and the legitlm lzerofthe laws of the land;
10) the guarantor of equal protection under the rule of law; serves as a 
reconciliatory agent between contending parties;
10) concerned with preservation and furthering the interests o f the society for 
which it Is responsible.
In short, the modem Keynesian welfare state, as we know it, performs essential 
functions which no other entity is able to carry ou t Essentially, the state is the 
source of sovereignty, identity, power, authority, legitimacy, and accountability. The 
state's existence is not in jeopardy because it still performs particular functions that 
at the present time only the state is able to carry out. The state is an important 
instrument in performing a managenal function. Furthermore, it is still a basic and 
central unit of the world order, although there are non-state actors that claim 
significance as well.
One of the purposes for which the state is created is to promote the economic 
and general welfare (well-being) of its citizens. Ideally, a state should be able to set 
its own limits on the extent and scope of its power or jurisdiction (be it a political or 
economic sphere). The economic sphere is where the state is primarily losing some 
of its traditional powers in modem times. Environmental protection is another aspect
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of governmental control that has entered the global level of concern. Ozone depletion 
and the green house effect are no longer problems in the exclusive jurisdiction of 
an individual state. It is increasingly hard for states to be sole protectors and 
guarantors of economic and environmental protection. This development requires 
states to interconnect, coordinate, and cooperate, which is one of the facets of 
globalization.
Let us play the devil's advocate and let us imagine for a minute that the state is 
“on its way out”, then we have to assume that one or several of its essential 
components are no longer viable. 1) Government Most of the states in the modem 
world have an identifiable govemment, except, of course, the states torn by civil 
war, which precludes the establishment of a legitimate authority. 2) Territory and 
physical identity retain their vitality as demarcated borders still exist, which 
guarantees the state its physical independence. 3) Each state possesses an 
identifiable population. 4) Sovereignty. States retain their relative independence 
and autonomy. Legal personhood of a state is also retained, whereby each state 
has fundamental legal rights and duties, possession of which confers a formal legal 
status on the state and guarantees equality in law. The capacity to engage in formal 
relations with other such entities flows from this legal status.
Thus, all formal components of statehood are present. Reduced autonomy or 
the allocation of sovereignty to other authoritative bodies do not render the state 
obsolete or irrelevant. Furthermore, the allocation of authority (sovereignty) to some 
other supranational or international bodies, in my view, is an active, positive exercise 
of sovereignty. Otherwise, if we blindly adhere to the doctrine of absolute sovereignty 
of a state, then intemational law. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, North 
American Free Trade Agreement, World Trade Organization, the United Nations, 
the Intemational Monetary Fund, and other such supranational structures should 
be discarded as useless. To announce the “death” of the nation-state at this juncture
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is simply to deny the existence of national boundaries, national govemments, political 
communities, and other numerous national institutions and associations which are 
viable, meaningful, and relevant in modem times.
The Delegation of Sovereignty in Intemational Law:
The Issues of Consent and Coercion.
Intemational law is assumed to be based on consent - express (explicit) or implied 
(tacit). Needless to say, this extreme positivist view of intemational law does not 
reflect the international reality. Consensual law is said to be represented by treaties 
(conventions) where a state gives its consent explicitly and unequivocally. Thus, 
the state’s sovereignty is reduced (or delegated) willingly because the state 
consented to it. There are numerous examples in intemational law when a state's 
consent is nofpresent and often imposition takes place as opposed to open, express, 
or even implied consent. One of the obvious examples is the birth of new states. 
When newly formed sovereign states come into existence, they have to abide by 
intemational customs and laws already in place. New states do not formally express 
consent. Due to the necessities of political and economic realities, and as members 
of the international community, they have to accept the existing intemational norms 
and customs as binding. Other examples of non-consensual impositions include 
economic sanctions, quarantines, boycotts, embargoes, military or humanitarian 
interventions, and withdrawal of economic assistance. Thus, the positivist myth of 
intemational law as exclusively based on consent (express or implied) is extreme 
and lacks in explanatory power.
The positivist doctrine of consent is closely linked to the 19th century nationalist 
movements (and the doctrine of sovereignty), according to which the state was free 
from extemal control and was free to give and withdraw consent based on national 
needs, traditions, aspirations, and circumstances.
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As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, sovereign powers can be viewed as 
allocable and divisible. When sovereign sticks are allocated to an intemational 
organization (for instance, the IMF), it is viewed in this thesis as the active exercise 
of sovereignty. The terms “loss” and “surrender” have negative connotations and 
are value-laden. However, they do appropriately apply to the situations when 
sovereign sticks are involuntarily surrendered to other entities. The terms such as 
“allocation,” “delegation” and “transfer” are more descriptive and neutral in nature. 
They are more appropriate in the circumstances when the state actively exercises 
its sovereignty and gives its formal consent. “Delegation" of sovereignty implies 
control, active exercise of power, conscious decision-making, and awareness. It 
also implies the ability of the state to regain the delegated authority. “Surrender” of 
sovereignty implies negativism, coercion, imposition, and loss of control. Thus, 
scientists have to be careful when using negative and value-laden terms in our 
political lexicon.
Disputes over the role of sovereignty in the late twentieth century take the form 
of a dichotomy between critics and defenders of sovereignty. The delegation or 
surrender (depending on the point of view) of sovereign authority to powerful 
intemational or non-state entities is perceived as the essence of the erosion of 
sovereignty. But this is not a new phenomenon. States have formed alliances, signed 
treaties, and joined various intemational bodies for centuries, which underscores 
the importance of cooperation even if some measure of sovereignty had to be 
delegated, transferred, or diminished. “All of intemational law represents a loss of 
sovereignty to one degree or another" (Trimble 1997, 1944). In other words, the 
delegation o f sovereignty is inevitable under the demands and constraints of 
intemational law. In the modem context, the growing importance of intemational 
law and the leverage intemational organizations exercise reflect the trend towards 
deeper interdependence. Increasing intemational interdependence is a fact, it is a
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reality. It had been a fact even before sovereignty itself was institutionalized and 
formalized. It is said that international law is a cosmopolitan enterprise. Growing 
interdependence dictates that intemational law and intemational institutions will 
increasingly affect external and internal aspects of societies.
Current transformations of sovereignty are reflections of the changes in the 
intemational world order. Traditionally, states were the recognized principal and 
predominant actors in the international arena. They made international law and 
they were the subjects of international law. Sovereignty has been the ultimate 
controlling and organizing principle o f the world order. The ascendancy of 
international institutions, environmental movements, human rights law and 
humanitarian law, frequent humanitarian interventions, and the globalization of the 
world economy pose challenges to the traditional understanding of the world order. 
The intemational milieu is changing. For instance, the free movement of capital 
across borders and the transnationalization of corporations seem to limit the 
traditional taxing and regulatory powers of the state.
However, it seems likely that all these new changes and challenges to state 
authority will proceed in the context of world order where “transformed" sovereignty 
will remain, for the time being, the basic founding and organizing principle. The 
interdependent and interconnected world (^lls for even greater cooperation between 
states in economic as well as other matters. States will increasingly see incentives 
and the necessity in fashioning advantageous economic arrangements through 
treaties and agreements, which in itself is consensual allocation of sovereignty (i.e. 
the active exercise of sovereignty). Globalization, which is essentially greater 
intemational (global) integration and interdependence, will offer more incentives for 
greater cooperation between states and through their membership in intemational 
organizations. The overwhelming trend towards a greater acceptance of a host of
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supranational decision-making authorities (GATT, NAFTA, the IMF, WTO, the UN, 
the Intemational Court of Justice, and the like) is present and undeniable.
The overwhelming exclusivity of the modem state is reduced in economic, political, 
and legal spheres. Globalization introduces shifts in power (political and economic 
alike). If we assume that states allocate some of their sovereign sticks to these 
supranational decision-making authorities and the shift in power is concomitant, 
how much ceded authority will flow to these institutions? To what sorts of institutions 
and decision-makers do we want this authority to flow? Who is going to be ultimately 
accountable and responsible for the decisions made by intemational bodies? Who 
will regulate them? States through governments? Individuals? Some global 
authority? As John Attanasio remarks:
Further impairing their public accountability intemational bureaucracies are farther 
removed from and consequently less sensitive to the needs of the people whom 
they govern. Domestic policy-makers must carefully consider to what sorts of 
decision-makers they are ceding sovereignty. (Attanasio 1995-1996,32)
The perception of sovereignty as strictly territonal has undergone profound 
transformation. Undoubtedly, sovereignty is still deeply associated with territoriality 
and national boundaries. Boundaries still matter and they still exist. But economic 
globalization, technological innovation, the unprecedented flows of information and 
capital, the ascendancy of intemational law, and intemational organizations make 
sovereignty less attached to the fixed territory. Sovereignty gets more dispersed; 
sovereign prerogatives (or “sticks”) get passed on to other authoritative bodies 
(private and public alike) in upward and outward direction. It does not make a state 
more or less sovereign; sovereignty is not something that can be permanently lost 
through mere delegation of power to an intemational organization. States exercise 
their sovereignty by signing treaties and Joining intemational organizations; states
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do not live in isolation. The need for cooperation and growing interdependence (in 
economic, political, environmental, and social spheres) naturally requires states to 
partially cede some of their powers to an intemational body. As a result, decision­
making is more diffused. Ultimately, it is the question of staying in control, being 
able to have a say in the decision-making of those intemational bodies.
The consequence of economic globalization is often the inability of states to 
have a meaningful say (not to mention a final sayl) in the decisions of powerful 
economic entities, especially capital-controlling entities such as multinationals, 
money managers, investment portfolio managers, private investors, and the like. 
This is one of the aspects of sovereignty that is being profoundly transformed due 
to economic globalization, i.e., a partial loss of control in the economic sphere. As 
we know, to be the final authority, to have a final word in decision-making is thought 
to be the essence of sovereignty. That understanding needs to be corrected due to 
economic globalization. A state cannot always be the supreme, ultimate, and final 
authority. It is only natural for the state to transfer, to delegate, or surrender some of 
its power to other authoritative bodies. The allocation of power and partial transfer 
of sovereignty is a natural development in an increasingly integrated world. Once 
again, it should be emphasized that there is nothing new about the transfer of 
sovereignty when the state exercises its sovereign powers by joining an intemational 
organization or signing a treaty through consent. What is new in this development 
is the inability o f the state to have meaningful control over powerful economic and 
political actors (private and public), the inability to regulate what used to be in the 
traditional economic and political purview o f the state. These developments take 
away the perceived consensual character of international law. As a consequence, 
states are often coerced to comply with these powerful non-state actors.
These developments can be illustrated by other examples. A state is traditionally 
thought of as a provider of employment opportunities. In recent years global markets
46
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
have helped create new Jobs and new employment sites; intemationalization of 
production and services is the case in point Take the Intemet (the Information 
Super Highway), for instance, the vast virtual supranational entity that spans the 
globe. It has spurred the creation of numerous Internet-related jobs. A whole new 
Internet culture has been created: virtual stores, markets, and industries. Service 
and information networks have been created on the Intemet. Just watch the stock 
market and the trading in the Intemet futuresl People are betting on the future of 
the Intemet. We might not see the adverse effects for some time. In the meantime, 
the Internet (the virtual reality Super Highway) creates jobs, services, markets, and 
opportunities.
There is another new development that transforms the legal aspect of sovereignty. 
The state is traditionally thought to possess the competence, legitimacy, and 
supremacy in law-making. Historical unity of law and state has been accepted as a 
fact. According to the monistic approach, there is no law in societies without a state. 
Could there be law without a state?** The traditional monopoly of the state over law­
making and legitimizing functions is being transformed due to globalization. The 
state is traditionally thought to be the exclusive legitimizer of domestic (municipal) 
and international law. In the domestic arena laws are adopted and validated through 
appropriate bodies of the govemment (legislative, executive, or judicial branches 
are involved depending on this or that particular state). Intemational law is thought 
to be the law between the states created by the states. Conventional wisdom 
attributes the creation of intemational lawto the following sources: 1 ) treaties signed 
by states; 2) customary intemational law; 3) general universal principles of law 
(recognized by civilized nations); and 4) the use of judicial decisions and the work
* To claim that there can be no law without a state would be somewhat shortsighted. That would 
impty that medieval societies of Europe of the pre-Westphalian era were lawless and had no legal 
structures. As we know, that is not the case.
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of highly qualified and distinguished jurists. The traditional exclusivity of the state 
over the legitimization function is being eroded due to globalization. The monistic 
approach which is based on the absolutism of state law needs to be reconsidered. 
In sum, the traditional perception of the sovereign state as an exclusive law-maker 
needs to be modified.
Some recent developments exemplify that the perception of the state as the sole 
law-creator is antiquated and outmoded -  WTO, NAFTA, economic arbitration, 
private economic regimes, lex mercatoha, legal business practices, and corporate 
law infuse a new dynamic into law-creation. The state still serves a crucial function 
of providing a law enforcement framework and upholding contracts and property 
rights. However, recent developments in human rights, environmental, and 
humanitarian law reflect the same trend towards the dispersion of the law-creating 
function to other intemational authorities. The state no longer holds the exclusivity 
or monopoly over law-creation, it has to co-ex/ist with other law-creating authorities. 
Needless to say, some of these intemational entities possess sovereign powers 
that states voluntarily and by consent ceded to them by joining these intemational 
organizations: the UN, the IMF, or WTO. Take, for instance, a considerable body of 
corpus Juris created by United Nations organs and the specialized agencies. This 
corpus Juris is an important instrument and part of the intemational “public goods” 
required for global trade, investment, communications, and other activities carried 
out mainly through non-state channels. In conjunction with that, it is said that 
globalization is eroding the legal doctrine of dualism which regards intemational 
and domestic law as two separate bodies of law. (Mbn/sfapproach treats intemational 
legal principles as part of the domestic law.)
A new aspect in this trend is the existence o f law-making bodies which are not 
comprised o f member-states or were not created by states. Private contracts, 
organizational routines, and business practices of global (transnational or
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multinational) corporations create new legal economic regimes {lex mercatoria), 
which are not under direct supenrlsion o f the states and make legal arrangements 
without formal consent o f the state, which it is often coerced to comply with. This is 
how Oscar Schachter describes this trend:
Global capitalism and more integrated investment and trade may bypass state 
control, but they require intemational “public goods” that go beyond the province of 
the nation-state. That includes the sets of rules, standards, dispute-settlement 
institutions, and procedures that intemational lawyers consider their province. 
Intemational markets require regimes for telecommunication and transportation, 
rules and procedures forfinancial stability and performance of contractual obligations, 
industrial and product standards, environmental protection rules and much more. 
(Schachter 1997,10)
It should be emphasized again that states do perform a very important function 
in the creation and application of these legal and quasi-legal regimes. They often 
require validation and enforcement by state agencies. A lot of these legal 
arrangements are validated without formal consent by the state. Understandably, 
as a result of these new developments, states surrender a large portion of their 
internal authority to the intemational domain but without formal consent.
These recent developments that have been outlined here require that scientific 
discourses move from statism towards pluralism. The realist school of thought might 
need to “update” its perception of the world, according to which, the state is the 
principal, the dominant, and THE ONLY meaningful actor in the intemational arena. 
Powerful non-state actors call that outmoded understanding of the world into 
question. Furthermore, the ascendancy of human rights movements and 
humanitarian law shift the focus from state-centered discourse to people-centered, 
and individual-centered legal discourses. The growing importance of non-state actors
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in the areas of humanitarian, human rights, and environmental law is shifting the 
focus away from pervasive state-centrism towards the humanization of political 
discourse. Individuals and the environment have become the subjects of meaningful 
political discourse that underscores this trend.
However, together with these positive shifts, negative effects of laissez-faire 
globalism such as growing disparities between “haves” and “have-nots” result in 
de-humanization of nations and individuals. What is meant by that? Essentially, 
markets are driven by profits and self-interest; traders and investors do not consider 
consequences, long-term effects, or the well-being of individuals directly affected 
by their actions. Thus, globalization carries both integrating and disintegrating trends, 
both humanizing and de-humanizing tendencies. Sovereignty should be analyzed 
with the vocabulary of transformation which captures growing interdependencies 
and linkages on different levels of analysis (local, regional, intemational, and global).
The next chapter will further analyze what aspects of sovereignty and state 
authority are being transformed by the forces of integration, globalization, 
transnationalization, and intemationalization. What aspects of sovereignty are 
delegated to other actors with the state's consent? What powers are taken away 
from the state unwillingly? What powers does the state retain? These and other 
questions will be addressed in the next chapter which focuses on various aspects 
of globalization and the concomitant transformation o f sovereignty.
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CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY
The growth o f a global economy in conjimction with the new telecommimications and computer 
networks that span the world has profoundly reconfigured institutions fundamental to processes o f 
governance and accountability in the modem state. State sovereignty, nation-based citizenship, the 
institutional apparatus in charge o f regulating the economy, such as central banks and monetary 
policies —  a ll o f these institutions are being destabilized and even transformed as a result o f 
globalization and the new technologies.
SasMa Sassen (Losing Control? 1996, xi-xiij
It  is tiot claimed here that globalization has touched every person, location and sphere o f activity 
on the planet, o r each to the same extent: nor that globalization is a  linear and irreversible process, 
even i f  it  has often appeared to have a Juggernaut quality: nor, in reductionist fashion, that 
globalization constitutes the sole and prim ary motor o f contemporary history: nor that territory, 
place and distance have lost a ll significance: nor that state and geopolitical botmdaries have ceased 
to be important: nor that everyone enjoys equal access to, and equal voice in, and equal benefits 
from the supraterritorial realm: nor that globalization entails homogenization and an erasure o f 
cultural differences: nor that it heralds the birth o fa  world community with perpetual peace. Indeed, 
in respect o f each o f these points the contrary has frequently been the case.
Jan Aart Scholte (GLOBALIZATION: Theory and Practice 1996, 47)
As mentioned earlier, the nation-state and sovereignty form a symbiotic 
relationship. What about the relationship between the nation-state, sovereignty and 
current globalizing forces^ This dynamic seems to have the appearance of a tide, a
51
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
wave-like motion. The dynamic between sovereignty and globalization is 
characterized by clash, challenge, contradiction, change, transformation, and 
complementarity. Globalization is similar to a swirling pool of energy that is bursting 
to get out, tired of being constrained. This swirling pool of energy makes one think 
of states, govemments, peoples, and individuals, involved or not involved in the 
exchange of ideas, information, goods, services, money, and all other media known 
to man. Globalization resembles an untamed beast, inviting but dangerous, 
potentially beneficial but hard to grasp. Everybody knows it is around and should 
be tackled with, but nobody quite knows how to tame or manage it.
One tries to avoid making a mistake a lot of students of political science make— 
writing in general about the general and not bringing any new insights into the 
scientific discourse. Here, an attempt is made to avoid broad generalizations and 
focus on a few fascinating aspects of globalization which contribute to the 
transformation of traditional sovereignty. What is that particularly dynamic dimension 
of globalization that is transforming national sovereignty in an unprecedented way? 
The answer is obvious— accelerated economic globalization and the revolutionary 
technological innovations of the last thirty years.
A prescriptive analysis of economic globalization escapes scientific rigor due to 
the indeterminacy of future outcomes. The inability to prove or disprove prescriptive 
conclusions about economic globalization precludes this type of prescriptive analysis. 
Any future developments of economic globalization have numerous variables and 
are shrouded with uncertainties. Furthermore, numerous definitions and explanations 
of globalization abound. This chapter will make an attempt to make some sense of 
prevailing definitional and conceptual confusion. Any normaf/Veanalysis of economic 
globalization appears value-laden, biased, ideological, and subjective. This thesis 
hopes to give a comprehensive framework for the understanding of economic 
globalization, both descriptive and analytical. The analysis will strive at objectivity
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and will be based on empiricism, i.e., it does not address what should be, rather 
what Is. If any normative episodes do crop in, it is when the views of others are 
quoted or analyzed. General conceptualization of globalization will precede a more 
focused analysis of economic globalization. Later in the chapter, the discussion will 
focus on current trends and developments. We will finish this chapter by outlining 
challenges and opportunities presented to the nation-state by the forces of economic 
globalization.
Contending Methodologies: Definitional Confusion
What is globallzatlorû Globalization has become a popular term, a much-used 
(and often over-used) buzzword. But what does it really mean? As a concept, 
globalization has come to mean so many things, so many phenomena, it is difficult 
to give a short and concise definition. The breadth of the concept precludes clarity 
and certainty and underscores ambiguity. As a result, conceptual confusion ensues 
and pervades most analyses of globalization. Paradoxically enough, globalization 
as a concept is so general, so wide and so encompassing, it serves its main linguistic 
function by definition — the concept is globalizing in itself and within itself. A 
comparison can be drawn with a black hole that absorbs all the matter it comes 
across. Similarly, the concept of globalization “swallows” into its “definitional basket" 
anything that has any globalizing features or any hint of globality.
Globalization has many faces, many guises and manifestations, and that is part 
of the problem. Conceptual confusion obfuscates the meaning of the term. It is a 
popular but an ambiguous word. WHAT ARE the many faces of globalization ? What 
associations does it evoke? A concept is just an abstraction, an empty vessel, so to 
speak, it acquires body and flesh when we apply it to the real world, when we put it 
against political realities, when we feed different sorts of knowledge into i t  Though
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problematic, such abroad usage of the term demonstrates that “something important 
is unfolding in the given historical setting" (Scholte 1996, 44).
G enerally speaking, globalization denotes the process o f growing 
interdependencies and interlinkages, it denotes increasing global integration at 
d iffe rent levels, it s ign ifies the relationships o f interdependence and 
interconnectedness or\ a global level between regional, national, and international 
entities. Globalization underscores the increasing volume of transactions beyond 
government control and the growing number of entities outside government control. 
Broadly speaking, the term denotes “the extension of social relations beyond 
traditional divides, that is beyond national, state and country confines" (Scholte 
1996,46). According to Scholte’s definition, “globalization refers to the emergence 
and spread of a supraterritorial dimension of social relations” (Scholte 1996, 46).
David Held and Anthony McGrewthus view globalization in the modem context:
Globalization can be conceived as having two interrelated dimensions: scope 
(or “stretching”) and Intensity (or “deepening"). On the one hand, the concept of 
globalization defines a universal process or set of processes that generate a 
multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that transcend the states and societies 
that make up the modem world system; the concept therefore has a spacial 
connotation. Social, political, and economic activities are becoming “stretched” 
across the globe, such that events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world 
can come to have immediate significance for individuals and communities in quite 
distant parts of the global system. On the other hand, globalization also implies an 
intensification in the levels of interaction, interconnectedness, or interdependence 
between the states and societies that constitute the modem world community. (Held 
and McGrew 1994,58-59)®
: Their article could be found in Gtdxd Transformation: Challenges to the State Systerrr. 
1994, edited by Yoshikazu Sakomoto. (See Bibliography for more information on the source)
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Psychologically, it denotes a growing perception that we are more and more 
connected, a deepening consciousness that what happens in one part of the world 
may affect the rest of the planet, sending ripples across, making changes felt in 
different places regardless of national boundaries. Technologically, it means shrinking 
distances through technological innovation, technical change, and advances in 
communications. And it is even more so nowadays, when transmission of information 
can occur almost simultaneously anywhere on the planet. Instantaneous 
transmission makes the world a very small place. It adds to a deepening perception 
that the world is a single place, one planet, one location. It changes our perception 
of “small”, “big", “here", “there", and “now." It transforms comfortable landscapes 
and challenges old orthodoxies.
Deep conceptual confusion is partly due to conflicting methodologies. Jan Aart 
Scholte thus describes the battle of wits between the contenders:
Recent years have seen an important reinvigoration of contests between orthodox 
and critical knowledge around the issue of globalization... Yesterday in the lexical 
shadowlands, today the vocabulary of globally occupies a notable place In the 
everyday parlance of commerce, govemance, academe and entertainment Debates 
over globalization relate centrally to questions of social change in the late twentieth 
century. Discourses of globalization have become a prime site of stmggle between, 
broadly speaking, consen/atives who deny such a trend, liberals who celebrate its 
presumed fmits, and critics who decry its alleged disempowering effects. (Scholte 
1996,43)
Liberal ontologies portray a rosy, over-optimistic picture of globalization as a 
homogenizing force that will make the world a better place and will bestow bounty 
on everybody. This over-optimistic view might appear remarkably short-sighted in 
view of deepening disparities, inequalities, and the widening gap between the “haves"
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and "have-nots." Liberal camp believes in the increasing irrelevance of the nation­
state in the economic sphere. Liberal discourse offers the interpretation of 
globalization as a homogenizing, equalizing, universalizing, balancing force that 
will bring prosperity, peace, democracy, and freedom to all peoples of the world. 
Arguably, it could be assumed that global capitalism in Western disguise (as one of 
the manifestations of globalization) does carry a certain homogenizing quality in 
economic relations and interactions. However, it is not yet apparent, for we have 
no empirical evidence at our disposal, that it brings prosperity and equality to all the 
peoples of the world. It is not evident that global capitalism is inherently beneficial, 
as some liberals portray. It is not evident that Westem consumerism, commercialism, 
and capitalism are accompanied by political democracy.
Some liberal theories decry the usefulness of the sovereign state against the 
sweeping forces of economic globalization, i.e., global financial markets and the 
global corporate economy. They announce the death of the state and the end of 
sovereignty. The state is presented as a casualty, a victim of globalization, and 
globalization is viewed as an all-determining force that dooms the state to death. 
Interestingly enough, they do not offer any plausible or attainable alternative to 
state authority. It should be remarked in passing that a global state is not in existence 
or anywhere near completion. The nation-state still performs very important functions 
that markets are not and will not be willing to take on. (The analysis of these issues 
will come later in this chapter.)
Conservative discourse, on the other hand, might appear too categorical, out-of- 
date and too dogmatic in its denial that globalization is actually happening. Realism 
with its “power politics" orientation and pervasive statist model keeps clinging to the 
idea that intemational relations are still power relations between Westphalian 
territorial states which are the dominant actors on the intemational arena. According 
to the Realists, intemational relations are reducible to inter-state power struggle
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and high politics. The world is viewed in terms of polarities (unipolar, bi-polar, multi­
polar). In its dogmatism, Realism appears deterministic, ahistorical, and static. The 
growing importance of intemational organizations and human rights movements, 
the ascendancy of the Greens’ movements and deepening environmental concems, 
the importance of multilateral military alliances (NATO), the growing independence 
of multinationals and financial markets, Pan-lslamism, religious resurgence, and 
terrorism  — these international movements, m ultilateral organizations, 
nongovernmental and non-state actors assert their rightful place in the intemational 
arena. The world is not conveniently mapped in terms of fixed territorial entities we 
call nation-states. Paradigmatic shifts blur the traditional lines of the past, the 
conventional dichotomies between “here” and “there”, “internal" and “external”, “us” 
and “them” are not as clearly defined as the Realists wish them to be.
Furthermore, it might be noted that Realists should pay more attention to such 
technological innovations as electronic space (cyberspace). The growing importance 
of cyberspace in our everyday lives is undeniable. It exists on a “supraterritorial" 
plane, it does not respect national boundaries, i.e. it defies territoriality as we know 
it - it is timeless and infinite. Our understanding of three-dimensional territoriality, as 
we know it, is enhanced and transformed by the existence of cyberspace. 
Cyperspace belongs to everybody and nobody; no particular state can claim 
ownership to this revolutionary technology, and that is a globalizing idea in itself. 
Global networks (via digital computers, satellites, telecommunications) can connect 
people anywhere and everywhere in the world almost simultaneously. Realists cannot 
turn a blind eye to “the growing number of economic activities taking place in 
electronic space. Electronic space overrides all existing territorial jurisdiction" (Sassen 
1996,5). It might be helpful for Realists to incorporate this transformative knowledge 
into Realist discourse and analyze the growing interdependencies between 
communication, technology, state and non-state actors. But that is just one of the
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many dimensions of globalization. It is apparent that Realists cannot simply overlook 
the ascendancy and the growing importance of new legal regimes for conducting 
transnational economic transactions. Multinational corporations and other economic 
transnational actors drive the globalization of the corporate economy and help 
develop global economic regimes.
In short, liberal and Realist theories have reached levels of abstraction detached 
from reality and unfit for dealing with specific issues and political realities. One 
might ask how these methodologies can claim these contradicting views in the face 
of empirical evidence. The persistence, the resilience of each camp, and their 
respective theories could be ideological or a mere attempt to keep their respective 
theories “alive" to justify their existence.
Marxist/critical/radical/emancipation theories analyze globalization in terms of 
the center-periphery relationship, the North-South divide, where the industrialized 
countries maintain the relationships of dependency, domination, and exploitation 
with the developing countries. These studies focus on dynamics of class relations 
and exploitation, on psychological and cultural oppressions that attend globalization. 
They focus on growing disparities among the rich and the poor, on identity and 
community crises, on marginalization and fragmentation of communities, and 
religious resurgence. Some decry globalization as the root of all evil and propose to 
reverse it. Some see in it a powerful potential for the activation of class struggle as 
a result of growing disparities and, as a consequence, recognize the emancipatory 
power of globalization. These studies focus on domination, exploitation and conflict 
as well as class, gender, power, rich vs. poor, and center-periphery relations in the 
age of globalization.
Those who deny globalization just have to look around and they will see the 
empirical evidence in abundance. Realists will be consoled by the empirical evidence 
which demonstrates that the sovereign state is surviving and is not anywhere near
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its proclaimed death. To liberals, one can submit that the process of globalization is 
indeterminate and its outcome escapes deterministic and prescriptive predictions. 
If globalization is supposed to bestow bounty on everybody and improve the lives 
of the peoples of the world, they need to design some workable (and tangible) 
mechanisms for equitable distribution of wealth around the world. There does not 
seem to be any “trickling down" of wealth on a global scale. It is hard to disagree 
with critical discourse about disturbing tendencies of wealth distribution and growing 
disparities between the poor and the rich nations. In conclusion, we submit to harsh 
critics of globalization that the process cannot be reversed. It can be studied and 
understood and the transformative knowledge can be used to modify or alter existing 
patterns.
A Pluralistic View of Globalization 
The modem world is witnessing conflicting and centrifugal forces which, ironically 
enough, complement each other. They form a relationship of complementarity 
between globalizing forces and the nation-state. It might appear paradoxical or 
even contradictory to those who are grounding their analysis solely on the assumption 
that the state must decline and die in a globalized economy. Our theory emphasizes 
the relationship of complementarity and co-dependency in which the globalizing 
trends and the sovereign state co-exist, contend, andcompiementeach other. Does 
it sound contradictory? A political oxymoron? The realities of the modem world 
constitute a part of the evidence which demonstrates that globalization is actually 
happening and is transforming the world on many social levels. Simultaneously, 
the state is holding its ground and is being transformed in the process of globalization.
The assumption that the state must eventually decline and die in a globalized 
economy cannot be proved or disproved. But it does lead to a pervasive “global- 
nationar dichotomy that distorts the relationships that exist on different levels
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between individual, local, regional, national, and global entities. The "global-national" 
dualization is narrow and does not help conduct a rigorous scientific analysis. A 
more rigorous analysis is possible if we focus on the relationships of complementarity 
and competition between the sovereign state and globalizing trends on different 
levels of analysis. Empirical evidence demonstrates that we cannot simply deny 
the existence of these trends.
We are faced with necessity for a pluralistic, eclectic view of the world where 
supranational, transnational, and state actors co-exist, co-depend, and complement 
each other, where they are active participants in the transformations that globalization 
is bringing about. Globalization facilitates the deepening interdependencies between 
the state and transnational actors on different levels o f analysis— individual, local, 
regional, national, and global. A closer look at globalizing trends helps understand 
growing interdependencies between state and non-state actors, the relationships 
of interconnectedness that underscores their significance. In this framework, state 
and non-state actors are not analyzed as being more or less dominant, more or 
less important. They cooperate, cohabit, and compete with each other within the 
pluralistic framework of the modern intemational system. We will show that 
globalization brings about multiplicity, diversity, and plurality o f actors on different 
levels but does not render sovereignty and the state obsolete.
Further Conceptualization of Globalization:
What Is New and What Is Old About It?
Is the concept of globalization new? Is globalization a novel phenomenon? Is it 
one of our latest linguistic and social inventions? In their loose form, the ideas of 
globality could be applied to the sbcteenth or the eighteenth century just as well as 
to the twentieth century. It seems that such common phrases as “imperial reach", 
“voyages o f discovery", “coloniar and “territoriat expansion", are but the familiar
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faces of globalization during the mercantile, colonial, and imperialistic periods. The 
phenomenon is not new. These terms were used in different historical settings to 
denote the on-going historical process; as a result, linguistic innovations and changes 
in vocabulary enriched the language with new terms. David Broad gives the following 
account of the historical roots of globalization:
And the first thing we discover when we look at history is that globalization is 
nothing new. It began roughly five hundred years ago with the so-called voyages of 
discovery, which coincided with the emergence of the capitalist world economy. 
People like Christopher Columbus were the outrunners for merchant capitalists, 
who funded voyages in pursuit of new wealth in the form of bullion and tradable 
commodities. (“Globalization versus labor”, 1995, Monthly Review47 (Dec): 20(12))
Generally speaking, globalization is a continuation of a historical process. Here, 
globalization is viewed as a process, not as an outcome. It needs to be stressed 
that globalization is an on-going and unfolding process, it is unclear where and how 
it will end and what the end-results might be. From a psychological perspective, 
human beings have always looked outwards, the drive for exploration and innovation 
seems to be one of the human characteristics. The human drive to “go out there,” to 
explore, to satisfy curiosity (for whatever reasons, selfish, noble, or mercantile) 
seems to be centuries’ old. Inventions, space exploration, landing on the Moon, 
and the search for new technologies are just a few manifestations of the drive to 
explore, to defy time and space.
Globalization has been considerably accelerated in the last twenty years due to 
technological innovations and the revolution in communication and information 
technologies. But these globalizing trends were apparent in the 1840s when 
telegraphic communication appeared and when globally synchronized time was 
introduced in 1884. The first regulatory bodies with a worldwide remit were
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inaugurated during the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Such international 
administrative agencies included the Universal Postal Union (1874), the International 
Telegraph Union (1875), Protection of Industrial Property (1883), and Copyright 
(1886). Telephone calls between countries were launched a hundred years ago, 
airline services, intercontinental short-wave radio programs grew in numbers in the 
1920s. The first global broadcast was transmitted in January 1930 (with the speech 
of George V opening the London Naval Conference which was transmitted to 242 
radio stations). Global influenza killed tens of millions in 1918-19. (See Scholte 
1996, 44-48) We can see that significant globalizing trends were already on their 
way in the last two centuries, though on a smaller scale and at a slower pace (long 
before the popular buzzword was invented).
But what is new about “globalization” in the modern context? What new 
components and elements are we witnessing with ourtidal wave of globalization? 
Popular culture - music, dress, movies, fashions, images -  reinforces an everyday 
shared experience. Cyberspace and digital media, global newspapers and global 
enterprises, global factories and global thinktanks, global systems of trade, finance 
and production, global mobile telephones and communications satellites, G7 summits 
and humanitarian military operations, human rights and solidarity movements, social 
movements, transnational networks, pollutants, ozone holes, AIDS, drugs, crime, 
and the decline of Earth's biodiversity are the key phenomena of the globalization 
scene around us. The other key feature is that growing numbers of people are 
affected by globalization. Along with these fascinating changes, however, 
globalization is not accompanied by the development of a single global culture, 
global village, or a single value system. Nor is it affecting everybody to the same 
degree or the same way.
In 1981 John S. Maclean called to the academic community “to comprehend and 
explain the historical process of the increasing globalization of social relations”
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(Maclean 1981, 104).® What sounded like a novel idea then, now preoccupies 
academics of different ideologies and ontologies with the issues of globalization 
and globality. It is remarkable that such common phrases as “a global economy", 
“global financial market", “global govemance”, “global gender relations", “global 
economic regime” and the like were literally unknown until the late-1980s. And now, 
just a decade later, the ideas of globality are in our every day parlance in such 
commonplace phrases as global markets, global communications, and the like.
On December 27,1998, CNN reported on a new technological innovation. The 
company called IRIDIUM announced the launch of a new product— a global satellite 
phone. For $3,000 one can have a true global reach, be it from a tanker out in the 
sea, from an airplane, or from a busy Manhattan street. It is all within one's global 
reach, all due to six low-flying satellites orbiting the planet. Due to continuing 
technological innovations, the world is getting smaller and the distances are getting 
shorter, or what Scholte succinctly characterized as “the process of the world 
becoming a single place” (Scholte 1996,43).
This next example is even more illustrating. It is the so-called “Y2K” problem or 
the “Y2K” bug (the abbreviation stands for the year 2000’). It is well accepted that 
global networks and computer systems that span the globe are interdependent; the 
existence of these global networks ultimately underscores interconnectedness on 
a global level. In line with that, it was predicted by pessimists that on January 1, 
2000 numerous computer and information networks would malfunction on a global 
scale. Interconnections between computer systems and information networks would 
fail and collapse, which would result in catastrophic results of global proportions. 
According to the pessimists' prognosis, massive failures would occur that in turn 
would affect various businesses, industries, markets, and entities such as banks.
® Could be found in “Political Theory, International Theory, and Problems of Ideofogy”, 1981, 
Millennfum 10(2): 102-25.
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stock exchanges, supermarkets, electronics, telecommunications, governments, 
and the military. Nuclear weapons were expected to fire, and massive shortages of 
food were imminent, warned pessimists. It sounded cataclysmic, phantasmagoric, 
and smacked of the end of the world. Those of us who took an optimistic view 
predicted that these systems would get reprogrammed by January 1,2000.
The anticlimax of the “Y2K” agony resulted in minor discrepancies of a very 
localized nature, nothing of a global importance. (Needless to say, some resourceful 
and calculating businessmen earned huge sums of money, capitalizing on the “Y2K”- 
fearing portion of the population.) Was the fear of the “Y2K” catastrophe a 
manifestation of globalization? Yes, undeniably. Although global crisis did not occur, 
the fear that it might have happened illustrates the world’s interdependency and 
interconnectedness as perceived by the public. In sum, psychological perceptions 
and fears of globalization should not be treated lightly.
It could be briefly mentioned that the construction of the intemational space station 
adds to the feeling of interconnectedness. The proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction does not recognize the boundaries of sovereign states or the distances 
between national borders. These are just a few of the many facets of globalization 
on different social levels and on different levels of analysis.
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Economic Globalization
The fa c t is that, in a world in which freedom o f movement has increased, economic actors o f the 
transnational society themselves decide where to invest and locate their activities, and they do so 
not as a consequence o f allegiance relationships o r o f sovereignty issues, but after considering the 
best opportunities offered by a combination o f geography, demography, regulations (in  particular 
labor costs and environmental rules), local subsidies, quality o f the infrastructure, prospects fo r  
political stability and so on,
Jean-Philippe Robe (Global Law Without a State 1994, 46)
As it has become apparent from the previous discussion, globalization is a 
multidimensional phenomenon. We can speak of cultural, economic, social, 
psychological, and political aspects of globalization. Now let us narrow the discussion 
of globalization to its particular economic manifestations. After the conceptualization 
part, the discussion will focus on the challenges posed and the opportunities offered 
by globalization to sovereign states and national govemments.
In its economic context, globalization essentially refers to global economic 
integration. Economic globalization is also a multifaceted process. It addresses 
systems and relations of interdependencies between markets, producers, 
consumers, govemments, legal frameworks, and political institutions. At one level, 
it means the growth and proliferation of transnational corporations, also termed 
global companies, it means the growing importance of global economic regimes, 
supranational regulatory agencies, global economic entities, and international 
organizations (WTO, NAFTA, GATT, the World Bank, the IMF, the EU, Wall Street, 
the London Exchange and the like). Another aspect of economic globalization is 
the proliferation of free trade zones and export-processing zones. The increasing 
vulnerability or weakness of the nation-state in the economic sphere is another 
facet of globalization.
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Saskîa Sassen describes “the geographic dispersal of firms' factories, offices, 
service outlets, and markets” as the “global assembly line in manufacturing . .  
(Sassen 1996,7). A case in point is IBM’s personal computer that has the “Made in 
USA” label whereas 70 percent of its component parts are manufactured overseas. 
Another aspect of globalization is the trend towards the internationalization of 
services and production, and worldwide geographic dispersal. Through the 
internationalization of services the corporate services compiex has been created. It 
is the network of financial, legal, accounting, advertising, and other corporate services 
that the global corporate economy requires.
Sylvia Ostry provides the following background for the early usage of the term 
“globalization" in Its economic context:
Almost precisely at the time that the Uruguay Round was launched in September 
1986, the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations since the GATT was 
established nearly half a century earlier, the intemational economy was beginning 
a process of dramatic transformation. The term globalization was first used in 1986 
and was spawned by the investment surge of the second half of the decade... Most 
of it was in capital- and technology-intensive sectors. Hence technology flows ... 
also ecploded, increasing from an annual negative growth rate of 0.1 to 22% between 
the first and the second half of the decade. (The Nation-State in a Global/information 
Era 1997,58)
We have to analyze economic globalization by looking at it in a big historical 
picture. Recent developments, more specifically, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the Soviet bloc, have established capitalism as a global actor, figuratively 
speaking, as a hegemon in economic relations. In other words, the assertion of the 
world capitalist market has been complete. In the changing global environment the 
globalization o f capitalism is one of the key features. Thus, the Western-flavored
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variants of capitalism have been propelled into the world as perceived globalizing, 
universalizing, and homogenizing forces, bringing with them unprecedented 
globalization of finance, trade, investment, and production processes. Capital flows 
across national borders demonstrate great potential for capital mobility, whereby 
large sums of money can be transferred almost instantaneously anywhere in the 
world.
Over a hundred years ago Karl Marx predicted capital's mobility and modes of 
capital accumulation; he anticipated capital's “annihilation of space by time" 
{Grundrisse: Foundations o f the Critique ofPoliticai Economy1857-58,524). Truly, 
economic globalization has been epitomized by twenty-four-hour, ‘round-the-world 
financial markets. Global production lines span the world, global consumption articles 
circulate the world, and not surprisingly, multinational enterprises account for a 
dominant share of world production. For instance, Marlboro can boast of figuring in 
world consumption - Marlboros are distributed and smoked in over 150 countries.
What other forces contributed to the acceleration of economic globalization? It is 
imperative to mention the deregulation of financial markets during the 1970s and 
the 1980s. Furthermore, the revolutionary changes in communication and 
computation have set the stage for the increasing integration of the world economy. 
Economic policies of privatization, market liberalization, and deregulation are the 
other variables contributing to market integration and globalization. Economic 
globalization implies higher mobility and increasing flexibility of information, 
production, capital, and people.
The multinational enterprise is a powerful agent of economic globalization. It “is 
becoming the dominant funnel for trade, finance and technology flows, the key 
engines of global growth,” writes Sylvia Ostry in The Nation-State in a Global/ 
Information Era (1997, p. 60). The revolution in information technology and 
deregulation of financial markets brought about an unprecedented increase in
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financial linkages. As a result of this development, financial flows dominate over 
trade flows among countries. Global information networks provide access to 
knowledge and information that are crucial in the era of twenty-four-hour, ‘round- 
the-world financial markets.
The virtualization and digitalization of economic activity in electronic space are 
worth mentioning. Here we talk about digitalization and electronic markets that extend 
beyond national territories and achieve unprecedented volumes. The instantaneous 
transmission of money and information is possible anywhere in the world. Let us 
take the foreign currency market. It operates largely in electronic space and has 
achieved tremendous volumes — a trillion dollars a day. The virtualization of this 
economic activity leaves central banks incapable of exercising influence on exchange 
rates. Another stunning example is the creation of the NASDAQ market in 1971. 
NASDAQ is an acronym for National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations. It is a dealers' stock market that operates In cyberspace; it is an electronic 
market that has no physical location. Nonetheless, it is no less important than the 
New York Stock Exchange itself.
An unprecedented volume of retail sales (domestic, intemational, and global) on 
the Internet is another aspect of the digitalization of economic activity. In 1994 and 
1995 on-line retailing generated a combined $33 million. In 1996 on-line retailing 
generated more than $245 million. In 1997 it reached $782 million. In 1998 on-line 
retailing was over $14.9 billion. It was projected that in 1999 it would top $36 billion. 
These increasing volumes would not have been possible without the existence of 
the Internet and the global reach it provides.^
’ T^hese statistics were found on an ach/ertizing mailerfromWsard.com. an Intemetprovkier. 
(1999)
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Starting in the early 1990s, domestic and intemational economic communities 
witnessed the surge in corporate mergers (the trend was apparent on a national as 
well as a global level). The wave of mergers contributed to further integration of the 
global corporate economy. In short, corporate mergers represent another dimension 
of economic globalization. Why do companies want to get bigger? Businesses and 
capital are in a constant search for profits. But as profit margins get lower (remember 
the theory of diminishing returns), they cannot control prices in a very competitive 
environment. What they can control are the costs of production and distribution. 
Corporate mergers increase assets and efficiency levels. Diversification and dispersal 
add more flexibility to corporate structures and capital movement. (These corporate 
mergers result in giant enterprises with a vast reach, which also raises various 
antitrust and antimonopoly issues. But that is a subject broad enough for another 
thesis.)
Concomitant with that, corporate intemational mergers change economic systems 
and affect the lives of workers in various countries regardless of national affiliations. 
Due to its inherent nature, global finance and capital are mobile, faceless, indifferent 
to national loyalties and identities, and they treat all potential sites in the same 
selfish fashion regardless of national affiliations. That is an important facet of 
economic globalization— apparent indifference of mobile global capitai to national 
divides, boundaries, needs, loyalties, and aspirations.
Let us look at a broader picture. Generally speaking, inherent in economic 
globalization is an idea that capital is in a perpetual search for new markets, new 
financial opportunities, new trade, and investment sites, ultimately geared at profit- 
maximization. It is in a constant search for faster production, for cheaper labor, and 
lower communication and transportation costs with the ultimate goal of accumulating 
profits. Intemational competition has been a powerful driving force behind the 
accelerated globalization of production and markets. However, the race for profits
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and hypermobile capital do not take into account national interests or long-term 
economic and social development They are not interested in investment in stable 
jobs or job security (if they are, it is marginal and profit-oriented); they are in search 
of the most profitable opportunities around the world. The ascendancy of financial 
markets stimulates the global circulation of capital. Finance is in constant search of 
the best investment opportunities worldwide. Multinationals and global financial 
markets stimulate integration into the global capital market which makes it possible 
for money to flow anywhere regardless of national origin and national divides. They 
do not pursue any long-term social development strategy or promotion of greater 
equity. In sum, capital movement and profit-maximization are not determined by 
national affiliations or issues of national sovereignty.
Another aspect of economic globalization, increasingly mobiie production (i.e., 
internationalization of production) is simply the search for lower cost locations. 
Multinationals move production sites from one country to another whenever the 
change of site brings higher returns through lower production costs. But again, by­
products of this development are large groups of unemployed, a dwindling middle 
class, and deepening disparities of disturbing proportions. These are the many 
facets of economic globalization. But what are the myths and misperceptions 
associated with economic globalization?
Myths and Misperceptions Associated With Economic Globalization.
First of all, the myth of total economic integration and total economic globalization 
has to be dispelled. The belief in the “invisible hand" and the laissez-faire, free 
market approach has to be carefully reconsidered. The myth of the world economy 
as one open free market is misleading. According to this myth, free exchange of 
goods and services takes place and capital flows around the globe in a free and 
unhindered fashion. Markets correct themselves and the balance is restored due to
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the self-regulating and self-correcting functions that markets are assumed to 
inherently possess. Supply and demand stay in equilibrium. Any disequilibrium is 
corrected by the markets themselves without any interference or regulation. It is a 
myth and a theory, ideologically colored.
The recent crises in Asia, Russia, and Latin America show that it is dangerous to 
trust markets with self-regulating and self-correcting functions. It might ultimately 
be up to national governments to ensure effective functioning of the economic 
system. National govemments are left to balance out economic imbalances, be it 
through drastic measures or with the help of an intemational organization (the IMF 
is a case in point). Where liberals are ready to discard the sovereign state as dead 
and useless, here it rises again as the phoenix in the time of crisis and instability. It 
could be the case that the govemment itself is partly to blame for the crisis. But the 
loose structure of the global financial system tends to intensify any given crisis. In 
short, there is still room left for a national govemment to watch the markets, take 
precautionary steps necessary to avoid crises, and extend its visible hand to rectify 
the situation when the crisis does occur.
Furthermore, within capitalist economies where the rich are getting richer and 
the poor are not getting any better, it is the national govemment that uses its political 
power to build and sustain welfare systems, which compensate for the inequality 
inherent in the capitalist system. The govemmenfs task of a safety net provider will 
become increasingly difficult as the financial structure becomes more globalized 
and more interdependent. The mobility of capital created through global finance 
and the independence of global financial markets have diminished the power, the 
influence, and the control of national govemments over those systems. “The financial 
structures inseparable from capitalism on a world scale are not democratic. . . .  
History, unfortunately, suggests that the power of bankers and financial markets is 
seldom checked until aftera financial crash” (Strange 1994,247).
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The myth of economic globalization as an even and harmonizing force is another 
pervasive ideology. It implies that economic globalization brings with it a leveling 
out of uneven development. The fact is that the global financial and monetary 
structure is highly undemocratic. The myth of economic globalization as a 
harmonizing force could be dispelled with the following example. Let me illustrate 
some of the effects that economic globalization has on countries and their monetary 
policies. It is a fact that during the 1989-1994 period the US dollar remained 
appreciated against most currencies. As a result, other countries held their foreign 
reserves in US denominated assets. As Masudul Alam Choudhury succinctly puts 
it:
Thus, when it is possible for the US monetary authorities to lower its interest 
rates in the face of appreciated exchange rates, then the changes in reserve situation 
of other countries are govemed by the exchange rate mechanism. On the other 
hand, when US interest rates increase, these changes in resen/es are determined 
by US interest rates. Hence, in both cases, the globalization scene for developing 
countries remain predominated by the interest rate and exchange rate mechanisms 
of the US monetary authorities in particular and of the G7 in general. The more 
volatile these movements are the more serious are the extemal sector uncertainties 
of countries that hold their assets in the US dollar denominated assets. (Choudhury 
1996,28)
We can illustrate the undemocratic nature of certain aspects o f economic 
globalization with another example, which is related to the one mentioned above. 
The Intemational Monetary Fund holds its reserves in the currencies of the five 
member countries. The Special Drawing Rights of the IMR which is a kind of weighted 
monetary asset, a valuation basket in which all countries hold part of their reserve, 
consists of US dollars (40%), the Deutsche mark (21%), the Japanese yen (17%),
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the French franc (11%), and the pound sterling (11%).® The financial instruments 
included in the computation of the SDRs are interest rates, currency amounts, and 
the exchange rates of the five member countries. We have to recognize the dominant 
presence of G7 in all foreign reserve management structures of other countries. 
The effectiveness of monetary policies of other countries seems to be constrained 
by the exchange rate and interest rate mechanisms of the US in particular and G7 
in general. In short, economic globalization seems to be dominated and influenced 
by the powerful presence of the US and G7, like a ruling oligarchy. It does not come 
as a surprise that intemational trade, market access, financial practices, investment 
choices, and liberalization policies are heavily influenced by the industrialized 
countries, which raises the issues of the Eurocentricity and Americanization.
The widening gap between the rich and the poor is another example of the 
misperceived image of globalization as an equalizing force. Malini Mehra provides 
these disturbing statistics:
While there are many positive aspects of globalization, such as the intemational 
exchange of ideas, cultures and goods, critical attention has focused on the 
unparalleled concentration of power, wealth and resources that is accompanying 
economic globalization. In the last 30 years -  during the UN’s so-called ‘development 
decades -  the gap between the world’s richest 20% and poorest 20% has doubled. 
The total assets of the world’s 447 billionaires now exceed those of almost one half 
of humanity. {Globalization of Sustainable Societies? The Internet, FoEl LINK - 78)
» Webster's New World DMonary gives the following definition of the SDRs: "S(pecial) 
□(rawing) R(ights) is a kind of international money created by the International Monetary Fund 
to supplement the use of gold and hard currencies in settling international payment imbalamnces.” 
Third College Edition, Macmillan, USA, 1994.
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Having dispelled some of the pervasive myths of globalization, let us analyze 
other tangible manifestations of economic globalization. One of them is the 
transnationalization of financial markets and the subsequent inauguration of the 
global financial network. It is a vital process and a significant trend, and yet, perhaps, 
the least regulated aspect of globalization.
Globalization of Financial Markets 
When we talk about finance we mean “the provision of money in the form of 
credit" (Strange 1994,228).® Susan Strange defines a structure of finance as a
...market-based mechanism for the creation of credit and a set of institutions 
and enterprises set up by govemments to monitor and regulate the price relations 
between national monies, i.e., currencies. ...The intemational monetary system... 
consists in the arrangements between states for the management of relations 
between their respective national currencies, in other words, of «(change rates 
and related matters. (P. 229)
The analysis to follow will demonstrate the area of vulnerability that national 
govemments are subject to, due to the globalization of financial markets. The fact 
is that states and govemments are not in complete control over such macroeconomic 
indicators as exchange rates because global markets can disturb the decisions 
and agreements of governments. (Recent crises in Asia, Latin America, and Russia 
are telling examples.) And vice versa, decisions made by national govemments 
can disturb global financial markets as well. A recent crisis in Brazil is a case in 
point. After the govemment decided to devalue the national currency, financial
=Alt quotations from Susan Strange cx)utd be found in Gfobaf Transformation: Chalfenges to 
the State System, edited by Yoshikazu Sakamoto, 1994, the United Nations Unversity Press. 
Susan Strange was one of the œntributors; her article (Chapter 8) is entitled The Structure of 
Finance in the World System", p.p. 228-247.
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markets and stock exchanges reflected the change, as a result, share prices 
plummeted- Susan Strange argues a similar point: “conversely, intemational financial 
markets could not exist without govemments, and are subject to whatever rules 
and restrictions that states may impose upon them." (P. 230)
Susan Strange describes the relationship between states and markets quite 
succinctly in the following paragraph:
The financial structure in the world economy can thus be visualized as a hybrid 
of states and markets, a halfway house between, on the one hand, the realist 
conception of separate national societies, surviving on more or less discrete national 
economies and govemed by political institutions of nation-states, and, on the other, 
the financiers' and bankers’ perception of a single global market for monies and 
credit instruments and for financial sen/ices. In the former, it is state frontiers that 
matter. In the latter, the most significant divisions in the market are set by the different 
times that the sun rises and people start work, and that the sun sets and they go 
home. Between the intemational monetary system, where it seems as though 
national govemments are the chief actors, and the financial markets, where the 
decisions of debtors and creditors and their intermediaries seem more decisive, 
there is a significant difference in the democratic dimension. National govemments 
may be directly subject to popular interests and pressures, whereas in financial 
markets democratic principles take second place to supply and demand and the 
vagaries of the markets." (P. 231)
In short, a striking manifestation of economic globalization is “the growing 
transnational nature of intemational finance.. .  " (Strange 1994,233). According to 
Susan Strange. “... the intemational (or global) financial structure coexists with a lot 
of national financial structures.. .  " (Strange 1994,234). She describes it as a sort 
of
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...hybrid, a halfway house between a completely integrated world structure and 
a totally unintegrated collection of national structures. . . .  In that structure, market 
forces are beyond the total control of any single national govemment. Indeed, with 
the notable exception of the United States, most govemments have very little 
influence over it. Their vulnerability to its changing character, its volatilities, and the 
new risks it brings, however, is only acutely felt. (P. 234)
Transactions in the global financial structure are growing faster than are those in 
local, national markets. If trends are extrapolated, it could be suggested that the 
unregulated part of the market will eventually overtake the regulated part, argues 
Susan Strange.
In contrast, the market for foreign exchange is globally integrated. The price of 
dollars in yen or in gold is virtually uniform everywhere at any given moment. The 
intemational bond market belongs in the global structure. Stock markets worldwide 
have become globally integrated. Worldwide market value reached 13 trillion dollars 
in 1995. The shares of global companies (multinationals) are traded on all the major 
stock markets. This globally integrated stock market makes possible the circulation 
of publicly listed shares around the globe in seconds.
“The deregulation of domestic financial markets, the liberalization of intemational 
capital flows, computer networks and telecommunications have all contributed to 
an explosive growth in financial markets," argues Saskia Sassen. (Sassen 1996, 
40) Intemational finance was revolutionized through technological innovations. The 
transactions are now registered automatically, through integrated computer networks, 
communicating with each other by satellites. (That eliminated the need for the 
sen/ices of hundreds of clerks and middlemen.) The London Stock Exchange was 
revolutionized by the introduction of TAURUS, an automatic system of share 
transfers. This eliminates the need for buyers and sellers to meet face-to-face. The 
speed with which transactions are conducted is accelerated enormously. That
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loosens the grip of national regulatory systems over lending, capital transfers, hedge 
funds, and capital flight. Global financial markets are in constant search of new 
clients due to the shrinking of profit margins, that makes them compete with each 
other as well as with national financial markets. Foreign banks penetrate national 
markets bringing with them increased competition and further deregulation of the 
banking system.
These trends are likely to continue. If the shift of substantial economic power 
from govemments to markets occurs, that would signify an unprecedented loss of 
popular power and popular review. That development in turn could jeopardize 
govemments’ accountability, legitimacy, and competence. However, having said 
that, it should be emphasized that developed monetary and financial systems are 
engines of economic growth. The ability of financial institutions to create finance 
(credit) and to move it around more quickly adds to the efficiency of the world market 
and promotes growth. The developing financial system will become, however, more 
unstable, risky, and volatile as national regulatory mechanisms get weakened and 
money becomes more concentrated in global financial institutions. “. . .  ^ h ile  the 
forces of globalization led by mobile capitafwiW certainly enhance world growth, the 
distributional consequences of globalization impact the immobile factors o f 
production, mainly the inhabitants of the nation state,” argues Sylvia Ostry. (Ostry 
1997,64) It is hard to disagree with this conclusion.
Multinational Enterprises As a DrivingForce of Global Capitalism.
Transnational corporations (TNCs) have contributed to considerable shifts in 
economic power and in the balance of power in general. Global companies with 
“worldwide connections dominate the four intersecting webs of global commercial 
activity on which the new world economy rests; the Global Cultural Bazaar; the 
Global Shopping Mall; the Global Workplace; and the Global Rnancial Network.
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These worldwide webs of economic activity have already attained a degree of global 
integration never before achieved by a world empire or nation state. The driving 
force behind each of them can be traced in large measure to the same few hundred 
corporate giants, with headquarters in the US, Japan, Germany, France, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, and the UK," write Barnet and Cavanagh.’® They call transnational 
corporations (and the banks) the “midwives of globalization: they are the ones behind 
it and they are the ones who have benefited."
The unprecedented power and leverage that TNCs possess is staggering. The 
proliferation of TNCs in the past three decades is equally remarkable. Malini Mehra 
provides some telling statistics on this account:
In 1970 there were 7000 TNCs, by the early 1990s there were 35,000. TNCs 
now account for 75% of global trade, the majority of which is between themselves. 
Of the world’s 100 largest economies, 51 are corporations, only 49 are countries. 
Ford’s economy is larger than that of either Saudi Arabia or Nonway. Mitsubishi’s 
economy is largerthan Indonesia's, the fourth most populous country on earth, and 
Philip Morris’ annual sales exceed New Zealand’s GDP. The combined sales of the 
top 200 corporations now account for almost a third of global GDP. Despite their 
worldwide operations, these same 200 firms employ only 188 million people, less 
than one-third of 1% of the global population. . . .  Less than 1% of the world’s 
population has any consequential part In corporate ownership. {Globalization or 
Sustainable Societies? The Intemet, FoEl LINK - 78)
Concomitant with the expansion of global companies' economic power is a new 
development in the legal sphere. TNCs challenge legal functions traditionally 
assigned to the nation-state. Multinationals infuse new legal practices and norms
From Global Dreams, Imperial Corporations and the New World Order, quoted In Gfobalzation 
orSustanaible Societies? by MeUini Mehra. Could be found on the Intemet, FoEl LINK - 78.
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into the workings of the global integrated economy. Here is some empirical evidence 
to that effect.
New Legal Regimes? Legal Pluralism?
The state has traditionally been the guarantor of property rights and contracts, 
as well as the executor of fundamental functions of law-creation and law-validation. 
What institutions can ensure these functions in a fluid and unregulated global 
economy? Economic globalization has been accompanied by the creation of new 
legal regimes and practices. These regulatory regimes for the governance of 
economic relations are intemational commercial arbitration {lex mercatoria) and 
various institutions that perform rating and advisory functions. International 
commercial arbitration has been institutionalized as the primary contractual method 
for the resolution of transnational commercial disputes. Two agencies — Moody’s 
Investors Service and Standard and Poor’s Ratings Group— dominate the market 
in credit ratings. These debt security and bond-rating agencies are part of a private 
regulatory system. They have contributed to the internationalization of ratings. These 
regimes have become essential to the functioning of the global economy, infusing a 
degree of discipline and order into the workings of various economic actors-. These 
mechanisms are not subject to govemment regulation and function independently 
of them. It is worth mentioning that these regulatory regimes have been 
Americanized. There is resistance (especially in Europe) to “the Americanization of 
the global capital market’s standards for the regulation of financial systems and 
standards for reporting financial information" (Sassen 1995, 18). Moody's and 
Standard and Poor are the two leading U.S. agencies.
Americanization could also be traced in the legal norms, in private corporate 
law-making, in commercial law, and business practices, which are ascendant in 
intemational business transactions. In part it is due to the ascendancy of American
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transnational legal services firms. In sum, the trade regime is a common law regime 
(as was pointed out earlier, the American variant of a common law regime).
Lex mercatoria could be defined as the global rules of commercial law, as the 
transnational law of economic transactions, or as a body of intemational legal 
practice. Here the role of multinational enterprises as law-makers is crucial, they 
seem to claim a unique jurisdiction in the global economy. Gunther Teubner calls 
lex mercatoria the “most successful example of global law without a state" (Teubner 
1995, 3). The internal legal regimes of multinationals, worldwide commercial 
practices, standardized contracts, technical standardization, activities of global 
economic associations, codes of conduct, professional self-regulation, and the 
awards of intemational arbitration courts are the sources of this new positive law 
called lex mercatoria. One might agree or disagree with the postulates of monism 
vs. legal pluralism, but there is no denying that worldwide practices of multinationals, 
intemational commercial arbitration awards, and intemational standardized contracts 
help further develop global legal regimes. But again, intemational arbitration courts 
rely heavily on cooperation and policies of govemments and states to grant awards. 
Multinationals conduct their business within the territorial boundaries of states. The 
presence of the state is real in the practices of global legal regimes. Its role as a 
law-validating and law-enforcing entity cannot be discounted.
We submit that national govemments are still performing numerous functions 
which neither global financial markets nor multinationals are willing to take on. As 
significant and powerful economic players as multinationals and financial markets 
are, they lack public responsibility; accountability, and motivation. We do not want 
to run the risk of demonizing markets and multinationals. The point is, they are 
particularistic in nature, serving special groups and certain, particular interests. 
Multinational corporations are answerable to the global money markets and their
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diffuse shareholders, dispersed across national boundaries. The unregulated global 
economy is the fertile ground for TNCs freedom of movement. Does that mean that 
the nation-state is dead? Far from it, at the present moment, there is no other 
workable or attainable substitute to the modern welfare state as we know it. And 
that is precisely the theme of the next section.
Global “Free” Markets vs. Government Regulation
Every individual endeavors to employ his capital so that its product may be o f greatest value. He 
generally neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting iL He 
intends only his own security, only his own gain. And he is in this led(asif)byan INVISIBLE HAND 
to promote an end which was not part o f  his intention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently 
promotes that o f society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.
Adam Smith, Wealth o f  Nations. 1776
Laissez-faire, free market philosophy embraces the notion that markets (national, 
intemational, or global) operate most efficiently when national govemments minimize 
their activity in the economy. In other words, it is the idea that the market system 
works best with only minimal govemmental intervention. According to this theory, 
govemments should provide national defense, security, police protection, determine 
property rights in the simplest fashion possible, enforce contracts entered into by 
private economic agents — and do as little as possible, or nothing else. This 
philosophy is closely related to the teachings of Adam Smith. According to Adam 
Smith, one of the adherents of this philosophy, markets are supposed to be govemed 
by the “invisible hancT. The “invisible hand" refers to automatic market adjustments 
that ensure equilibrium. Smith postulated that economic freedom is an efficient way 
to organize an economy. Self-interest is the driving force of an economy. A free 
marketplace is an ideal individualistic society where buyers and sellers conduct 
their affairs freely with minimal or zero govemment regulation. The “invisible hand" 
of competition coordinates economic transactions in the marketplace keeping the
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system in equilibrium. According to Smith, self-interest and competition harmonize 
with the public interest, yielding increases in national wealth.
An abstract society, outlined by Adam Smith, is supposed to portray pure 
capitalism, where private individuals own virtually all productive resources and make 
decisions that govern their uses. Once again, these decisions would be based on 
self-interest and not on the public interest. In reality, pure capitalism and a pure free 
market do not exist. The empirical evidence indicates the existence of some form of 
mixed economy. Even if economic globalization facilitates the spread of global 
capitalism, it is NOT bringing about pure capitalism or a pure free market. What 
economic globalization changes is the means o f govemmental coordination, 
supervision, and intervention in a globalized economy.
Arguably, if global economic players increase their independence from 
government regulation, the result would be the loss of control over economic 
transactions on the part of govemments and central banks. Even if the role of the 
state is decreased in the global economic sphere, a modem welfare state has an 
important task to perform in providing social protection, safety nets, defense, and 
the furtherance of public and collective interests. The state still has significant 
economic powers — generally speaking, the state has the monopoly over the 
production of money (ownership of a mint), it can debase, depreciate, or devalue 
the currency, it can launch inflationary or deflationary policies, it can introduce the 
policies of protectionism, it can impose non-tariff barriers on imports, or it can raise 
taxes. Interestingly enough, states have to steer their course carefully as they 
compete for investments. Needless to say, the effectiveness and the degree with 
which states exercise their economic sovereignty vary from state to state. The IMF, 
for instance, can impose freezes on credit and money production as part of a 
conditionality package, which would considerably limit the state's leverage in the 
economic sphere.
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Apart from social obligations to its citizenry, states also have to “survive” and to 
compete with each other in an increasingly competitive economic environment. 
Investors will come and capital will flow into a country that has a favorable economic 
environment, however a multinational company or an investor will define it for 
themselves. Numerous economic transactions realize themselves within a certain 
territory. Intemational trade is vulnerable to the macroeconomic policies of states-  
interest rates, exchange rates, tariffs, and the like. International finance is also 
vulnerable to the decisions of national monetary authorities. On the other hand, 
international markets can upset the decisions and regulations set by national 
govemments. In short, markets and governments seem to exist in a symbiotic, 
interdependent relationship, in competition with each other, yet with a strong need 
for each other.
In sum, the world has never seen pure capitalism -  neither free enterprises are 
completely free, nor is the state powerless in the global economy. States and markets 
form an alliance, a relationship of interdependency. They form a hybrid that is based 
on interlinkages between national monetary policies, rules, regulations, intemational 
agreements, intemational trade, and global financial markets. The nation-state 
continues to play a major role, although a transformed one under recent 
developments. Nonetheless, the state plays a key role in providing for social order, 
physical security, widespread education, economic well-being, basic welfare needs, 
social guarantees, protection, law-creation, law-validation, and the maintenance of 
the social contract with its citizens. The state is still the key guarantor of contracts 
and property rights. (Of course, the effectiveness of mechanisms and institutions 
for delivery of these guarantees and protections might vary from state to state, 
depending on its organization, tradition, history, and leadership.)
It is true that high mobility of multinationals and capital reduces the effectiveness 
of govemments to regulate and conduct taxation. Individuals and multinationals
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can hold their investments in various parts of the world and under many names, 
thus avoiding national taxation. The fact is that power and authority become more 
dispersed in a multiplicity of sites. That is why it is time to move from statism to 
pluralism, to understand various sites of authority so that we might redress the 
imbalances (economic as well as political) in the modem international system. A 
more beneficial outcome might be an alliance in the form of cooperative 
arrangements between governments and enterprises, some balance between 
government regulation in cooperation with market self-regulation and self-restraint. 
The state still performs very important functions to be permitted to die. Undeniably, 
the nation-state is being transformed by economic globalization. Though getting 
weaker in certain economic areas, it is still the source of political and legal authority, 
the repository of national identity and the guarantor of basic welfare needs. In 
conclusion, our modem experience portrays globalization as a contradictory process; 
it is fragmented rather than uniform. “Despite the importance of intemational relations 
and international private and public law, politics and law still have their center of 
gravity in the nation-state” (Teubner 1995,5). These paradoxical, centrifugal trends 
can be reconciled by adopting the framework of pluralism where the state arid other 
actors could be analyzed in the relationship of cooperation, competition, and 
interdependency.
When Govemments and Markets Fail, What Then?
Here again we are dealing with a deep philosophical dilemma — leave it to the 
markets? Or govemments? Or put an institution in place that can regulate the global 
economy? One may not adhere to the notion that market forces are automatic and 
self-correcting, nor may one subscribe to the notion that there are natural economic
laws akin to the laws of physics. Economic institutions are human, man-made 
creations. The belief in natural economic laws would signify that we should leave
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market forces alone, and keep the status quo without trying to correct injustices, 
imbalances, and inequalities. The marketplace and other economic systems are 
but human inventions; govemments and states are just as good as the human 
beings that created them.
At the present time, where govemments fail to be effective, where markets panic 
and crises ensue, heads tum to the institution of “last resort” — the Intemational 
Monetary Fund. It seems that in the world of economic instability and fierce 
intemational competition the presence of a stabilizing force such as the IMF is 
beneficial. Perfect free competition does not exist; the laissez-faire approach, which 
sees the markets as possessing self-correcting ability, does not correspond to reality. 
The magical “invisible hand” of the market becomes visible in the form of the IMF. 
Once again, it should be emphasized that one may not regard the IMF as an ideal 
institution. It needs to reform itself just as the world is being transformed by the 
forces of globalization. It is precisely because of accelerated economic globalization 
that the role of the IMF is also amplified and is in need of transformation. Weak 
govemments, failed leadership, inefficient economic systems, poorly-designed legal 
frameworks, and bad fiscal policies will make states more vulnerable to independent 
financial markets. This precariousness might make states the ready casualties and 
victims of economic globalization.
Just as in domestic markets, where the debate could rage over laissez-faire 
policies versus govemment regulation, the debate continues over the regulated 
world economy versus laissez-faire global markets. The task is to satisfy the needs 
of the political community and the population, i.e., people directly affected by the 
decisions of govemments and markets. More than any other entity, the nation­
states and national govemments are left with the task and the responsibility of 
promoting collective/community interests and looking after their population. In the 
environment of accelerated economic globalization, characterized by fierce
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competition, market volatility, and uncertainty, the welfare state (the modem state 
as we know it) assumes responsibilities to look after its community. However, it is 
high time that markets and govemments stopped treating each other as adversaries. 
While acknowledging that certain pattems of competition and rivalry will persist, 
states and markets have to strive for mutual reinforcement and cooperation. In 
sum, they have to form an alliance, a working relationship in the age of economic 
globalization so that both individualistic and collective interests are promoted and 
satisfied. And the role of the Intemational Monetary Fund is paramount in establishing 
a constructive dialogue and serving as a balancing force between govemments 
and markets.
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CHAPTER IV
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND 
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION
I f  your domestic institutions are strong, then you don ’tneed very strong global institutions. 
I f  domestic institutions inside countries are weak, it won Y matter how strong your global 
institutions are. They will not be effective.
Robert Hormats (the Vice Chairman o f Goldman Sachs Intemational)
Since their emergence as recognized entities. States have been concerned with their role 
in the intemational order and with increasing their stature therein. Economic strength is 
one clear indicator of state power. To enhance their position. States throughout history 
have entered into legal and other arrangements to protect and further their economic interest
Celia Taylor (Statehood and Sovereignty 1997,775)
By virtue o f their global reach, organizational strength, professional expertise, and close 
connections with core govemments and private banks and corporations, these intemational 
institutions [ the IM F  and the World Bank} have acquired an authoritative status within the 
world economy comparable in some respects to that enjoyed by the state vis-a-vis the national 
economy. To this extent, the leading intemational organizations, o f which the World Bank 
and the IM F  are the most conspicuous, may be said to play an increasingly important 
initiating, monitoring and regulatory role in the reorganization o f economic activity on a 
global scale.
Camilleri and Falk (The End O f Sovereignty? 1992,95-96)
National economies are interlocked, commercial banking and business ownership 
(controlled by some 750 global corporations) transcend economic borders, intemational 
trade is integrated and financial markets around the world are connected through instant 
computer link-up.
Michel Chossndovsl^ (The Globalization o f Poverty 1997,15)
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Closely linked to the issues of economic globalization and sovereignty is the role 
of the Intemational Monetary Fund in the changing global environment. What seems 
to be at the heart of the debate over the role of the IMF is the ways and strategies 
for combatting, harnessing, managing, and goveming globalization. Globalization 
is happening; it is a fact and a social, economic, and political reality. It cannot be 
ignored, forgotten, be rid of or put on the “back burner", it is around us. Globalization, 
however, is not always an equalizing, homogenizing, and balancing force, as it is 
often perceived by the liberal camp. Globalization underscores the stark differences 
between the haves and have-nots, winners and losers, the industrialized and the 
underdeveloped. Humanity at the present time is faced with a world which is neither 
democratic nor equitable. Economic globalization is thought to imply market 
integration, free trade, liberalization, internationalization, the spread of market values, 
the promotion of democracy, and other integrative processes, which are said to 
possess a democratizing and equalizing potential. However, as mentioned earlier, 
economic globalization is often accompanied by centrifugal, disintegrative and 
conflicting trends -  deepening disparities, increasing income inequalities, worsening 
living conditions, perpetuation of indebtedness, destruction of public safety nets, 
job losses, and social dislocations.
Furthermore, economic globalization and the trend towards integrated but volatile 
global markets increase chances of economic crises that may deeply affect and 
even impoverish both rich and poor countries. Thus, it stands to reason that the 
more integrated the world becomes, the more effective ways of intemational 
cooperation, management, and global govemance are needed to offset the negative 
impact of globalization.
Let us start by asking a number of fundamental questions which revolve around 
the role of the IMF in the changing environment. This chapter is but a modest 
attempt to encompass a very broad spectrum of issues. What course of action are
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we to take in the age of integrated global markets? Should we tame globalization? 
Fight it? Curtail or slow it down? Should it be managed, govemed and regulated? 
Or should we just let the chips fall where they may and let everybody fend for 
themselves? Inherent in this debate is the dualism between the nation-state 
(sovereignty issues) and global integrated markets (economic globalization). What 
is the role of the govemment in the era of economic globalization and integrated 
markets? Are we witnessing a new pattern of interaction between government and 
market forces? How is the economic power of the state being transformed due to 
powerful economic actors? How and by whom should markets be regulated, or 
should they be regulated at all? Is the IMF an optimal regulating body or should it 
be reformed? Who does the IMF favor, protect and regulate - markets or states? 
Can it ever be an objective, unbiased force between member-states and global 
markets? How can it be transformed into a more democratic and equitable balancer 
between governments, national economies, and global markets? Should the IMF 
pursue a narrow or an expanded role? There are a lot of empirical and normative 
issues of this sort, and a lot of contentious opinions are expressed along ideological 
divides. At the heart of this debate lies the fundamental question about the fMFs 
unique role in fostering and furthering economic giobaiization, and in simultaneously 
managing and goveming globalization in order to protect and strengthen states 
against its negative effects.
There is no general agreement on howto resolve the dualism, i.e., the contentious 
competition between sovereign states and global integrated markets. One side of 
the spectrum holds that govemments should be directly involved in the economic 
process through participation in production and distribution of goods and services. 
This view assigns an active, dominant, and decisive role to the govemment in 
economic policy management. As Manuel Guitian succinctly puts it:
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[This viewj reflected the notion that besides providing public goods and correcting 
market failures, governments were also alone responsible for stabilizing cyclical 
economic fluctuations as well as for growth and development in the economy. 
{Conditionality: past, present, future, Intemational Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 1995, 
V. 42 (Dec): 792(44))
The opposing view argues that instead of being directly involved in the economic 
process, government policies should be directed towards fostering market forces, 
safeguarding competition, and encouraging private initiatives. Governments should 
not compete or interfere with market forces; governments should establish 
frameworks in which market forces can efficiently operate, thus, furthering economic 
globalization.
According to Manuel Guitian, the latter view of economic policy enjoys wide 
consensus in the IMFs membership, including both the industrial and developing 
countries (which is a debatable point). The perceived economic policy consensus 
lays out basic responsibilities of government that include “first, the establishment of 
a stable macroeconomic setting and the timely undertaking of policy adjustment 
efforts," ..."second, the protection and maintenance of the country's economic 
infrastructure” [investment in both human and physical capital)," and “third, the 
establishment, development, and safeguard of the economy's institutional 
infrastructure. This responsibility includes a host o f . . .  govemmental activities, 
such as the provision of an appropriate legal, regulatory, and social framework to 
support the functioning of market forces" (Guitian 1995, 792). These contending 
visions of the role of the state in conducting economic policies essentially reflect 
the debate over the right balance between government regulation and free markets. 
The international Monetary Fund takes on a role of a balancer between the two in 
the age of globalization.
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Approaches to the IMF 
The role of the Intemational Monetary Fund is unique and inherently paradoxical 
in the era of globalization and global integrated markets. The IMF has a unique 
function of a referee between markets and governments, and that is where the 
paradox lies -  the IMF, as a vehicle of economic globalization, promotes market 
forces, liberalization, competition, and open free trade. The IMF is at the same time 
an /hfer-national organization that consists of sovereign member-states, which apply 
for its assistance to protect and strengthen themselves against the negative effects 
of globalization. Is the IMF a neutral referee, objective and unbiased? Unfortunately, 
it is far from being objective and democratic, which will be demonstrated with 
empirical evidence in the discussion to follow. What approach towards the IMF’s 
role is feasible and practicable so that the “wheels of progress” continue to tum and 
so that countries are also protected against the negative effects of globalism? Surely, 
this thesis will not answer all the questions in a way to fit all contending visions; the 
great debate over the right balance between regulation and free markets is likely to 
continue. Let us now review the contending approaches to the role of the IMF in the 
modern context.
The laissez-faire, ^ee-marketapproach calls for free movement of capital, goods 
and services, and the minimum institutional intervention (be it govemmental or 
intemational in the form of the IMF). The notion that free markets are self-sustaining 
and market excesses will correct themselves is fundamental to this approach. 
According to this view, the IMF, as a “safety ne f provider and a “bail-out" agency, is 
harmful to healthy free competition and should leave the markets alone. This 
approach argues that the IMF should abandon its rescue packages, stop its practice 
as the intemational lender of last resort, encourage free competition, and let n larkets 
decide on the outcome. But this “hands-ofT, “leave it to the markets” approach 
could lead to the collapse of governments, national economies, great human
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sacrifice, and the elimination of the public safety net. Ample empirical evidence 
demonstrates that the marketplace is not always prudent, reasonable, people- 
oriented, or unselfish. To be left at the mercy of the marketplace and at the time of 
crises be punished by it for the lack of a social safety net is not a very encouraging 
prospect.
This picture portrays a veritable wildemess, where each individual is left to fend 
for himself/herself; it represents extreme individualism at its worst, where each 
individual is left without any safety net in hope that market forces will take care of 
public needs. This extreme individualistic approach is neither fair nor politically 
sustainable. A firm domestic/national base provides a safety net (together with an 
IMF safety net in time of intemational crises) which the marketplace is not capable 
of guaranteeing. Financial markets have shown poor Judgment before -  they are 
partly the cause of the recent Asian crisis. Governments could not be totally blamed 
for the stock market crashes and failures of national economies. Markets are often 
unwilling to accept the responsibility and the blame for failures. In sum, for the sake 
of the poor, the dispossessed and the vulnerable, the IMF should continue to play 
its role as a “safety net provider" in time of crises, for the lack of market-sponsored 
networks for public goods.
The second approach, on the other hand, calls for heavy global and international 
regulation. There are a number of ideas calling for the reform of the intemational 
economic order. To fame the dangers of globalization, it is proposed to create new 
institutions to infuse discipline, structure, and direction to the global marketplace. 
The intemational financier George Soros argues for the supervision of intemational 
capital movements and the regulation of credit allocation. He proposes that a new 
authority be created as a sister institution to the IMF, what he calls the “Intemational 
Credit Insurance Company,” that would guarantee intemational and private sector 
loans up to a specified amount for a modest charge. Borrowers would have to
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agree to complete disclosure of all borrowings, public or private, which would help 
the ICIC set ceilings on the size of the loan. (“Avoiding a Breakdown”, Financial 
Times, December 8,1997)
Henry Kaufman, a Wall Street economist, proposes the creation of a “Board of 
Overseers of Major International Institutions and Markets” to supervise and regulate 
financial markets and institutions. This Board would be empowered by member- 
governments to harmonize and monitor the performance of institutions and markets 
under its supervision. It would be empowered to set minimum capital requirements 
for all institutions under its purview, to establish uniform trading, reporting, accounting, 
disclosure and lending standards, and to monitor performance. It would “supervise 
risk-taking not only by banks and other financial institutions but also by new 
participants in the global markets.” Unlike “today’s reactive IMF”, this Board of 
Overseers would be responsible for “anticipating problems and forcing preventive 
action,” a sort of an early alert system that would warn us against incipient economic 
crises. (“Preventing the Next Global Financial Crisis", New York Times, January 28, 
1998)
The historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. calls for the creation of an intemational 
mechanism that would function similarly to the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission. He points out that the US free-market economy functions within a 
broad regulatory framework and under close supervision from the SEC. 
(“Govemment Isn't the Root of All Evil”, Wali Street Journal, January 30,1998)
Former Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin stated his belief in a strong 
supervisory mechanism by saying that the global economy needs “to develop and 
maintain strong supervisory regimes and regulatory structures” to prevent future 
financial crisis.^^ A proposal by James B. Hurlock calls for the transformation of the
" Quoted in James Chace, “Bretton Woods tl?" Worfd Policy Journal, Vol. XV, No. t , 1998 
(Spring).
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IMF Into a global bankruptcy court to respond to the problems of sovereign liquidity 
and debt default, which would give the IMF vast legal and regulatory powers. (“The 
Way Ahead for Sovereign Debt", In ti Fin. L  Review, 1995 (July): 10-12)
But it makes one wonder where the so-called developing countries and reforming 
countries of Eastern Europe fit into this picture of omnipotent global entities. Would 
these agencies of global supervision be more democratic than the intemational 
bodies of the present? Interestingly enough, this centralized model of global 
supervision resembles the “Asian model" of centralized economic system which 
has been so harshly criticized during the recent Asian crisis. Furthermore, for now, 
national governments will resist the creation of any such omnipotent supranational 
entities that would fundamentally challenge state sovereignty (Haas and Litan 1998, 
4-6). As it stands, globalization has already chipped away considerable fragments 
from the sovereign armor. However, total insulation from globalization is not possible. 
Tight domestic regulation in the form of trade barriers, protectionist policies, and 
investment restrictions is another way of insulating people from the forces of 
globalization. You can run from globalization but there is no hiding from it in an 
interdependent world with interconnected needs. Tight domestic regulation might 
also be harmful to domestic growth and national economies. In sum, just as extreme 
nationalist protectionist policies could be harmful to trade and commerce, so an 
unregulated intemational economy with no rules and no discipline could bring disaster 
to states, peoples, national economies, and markets.
The third approach, the so-called “managed" approach towards the relationship 
between the IMF and globalization is of a more moderate nature. It does not call for 
a drastic overhaul of the existing architecture of the intemational economy. Some 
remodeling, reforming, and reorganizing of the IMF are called for, however. The 
safety net provided by the IMF should be kept in place, it is believed, but business 
incentive and entrepreneurship should be encouraged. This managed, balanced
94
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
approach “would eschew the heavy hand of International regulation but aim to 
maintain the element of risk essential to capitalism without removing the safety net 
provided by the IM P (Haas and Litan 1998, 4), The IMF, a regulatory agency, is 
perceived to be at the helm of this managed approach by introducing reforms at 
both the national and intemational levels. (Needless to say, reforms involving the 
transformation the IMF itself would be beneficial.) Such IMF-led reforms include 
“improving the supervision of financial institutions, instituting Western-style 
accounting practices in banks and corporations, and opening up markets to foreign 
investment” (Haas and Litan 1998,4). The provision of more accurate information 
to foreign creditors and lenders, and transparency are also required.
This managed approach leaves national governments with the initiative to manage 
globalization and to provide a safety net for the people. The IMF should also help 
national governments build a firm domestic base -  strong economies, sustained 
economic growth, and help strengthen such public goods as health insurance, 
pensions, training, and unemployment insurance. This managed approach 
acknowledges that “it is still states and governments -  by the practices they adopt, 
the arrangements they enter into, and the safety nets they provide -  that will 
determine whether we exploit or squander the potential of this era” (Haas and Litan 
1998,6).
In echoing Robert Hormats, we believe in strong domestic institutions, in strong 
legal, social and regulatory frameworks which are capable of protecting the people 
and creating public safety nets, and which are also designed to promote various 
incentives. It is suggested here that strong and sound domestic institutions will be 
crucial in managing globalization. In other words, strong domestic institutions will 
be the safeguard against the negative effects of globalism. The role of the IMF 
should be underscored in its endeavor to strengthen domestic institutions through
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structural adjustment reforms. Its mission to strengthen a country’s domestic 
institutions in need and in deep financial trouble is paramount.
However, along with the positive aspects of the IMF participation in the 
management of the global economy and globalization, a constructive critique is 
necessary. The IMF needs to abandon its policy of applying a one-size-fits-all 
conditionality dogma to different countries with different circumstances. The IMF 
should be careful in blindly promoting free market values to the less developed 
countries. While forcing an entry into the global markets’ wilderness on 
underdeveloped countries, the IMF often undermines, not strengthens, domestic 
institutions. The IMF should establish some “readiness” criteria for entry into the 
global marketplace for the less developed countries. Institutionalization of strong 
and sound domestic institutions should be the primary goal on the IMF structural 
adjustment agenda. Are structural adjustment programs not intended to strengthen 
domestic institutions? Promotion of strong domestic institutions through innovative 
and individualized structural adjustment programs should be the IMF’s reformist 
agenda.
Thus, a radical reassessment of the IMF’s structural reform practices is in order. 
The IMF should reaffirm its unique mission as a balancer between states and 
markets. Its preoccupation with across-the-board liberalization and a pervasive free 
market agenda, however, could be harmful to both domestic institutions and global 
markets. Markets will not prosper or thrive in the environment where domestic 
institutions are in shambles; markets and states are interdependent and co­
dependent on each other. Despite global integrated markets, technical innovation, 
instant communication, cyperspace, and digitalization of financial markets, 
geography still matters; national economies still matter; states and domestic 
institutions still matter, it is with some measure of restraint, discipline, and regulation 
that we stand a chance at balancing out contradictions of our times.
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[n sum, the managed approach seems more realistic and applicable in the modem 
context. While new ideas on global regulatory bodies are explored and proposals 
are made for the drastic reform or complete overhaul of the intemational economic 
order, we have to use the resources at our disposal in the most optimal way. Just as 
we need strong domestic regimes and institutions, so we need to maintain strong 
international supervisory and regulatory bodies to be better equipped to avert future 
financial crises and to govem globalization. That is why it is suggested here that the 
IMF should be reformed and reorganized to manage the negative effects of 
globalization more effectively. If the IMF is destined to be the leader of any future 
intemational reforms in the decades to come, it needs to reassess fundamental 
economic and democratic values and to undergo an institutional reform as well.
Our methodology views the IMF from an analytical and critical perspective. The 
analysis includes both the empirical and the normative aspects; it looks at what the 
IMF represents at this given moment in history and what it should strive for in its 
reformed capacity. One of the criticisms focuses on burden-sharing and accountability 
on the part of the IMF. If governments are accountable to the public for their economic 
policies (be it under the guidance of the IMF or independently), then the IMF should 
share and carry the burden of responsibility in the implementation of IMF-sponsored 
programs, in order to be perceived by its members as a democratic institution. If the 
IMF imposes conditions through its loan conditionality, thereby forcing a partial 
transfer of sovereignty, it should also be accountable if the corrective measures do 
not cure the “ills" and result in failure. It seems a logical inference that the IMF 
should be more accountable for its corrective prescriptions if it takes on a more 
expanded role.
The managed approach to globalization puts the IMF at the center of the 
international economic superstructure where it plays the role of a referee, a 
coordinator, a manager, and a balancer between various state and non-state
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economic actors, between govemments and markets. Globalization is regarded 
here as a process not as an outcome. Thus, when we discuss the ways of managing 
globalization, we are required to find the ways of engaging governments, powerful 
economic actors, markets, and intemational financial institutions (such as the IMF, 
the World Bank, the WTO, and NAFTA) in a meaningful dialogue where each party’s 
interests and views are acknowledged and weighed, and where some form of 
compromise Is reached. The IMF could take a leadership role as a mediator between 
various economic and political actors -  regional, national, global, or international.
If we extrapolate the current globalizing trends (cooperation vs. conflict; integrative 
vs. disintegrative), it could be postulated that the further delegation of sovereign 
authority to international and global entities will continue. If the current trends 
continue, and they are likely to, the importance and the mandate of the IMF will 
increase, not decrease. There is always a danger of institutional overreach if the 
IMF takes on a more expanded role. That is why the IMF needs to undergo reform 
and reorganization more than ever, to be better tuned to the changing environment. 
We will propose our own recommendations for the reformed IMF; they will be 
summed up succinctly at the end of the chapter. Intentionally, some of these 
recommendations will be included in the following discussion which centers on the 
role of the IMF in the changing environment.
The IMF -  A Friend In Need Is a Friend Indeed?
In any scientific controversy or debate we encounteropposing camps, competing 
visions, contending theories -  they form the dichotomy between critics and 
supporters -  but there is nothing new about the dichotomous and conflictual nature 
of scientific discourse. The Intemational Monetary Fund and its role in the changing 
environment is not an exception; the institution has its ardent critics and loyal 
defenders. Some of the issues that both critics and supporters have to address
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Include the following: Has the IMF been successfulin promoting globalization? Has 
it been successful and effective in reducing developing countries' external debt? 
Has it been successful in the area of currency stabilization? Have its structural 
adjustment programs actually succeeded in improving conditions in the debtor 
countries? Has the debt burden of the developing world actually been reduced? 
These are some of the questions that invite interest from political scientists and 
economists. The fact is that there is no accepted methodology on how to assess 
IMF successes and failures. In addition to numerous contending methodologies 
and typologies, there is no consensus or agreement on what constitutes a failure or 
success.
It is also important to emphasize that REALISM, a theory that reduces intemational 
relations to power relations between states as unitary actors and focuses on “high” 
politics, has been so dominant among scientists as an explanatory tool that non­
governmental organizations and intemational organizations have been on the 
periphery of scientific discourse. The dominating presence of realism did not give a 
chance to other political and economic non-state actors at extended scientific 
analysis. As these non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and non-state 
movements gain in importance and influence with accelerating globalization, they 
attract the attention of the scientific community. Their role in the changing 
environment attracts due attention and comes to the fore of scientific discourse.
Dichotomous views on the role of the IMF in the changing environment include 
positivist and normative theories. Contending opinions on the role of the IMF are 
voiced from different ideological camps - the Left, the Right, and the Center. The 
successes and the failures of IMF-funded programs have been contested, approved, 
disapproved, downgraded, or praised. It is a matter of subjective opinion: the 
analyses of the IMFs structural adjustment and conditionality reforms tend to be 
value-laden, ideological, and subjective. Let me begin with some criticisms of the
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IMF, which are replete. One of the critical views centers on the issue of the IMF 
structural adjustment medicme. The IMF applies the same rigid austerity medicine 
(the same old “structural adjustment” orthodoxy) to all its “patients” indiscriminately, 
regardless of the fact that they might be “suffering” from a different malady.
Another criticism views an overexpanding role of the IMF as too much undesired 
encroachment on state sovereignty. The IMF expands its mandate by including 
harsh structural elements in the loan conditions and goes beyond its primary objective 
of correcting the balance of payments disequilibrium. Critics charge that, as a 
consequence, economic conditions attached to the loans exert political leverage 
and unduly intervene into sovereign states’ policies. Critics suggest that, as a result, 
the IMF’s practices become highly politicized, they often lack popular support and 
popular review, and the IMF itself lacks accountability and transparency.
Another aspect of the IMF practices that invites criticism is the moral hazard of 
bailout packages. Critics who come from the “free market” camp charge that lenders, 
bankers, officials, govemments, and investors take risks and pursue reckless policies 
without weighing the potential dangers in the belief that the IMF will come to the 
rescue (by performing a sort of safety net function in the time of crisis). Free 
marketeers charge that the presence of a “safety net” institution is harmful to free 
market spirit and free competition. This bail-out psychology is thought to be 
"motivated by the belief that the IMF lulls govemments, investors, and lenders into 
recklessness. ...The laissez-faire, free-market approach looks good in the abstract 
because markets reward sound investments and regulatory practices and punish 
poor ones. In principle, it can provide incentives for investors to avoid overly risky 
investments and for govemments to adopt prudent policies. To intemational free 
marketeers, the safety net pn the form of the IMF) destroys this incentive" (Haas 
and Litan 1998,3).
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Steve Forbes, an adherent of Adam Smith’s theory, charges the IMF with being 
“oblivious to four basic principles of economic progress: sound money (the IMF is 
addicted to devaluations), low taxes, property rights, and non-bureaucratic 
interference with the setting up and running of businesses." (“The Scourge of the 
Intemational Monetary Fund", Forbes 158, October 7,1996:25)
Critics from the Marxist/radical camp charge the IMF with manipulation of market 
forces to serve the interests of dominant economic and financial actors, i.e., 
economically powerful countries. The IMF as part of a powerful international 
bureaucracy has the ability to “supervise national economies through the deliberate 
manipulation of market forces” (Chossudovsky 1997,16). The radical/Marxist critics 
do not spare the IMF and call it the instrument of the globalization of poverty. They 
call the IMF the vehicle o f Impovenshment of developing countries, they argue for 
its dissolution or radical reorganization. Michel Chossudovsky portrays a not so 
complimentary picture of the IMF practices:
Since the early 1980s, the “macro-economic stabilization” and “structural 
adjustmenf programs imposed by the IMF and the World Bank on developing 
countries (as a condition for the renegotiation of their extemal debt) have led to the 
Impoverishment of hundreds of millions of people. Contrary to the spirit of the Bretton 
Woods agreement which was predicated on “economic reconstruction” and the 
stability of major archange rates, the structural adjustment program has contributed 
largely to destabilizing national currencies and ruining the economies of developing 
countries. (Chossudovsky 1997,33)
He goes even further and terms IMF structural adjustment programs “economic 
genocide”:
Structural adjustment is conducive to a form of “economic genocide” which is 
carried out through the conscious and deliberate manipulation of market forces...
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structural adjustment programs affect directly the livelihood of more than four billion 
people... This new form of economic and political domination - a form of “market 
colonialism” - subordinates people and govemments through the seemingly “neutral” 
interplay of market forces... At no time in history has “free” market - operating in the 
world through the instruments of macro-economics - played such an important role 
in shaping the destiny of “sovereign” nations. (Chossudovsky 1997,37)
Kevin Danaher (also from the radical camp) charges the IMF with imposing policies 
designed
...  to facilitate the repayment of debt that is, the steady transfer of wealth out of 
Third World countries to the bankers of the industrial countries.... It is not simply a 
war between ‘North and South,’ as it is so often portrayed in the mainstream press 
and academic literature. Rather, it is a collaborative effort between southem elites 
and their northern counterparts. (Danaher 1994,2)
Other criticisms and recommendations express the necessity for the IMF to follow 
a narrow mandate and not to expand its role. They recommend that the Fund should 
refocus from imposing major structural and institutional reforms and should rather 
follow its narrow traditional task which is balance of payments adjustments, balancing 
out sustained trade deficits and temporary shortages of foreign exchange. They 
recommend the Fund be more disceming in distinguishing between liquidity vs. 
insolvency crisis^^, instead of treating every patient as a complete failure, as being 
totally insolvent, and threatening to default on sovereign debt. Here again, the crux 
of the matter is the IMF’s indiscriminate application of its rigid “cure” without regard 
for the specific causes of the “malady."
As in the case of South Korea, for instance, which did not suffer from an insolvency crisis 
or sovereign debt but had a temporary liquidity shortage.
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Let us take the recent case of the Asian economic crisis. Before turning to the 
critiques of the IMF’s handling of the Asian crisis, it should be emphasized that it is 
short-sighted to blame the IMF for all the ills, woes, tribulations, and failures of the 
Asian economies. There is something to be said for the pervasive crony capitalism 
of the Asian economies in distress. However, the IMF’s belief In strong Asian 
fundamentals until the onset of the crisis taints its reputation considerably. Critics 
argue that the IMF did not warn about Asian economies’ overheating, although the 
signs of “ailment" were apparent in the form of real estate and stock market bubbles. 
Why did the IMF not alert them to the incipient disaster? Critics charged the Fund 
with not responding efficiently and effectively, for it did not have a crisis prevention 
strategy. Is it possible that the Fund simply missed the signs of “ailing" Asian 
economies against the background of outstanding economic performance of several 
decades? How could the Asian “miracle," Asian “tigers," and the Asian “model”  tum 
into a failure overnight? How could the IMF be so demanding and unyielding now in 
imposing harsh austerity measures in the time of crisis when it did not advise on 
any preventative measures before the crisis occurred? How could the Fund have 
been so short-sighted (or not openly truthful?) in not acknowledging the signs of 
“ailing" of the Asian “miracle"?
As Devesh Kapur remarks on the Asian crisis;
In reality, their economies were undone not by visible intemai flaws, but by the 
unforeseen impact of the global capital flows that the IMF sought to set free. The 
conventional macroeconomic indicators of the Asian crisis countries were well within 
prudential norms. These were not profligate govemments whose policies yielded 
large deficits and inflation. (Kapur 1998.122)
In hindsight, it is easy to criticize Asian crisis-stricken countries fo r weak 
fundamentals and crony capitalism; however, they did thrive quite long and quite
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impressively to be dubbed the “Asian miracle" and “Asian model." It does seem 
ironic that the IMF used Asian countries’ weakened positions to impose heavy 
structural reforms to further its own neo-liberal interests and to open up insular 
protectionist markets. Take, for instance. South Korea. Martin Feldstien argues that, 
in the recent crisis. South Korea was not facing the insolvency problem, it was 
facing a liquidity shortage : “...this was clearly a case of temporary illiquidity rather 
than fundamental insolvency" (Feldstien 1998,25).
The IMF, however, ventured to fix all South Korea’s “ills" with one stroke -  lift 
investment and import restrictions, reform the banking system, and open up domestic 
financial markets for foreign banks and insurance companies. It sought to reform 
corporate structure and labor laws, in short, to further a free market agenda and 
open up protectionist markets. It demanded “a fundamental overhaul of the Korean 
economy” in exchange for financial rewards in the form of conditionality loans. It 
applied its usual medicine of “contractionary macroeconomic policy of higher taxes, 
reduced spending, and high interest rates" (Feldstein 1998,26).
Critics argue that the IMF shows favoritism it its policies: the IMF is driven to 
rescue investors, creditors, and lenders first; they seem to be the favored 
beneficiaries of the IMF rescue packages. Take, for instance, the recent Asian crisis: 
the IMF was not bailing out Asian national economies-the disbursements provided 
by Fund programs have been used by collapsing Asian economies to pay off foreign 
creditors. Although it is well known that debts involve both public and private 
obligations, where both govemments and private entities are involved, the IMF 
rescue packages seem to favor creditors and lenders. It seems that whatever little 
money is left over from paying off public and private debts could be used for the 
collapsing national economies and diminishing safety net Thus, it appears that the 
most vulnerable portion of the population of the collapsing economy will have to 
bear the brunt and the burden of the conditionality package. What about IMF-
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imposed austerity programs for the financial markets, lenders, and creditors? Should 
not they be taught some responsibility? Undeniably, during the time of crises, 
investors and lenders do take a hard h it However, the IMFs overwhelming focus 
on paying off foreign creditors at any cost and the demand for harsh sacrifices from 
national govemments (and the most vulnerable portion of the population!) do not 
seem to be balanced.
Critics further argue that if the IMF does provide temporary relief and some of 
the structural reforms could be beneficial, such shock therapies and the demand 
for complete economy overhaul could have a negative effect on a national 
government’s legitimacy and economic growth. Such therapies can cause instability 
and deeper recession. In short, these corrective measures can backlash in the 
form of unrest and social dislocations. Critics further argue that the IMF needs to 
make sure that its policies do not unnecessarily interfere with the proper jurisdiction 
of a sovereign government. It is often too apparent that the Fund makes the 
industrialized countries’ agenda a part of its conditionality packages. As Devesh 
Kapur explains:
... [rjhe disbursements were linked to the countries' meeting a range of conditions 
that seem to go well beyond the IMFs mandate. Two decades ago, fund programs 
typically imposed a dozen or so requirements orstrictures. But the Asian countries 
have had to sign agreements that look more like Christmas trees than contracts, 
with anywhere from 50 to 80 detailed conditions covering everything from the 
deregulation of garlic monopolies to taxes on cattle feed and new environmental 
laws. (Kapur 1998,123)
How about the “laundry list” of conditions imposed on South Korea ? It included 
certain items that have been on the agenda of industrialized countries for some 
time. Very often the conditions that a crisis-stricken country is required to accept
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are practiced in the major industrial European economies -  protectionist labor market 
rules, corporate ownership structures that give controlling interest to governments 
and banks, state subsidies to inefficient industries, and trade barriers to imports, to 
name a few. As Devesh Kapur remarks: This contradiction has less to do with an 
apparent double standard than with the unlikelihood of many European nations 
ever being subject to IMF strictures" (Kapur 1998,126). The IMF seems to play the 
role of a policeman on behalf of the industrialized countries to ensure that neo­
liberal interests are further promoted.
In short, “a nation's desperate need for short-term financial help does not give 
the IMF the moral right to substitute its technical judgment for the outcomes of the 
nation's political process" (Feldstein 1998,27). Martin Feldstein argues for a narrower 
role for the IMF. He reminds the Fund that it is the borrowers and lending banks that 
bear primary responsibility for resolving debt problems. The IMF should monitor the 
success the country is making, implement preventative strategies to avoid potential 
crises instead of operating as a bailout agency of intemational lenders and domestic 
borrowers. It should devote its energy to crisis prevention before economies relapse 
or collapse completely. As Martin Feldstein prescribes: “If the fund is seen more a 
client-focused and supportive organization than the imposer of painful contractions 
and radical economic reforms, it is likely to find that countries will be more willing to 
invite its assistance when it can be more helpful" (Feldstein 1998,32-33). So much 
for the criticisms of the IMF, what do supporters have to say in defense of the 
Fund?
Defenders of the IMF argue that the world would have been worse off if the IMF 
had not been around for over fifty years. It is a fruitless endeavor, an idle exercise 
in speculation to hypothesize what the world would have been (either better or 
worse or different in other ways) had the IMF not been in existence. It does exist 
and will continue to exist even though its role, purpose, and importance might change
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over the course of time. Realistically, it is not feasible to imagine the IMF to be 
dismantled and dissolved (as some critics from the radical camp call for) as long as 
it has a role to play. It does have a role to play. What might be needed is a profound 
reform and critical reassessment of the IMF in the modem context of the global 
integration.
Defenders of the IMF argue that structural components and conditionality 
prescriptions, which in their view lie at the heart of the crisis and are the causes of 
it, are necessary sacrifices to improve the borrower country’s macroeconomic 
standing. These sacrifices help countries to gain market access and help improve 
growth rates in the long run. IMF defenders emphasize the Fund’s role as a force 
for containing contagion from spreading to other countries. The IMF believes that in 
a world of integrated markets it has a role in containing the crisis from spreading to 
other countries or continents. Sensitivity and vulnerability of markets in one country 
could be the beginning of such contagion.
The IMF supporters believe that the structural elements need to be addressed at 
the first sign of crisis and the involvement of the IMF in crises through loan 
conditionality is critical. They defend the IMF as a balancer in offsetting disintegrative, 
centrifugal tendencies concomitant with economic globalization -  income disparities 
and inequalities between industrialized and developing countries, deep social and 
economic dislocations, market fluctuations, capital flight, market volatility, and capital 
mobility. (There is subtle irony in the fact that the IMF, as a vehicle of economic 
globalization, causes some of these negative effects it is supposed to offset, by 
promoting the neo-liberal model, free market, deregulation, liberalization, and market- 
oriented strategies.) The IMF supporters defend the IMF-imposed structural elements 
as the cure for the causes of crises and the necessary sacrifices for the sustained 
development. In the supporters' analyses, the govemments are perceived as the 
causes of failure, but imprudent decisions on the part of creditors and lenders are
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somewhat downgraded. This concludes our discussion of the criticisms and 
supportive views of the Fund.
How did the IMF become such a powerful institution with a global reach and so 
much leverage? To answer this question, let us analyze the Fund’s genesis from its 
inception to the present time.
Brief Overview of the IMFs Creation, Purposes and Functions.
How Does the IMF Work? The IMF, one of the Bretton Woods institutions, was 
created in 1944 during the atmosphere of WWII when the need for cooperation and 
yearning for stability was felt by all warring countries.^^ The destructive nationalist, 
protectionist policies of the 1930s, and unstable exchange rates, which led to a 
worldwide depression, made the states aware of the dangers of a chaotic, anarchical, 
and unregulated intemational economy. They made a choice between anarchy/ 
chaos and stability/cooperation. The intemational economic environment of the 
1930s, characterized by devastating beggar-thy-nefghbor policies, competitive 
currency devaluations, harmful restrictions and asset and commodify price deflation, 
left deep scars on national economies and a few reminders of the devastating 
breakdown in the system. From the IMFs inception, the necessity for stable monetary 
arrangements and the resolution of balance of payments problems was strongly 
felt by all member-states. The general purpose of the IMF was to promote 
intemational monetary cooperation, to foster exchange rate stability, to facilitate 
the expansion of intemational trade, and help correct maladjustments in the balance 
of payments of member-states. The IMF came into official existence on December 
27,1945, when 29 countries signed the Articles of Agreement agreed upon at a
"  The World Bank was its sister institution establKshed in 1944, GATT was completed in 
1947.
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conference held In Bretton Woods (New Hampshire, USA) from July 1-22, 1944. 
The Fund commenced Its financial operations on March 1,1947.
As Alan Reynolds puts it: “...[TJhe primary role of the Intemational Monetary 
Fund was to foster global stability of exchange rates and prices by providing short­
term financing to countries in which temporary balance of payments problems 
threatened to result in currency devaluations" (Reynolds 1998,247). Kevin Danaher 
points out: “I t ... created a reserve of funds to be tapped by countries experiencing 
temporary balance of payments problems so they could continue trading without 
Interruption” (Danaher 1994, 3). It was understood by all signatory powers that 
above all, the IMF's primary objective was to promote exchange rate stability as 
one of the key eiements of stable intemational economic environment 
By accepting membership in the IMF, a member-state was allocating partial 
sovereignty to become a responsible participant in the intemational economic sphere, 
it also gained access to the Fund's advice and funds. Against the background of the 
devastation and horrors of WWII, original members based their idealistic vision on 
the necessity for economic cooperation and stability. By agreeing to adopt stable 
exchange rates (fixed but adjustable par values) and currency convertibility, a state 
was relinquishing some of its sovereign prerogatives in favor of economic stability 
and cooperation. The membership in the IMF and the acceptance of its obligations, 
though constituting the allocation of sovereignty, were based on consent and 
necessity, whereby the members were actively exercising their sovereignty.
The Bretton Woods system (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
and GATT) was premised on the existence of rules that were designed to govem 
the management o f exchange rates between the signatory states. Exchange rates 
were fixed to gold and the dollar. The limitations on the movement of exchange 
rates represented partial surrender of sovereignty, which translated into binding 
rules of conduct. This rule-based system required that govemments make their
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currencies freely convertible into others, and that they maintain the par value o f 
their currencies within very narrow limits. These rules laid the foundation for stable 
rates between currencies (fixed par value exchange rates). Once these two 
objectives were achieved (currency convertibility and fixed par value currency) a 
member-state could draw on the resources of the IMF for financing deficits on current 
account balance of payments and capital accounts.
According to Article 1 of the Agreement, as adopted at the United Nations Monetary 
and Financial Conference, July 22, 1944, and entered into force December 27, 
1945, the purposes for the establishment of the IMF included:
(i) To promote intemational monetary cooperation through a permanent institution 
which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on intemational 
monetary problems.
(11) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth o f intemational trade, and to 
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment 
and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members 
as primary objectives of economic policy.
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements 
among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.
(iv) To assist In the establishment o f a multilateral system of payments in respect 
to current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange 
restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the 
Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them 
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without 
resorting to measures destructive of national and intemational prosperity.
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree 
o f disequilibrium In the international balances of payments of members.
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It is essential to emphasize that the breadth and the generality of these purposes 
ensured the institutional survivability and adaptability of the IMF as the international 
environment itself undenvent changes and transformations. How did the Fund 
perform these broad tasks? The primary objective of promoting exchange rate 
stability was manifest in the IMF overseeing the par value system in which the value 
of a member’s currency was defined in terms of US dollars or gold. IMF members 
could not change the par value of their currency by more than ten percent without 
the Fund's approval.
Opinions vary on the Fund’s success during the first two decades of its existence. 
For instance, Susan Strange believes in the limited success of the first decades;
Only in 1959, when for the first time the European govemments in concert made 
their currencies convertible, did the Bretton Woods “regime" begin to function. Its 
reign as a system of clear rules for exchange rate management lasted barely more 
than a decade, until 1971 when President Nixon declared the dollar inconvertible 
into gold and allowed the market, rather than the US govemment, to determine the 
dollar's exchange rate with other currencies. (Strange 1997,241 )
It seems, however, that during the early years (1945-1971), the IMF’s role was 
narrow and its performance was quite successful in the postwar stabilization efforts. 
Certain weaknesses and qualifications notwithstanding, the Bretton Woods system 
contributed to the world's economic growth and stability. In fact, the European 
countries lowered their inflation rates and reduced their balance of payments deficits.
The par value system collapsed in the early 1970s in favor of floating exchange 
rates, partly due to the explosive growth of global capital markets. President Richard 
Nixon announced that dollar convertibility into gold was suspended in favor of the 
markets as a measure of the value of currencies. When the pillars on which the IMF 
was resting collapsed (the par value system), there was doubt whether the IMF had
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any future. Critics and supporters alike had doubts about IMFs diminished mandate. 
The economic environment undenwent a profound change-from a rule-based to a 
discretion-based economic system. The IMF had to adapt to the changing 
environment with the help of innovative institutional solutions. Ironically, the drastically 
changed environment offered the IMF new reasons for existence. As Margaret G. 
De Vries describes:
In view of the requirements of the floating exchange rate system, it [the IMF] 
amended its Articles of Agreement extensively to update its legal authority. Its new 
mandate gave it an intensified “surveillance" role - it would monitor not only the 
exchange rate policies of members but also their domestic economic politics affecting 
exchange rates. (DeVries 1995,1)
Why was the IMF able to survive, and not only that, why was it able to expand its 
mandate? The theory o f institutionalization* could be helpful in understanding the 
IMFs institutional survivability. Samuel Huntington in his theory of institutionalization 
described effective and viable institutions as the prerequisite for democratic political 
development. Huntington was describing govemmental institutions. But his theory 
could be applied in the intemational context, in our case the IMF, an intemational 
organization. He measured the level of institutionalization by such criteria as 
adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. The IMF is highly institutionalized, 
which explains its survivability and organizational strength. The original purpose of 
the IMF was exhausted with the collapse of the fixed but adjustable exchange rates 
(par value system) in the early 1970s. Floating rates became the norm of monetary 
policies beginning in 1971. Adaptability {as opposed to rigidity) is one of the 
organizational characteristics that an organization acquires overtime. The original
” See more on tfie poiiticat theory of insthutnnalfzatibn in Samuef Huntington, Political Order in 
Changing Societies, New HavenrYaie Unwersily Press. 1968.
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purpose of the IMF as a “short-term monetary stabilizer" was expanded to a new 
role as a “long-term development financier", comments Nigel Holloway (“Doctor 
Knows Best", Forbes 161, April 6,1998:108(2)) The IMF successfully adapted to 
the changing environment by re-inventing an expanded role for itself, thus, exhibiting 
a high level of adaptability and complexity (i.e., institutionalization). By adapting to 
the changing environment of the first decade of the new millennium the IMF will 
have another chance to exhibit a high level of institutionalization. The adoption and 
the outcome of the reformist agenda still remain to be seen.
In the 1970s, the IMF manifested a high level of adaptability in its ability to adjust 
to the changing environment. Even after the collapse of the par value system, the 
IMF continued to exist with its newly-found expanded role. The role of a development 
financier became important after the wave of de-colonization in the 1960s and after 
the 1973 oil shock. The 1980s saw the IMFs renaissance due to a severe debt 
crisis. Not only did it find new reasons for existence, it acquired increased 
significance. It became a crisis manager after the 1982 debt crisis in Latin America, 
and subsequently, it expanded its role to the lender of last resort and debt manager. 
In 1989 (after the fall of the Berlin Wall) the IMF acquired yet another significant role 
by becoming a development financier for new capitalist states of Eastem Europe. 
Camilleri and Falk observe:
The debt crisis, probably more than any other factor, has propelled the IMF to 
the forefront of intemational decision-making. Both Third World and Eastem 
European countries with sgeable debt problems have almost without exception 
had to rely on the IMF for emergency relief. However, to gain such relief and have 
their creditworthiness restored, they have had to accept the IMF's harsh fiscal 
discipline. (Camilleri and Falk 1992,95)
113
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
One of the reasons the IMF has been able to adapt to the changing environment 
is its institutional ingenuity and resourcefulness in creating new special facilities. 
For instance, when decolonized and developing countries of the Third World drew 
IMFs special attention during the 1960s, it introduced two new lending facilities -  
the Compensatory Financing Facility (1963) and the Buffer Stock Facility (1969). 
These facilities were designed to offset declines in export earning caused by 
fluctuations in the prices of primary products. In the 1970s another lending instrument 
was introduced -  the Extended Fund Facility {"1974) designed for the medium-term 
needs of developing countries.
The oil shocks of the 1970s caused imbalances in extemal payments. Historically, 
high inflation, rising prices, and high unemployment were concomitant with worldwide 
recession. These circumstances expanded IMF role even further and placed it in a 
leadership position. Once again the IMF had to come up with innovative solutions 
to prevent exchange rate instability and competitive devaluations. First Oil and 
Second O il Facilities were established in 1974 and 1975 respectively. The 
Supplementary Financing Facility was approved in 1977. Stand-by Arrangements 
was launched in 1982. A Structural Adjustment Facility was established in 1986. 
An Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility {ESAF) was approved shortly afterwards 
in 1987.
The Systemic Transformation Facility was adopted in 1993. Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Faciiity{PRGF), first adopted as ESAF in 1987, was enlarged in 1994 
and further strengthened in 1999. It made poverty reduction its key element. 
Currently, 80 low-income countries are eligible for PRGF. Heavily Indebted Poor 
Country (HIPC) Initiative, adopted in 1996, is worth mentioning. According to the 
IMF, it is a comprehensive approach to debt relief which involves multilateral, official, 
and bilateral creditors. This list of regular and special facilities demonstrates the 
IMF adaptability as an institution to adjust to the changing environment. In short, it
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has been able to reinvent its role, its mission, and its mandate in order to adapt to 
the changing needs of its members as well as to the changing international milieu. 
And again, views on the IMF track record are divided between its supporters and 
critics.
The role of the IMF as a lender of last resort has put the Fund in the forefront of 
crisis resolution management. This function is akin to that of an international credit 
union. It is like paying an insurance policy: you just never know when you might 
need it, just in case something happened, and you needed cash in an expedient 
manner. However, the IMF insurance policy often has strings attached to it, called 
conditionality. A country is insuring itself for potential crises, in a manner of speaking, 
by joining the IMF. In its structure, the IMF essentially resembles a “financial 
cooperative”, as Devesh Kapur describes it;
In principle, the IMF has a structure akin to a financial cooperative. A member 
country's contributions to the IMF (called “quotas") are based on its weight in the 
global economy. This weight also determines its voting power and borrowing capacity 
(called “drawings!. Quotas amount to an exchange of assets with little direct cost 
to taxpayers. For instance, in the case of the United States, its contributions entitle 
it to an equal amount of U.S. claims on other currencies. That is, just as other 
countries can draw U.S. dollars from the IMF in times of need (such as pressures 
on the U.S. dollar), the United States can draw their currencies (be it the Japanese 
yen or the German mark) for itself. In fact, the United States has drawn on the IMF 
on 28 different occasions, most recently a $3 billion drawing in 1978. (Kapur 1998, 
116)
What about the IMF's contribution to the world economic system which is 
characterized by global financial and capital markets and the growing 
interdependence of national economies? What is the IMF's track record in promoting
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and fostering globalization and global markets? Indeed, the IMF has functioned in 
an important capacity as a vehicle of globalization and global integration. According 
to Manuel Guitian:
Progressively integrated capital markets are the logical result of the past fifty 
years' worth of effort by the IMFs members to fulfill their objective, and the institution's 
mandate, of opening and liberalizing trade and current account balances. Open 
national markets for goods and services, leading to growing trade flows, could not 
but enhance closer financial and credit ties among trading nations, which is an 
essential factor behind the intemationaiization of capital flows. (Guitian 1995,792)
At the present moment, the IMF continues to function in its enhanced capacity 
as an advisor, a surveyor, an overseer, a monitor of the macroeconomic management 
policies of states, and as a policeman in disciplining ailing indebted economies and 
financially weak states. It continues to perform the role of an intergovernmental 
forum, a consultant, an advisory agency, a crisis manager, a debt manager, and the 
lender of last resort. It continues to perform a surveillance role, which gives the 
Fund the mandate to appraise members' exchange rate policies and to assess the 
general economic situation and the policy strategy of each member. It serves as an 
international consulting entity that offers technical and financial assistance. The 
IMF is further increasing its regulatory function by becoming a sort of world policeman 
and disciplinarian in toughening up conditions of “bail-out" and conditionality 
packages.
Now the IMF is expanding its mandate by taking on a political agenda —  Mr. 
Michel Camdessus, the former Managing Director for the IMF. announced a new 
enhanced role for the IMF in a Washington speech in February 1998. Economic 
deregulation, a war on corruption, reductions in costly military build-ups, increased 
spending on basic human needs, worker retraining programs, environmental
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concerns, and a push for good governance are some of the items on the IMFs 
highly politicized agenda. It is a matter of debate whether the IMF has competence 
in those areas (some of them are of a political nature and arguably beyond its 
Jurisdiction). As an institution, performing an important integrative function, the IMF 
is moving towards a more expanded role, by exerting not just an economic but a 
vast political leverage. Does the IMF have sufficient jurisdiction and a legitimate 
mandate in those areas? Again, critics and supporters are divided on this issue. 
There are a lot of sovereignty issues as well as the haunting question of economic 
and political coercion. These and other concerns will be addressed in the next 
section.
Legal Status of the IMF As an International Organization:
Theory and Practice
The IMF is a specialized agency of the United Nations. It enjoys a certain degree 
of independence and possesses a legal personality, which enables it to be a 
prominent decision-making authority in the international arena. It is able to enter 
into legal and binding agreements with member-states. The IMF is an international 
multilateral institution. It is a grouping of states, which is formed to further the 
members' interests by pooling their resources. The idea behind such an institution 
is to strengthen the whole by putting separate pieces together. The IMF is comprised 
of sovereign states that actively exercise their sovereignty by joining the Fund. 
Once it joins, a state's freedom of action (sovereignty) is limited. The IMF dictates 
its decisions to its members, thus, restraining their actions. In theory the IMF is 
supposed to act on behalf of and represent the interests of all its member-states, 
not just the powerful few.
Membership in an international financial institution is an international act. It is an 
open, formal, consensual, and intentional delegation of sovereignty to a state
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grouping. Thus, a member-state passes its sovereign sticks to the IMF as a practical 
necessity (which proves our earlier point that sovereignty is allocable and divisible). 
A sovereign state, by definition, resenres the right to withdraw its membership from 
the Fund, although the consequences of that might be detrimental to a state’s 
economy, reputation, and economic standing. By joining the IMF, a member-state 
reduces its ability to act freely. For instance, a state may not freely alter its exchange 
rate to make exports more attractive and to boost economic growth. That might 
constitute exchange rate manipulation and gaining an unfair competitive advantage 
over other members.
Why Join the/MF? Apart from facilitation of economic cooperation and international 
trade, the IMF provides intemationai financing, which could be indispensable in 
different circumstances. A state determines, through a cost-benefit analysis, how 
much power and authority is allocated to the IMF, as the price of membership, 
which is weighed against the benefits and rights gained through the membership. 
(It should be noted in passing that a cost-benefit analysis of power allocation in the 
case of a Third World country could be a speculative exercise, for it could lack 
power, authority, and control over economic matters before it even joins the IMF).
Integration theorists hold that persons (states) adopt integrative behavior, in our 
case by joining the IMF, because of expectations of joint rewards and penalties. 
Haas postulated that “the decision to proceed with integration [i.e., to join an 
intemationai entity], or to oppose it. depends upon the expectations of gain or loss 
held by major groups within the unit to be integrated" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 
1990,438). A joining state exhibits pragmatism, it assesses pros and cons, relative 
benefits, privileges, obligations, and costs ensuing from the membership, weighs 
gains and “losses," and decides whether the membership's benefits outweigh the 
costs. In other words, rationalization Is based on the perception of rewards in excess 
of costs. The costs include a subscription payment (quota), which Is calculated on
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the basis of economic power a state possesses as relative to other states, and the 
passage of sovereign sticks through the acceptance of obligations imposed on all 
members.
Other obligations include the commitment by each member-state to “direct its 
economic and financial policies towards the objective of fostering orderly economic 
growth" (The IMF Articles, Article IV, paragraph 1(1)). It is the IMF, an intemationai 
entity, not the state, that determines and formulates what constitutes “orderly 
economic growth.” The IMF, as an overseer of economic cooperation and a facilitator 
of intemationai trade, can pass judgment on a state's fiscal and monetary policies 
(which constitute its national interest and welfare). The definition of “orderly economic 
growth" is often heavily influenced by the United States as the member with the 
largest subscription quota, by the neo-liberal vision, and by other powerful member- 
states. Another commitment on the part of joining states constitutes the agreement 
to avoid manipulating exchange rates in order “to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage over other members" (Article IV, paragraph 1 (ill)). If the IMF believes 
that a member-state is altering its exchange rate to gain that advantage, the state 
could become ineligible to use the IMFs funds.
What are other real, tangible benefits of joining the IMF? The IMF is an influential 
financial institution endowed with the ability to transfer large sums of capital. A state 
receives a needed sum of money in exchange for the acceptance of terms and 
conditions as the cost of receiving capital. In theory, a state makes a conscious and 
free decision to obtain the capital. The state is thought to be exercising its sovereign 
powers by choice: expressly, rationally, and consciously. This delegation (or transfer) 
of sovereign powers is multilateral because a receiving state gets the funds from 
the pool o f capital provided by a grouping o f states. In practice, the role of the IMF 
as a lender of last resort serves as an incentive to be part of the organization when 
private and public lenders refuse to lend money. It is a kind of the Central Bank for
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the international community for the states in distress. Furthermore, membership in 
the IMF is essential to be considered a full member and participant in the intemationai 
arena, thus elevating a state’s status by having the IMF’s seal of approval. 
Membership in the IMF is nearly universal -  it has 182 members as of March 2000. 
The IMF’s seal of approval provides acceptance and market access, which signal 
the green light for lenders and creditors to go ahead with lending. Now, let us analyze 
some of the IMF’s lending and financing practices, which is essential for a deeper 
understanding of the Fund’s role in the changing world. Does the IMF live up to its 
name as an international financial cooperative'? Is it the democratic institution it 
purports to be? Has the international community created an institution that is attuned 
to ail its members’ needs and expectations?
The IMF Conditionality: Limitations On Sovereignty
It is often assumed that all intemationai law is based on consent (express or 
tacit). As mentioned earlier, this broad assumption of intemationai law as consensual 
does not correspond to reality. It is a folly to assume that the delegation of sovereignty 
is always equated with or based on consent. Yes, undoubtedly, governments join 
intemationai organizations and sign treaties by consent (thus, imposing self­
limitations). By signing treaties and joining intemationai organizations, states actively 
exercise their sovereignty, whereby they expressly consent through open 
intemationai acts. Yes, states have to abide by established practices and norms of 
intemationai customs, and norms and rules of conduct, which are deemed binding 
on them through implied consent.
But powerful economic actors (public or private) do not always seek governments’ 
consent (express or implied). Preceding chapters showed the extent to which 
globalization (particularly, technological innovation, information technologies, and 
economic integration) transforms comfortable landscapes and old, rigid orthodoxies.
120
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
States very often lack participation and often are just passive participants in the 
workings of private economic institutions, i.e., in the decisions of private investors, 
money managers, multinationals’ executives, international portfolio managers, 
brokers, traders, or commercial banks. Through the power of the purse, whether 
with or without obtaining formal consent and acknowledgment from governments, 
non-state economic actors influence economic policies in the domestic and 
intemationai spheres. They exert economic and financial leverage on states, which 
is a form of economic intervention, thereby causing shifts in financial and economic 
power. As a consequence, states are coerced to allocate sovereign “sticks” to 
powerful non-state actors.
The IMFs bail-out and conditionality practices constitute another form of economic 
intervention. The following discussion is premised on the idea that a state’s consent 
is very limited in the IMF conditionality practices and loan requirements. In theory, 
partial delegation of sovereignty is bound to take place if a state consents to certain 
policies (conditions) in exchange for financial assistance. We will show that these 
conditions that states agree to have the nature of coercive impositions. This highly 
limited consent and imposing nature of loan conditions lead to involuntary surrender 
of sovereignty, which questions and undermines the legitimacy of sovereign national 
governments and the workability of IMF packages.
The IMF practices perpetuate the inferior vs. superior pattern and the divide 
between the developing vs. the industrialized world. These practices demonstrate 
a troubling “doctor-patienf dependency relationship between a receiving state and 
the IMF. The desperate circumstances of a debtor country trigger the application for 
a loan in the first place, which does not leave much room to maneuver or to negotiate. 
The IMF extends its help to those poor, indebted, and crisis-stricken countries to 
which no commercial bank or creditor is willing to lend. The helpless and hopeless 
nature of a loan request gives the IMF overwhelming leverage which is unduly
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applied through loan conditionality In theory sovereign states should be able to 
negotiate with the IMF on the conditionality of loans, thus retaining significant 
authority (sovereignty) in decision-making, especially, if the IMF wants to be 
perceived as a democratic, not an oligarchic or dictatoriai, institution. However, 
conditions are rigid and applied to all situations indiscriminately. Let us now discuss 
the mechanisms of loan conditionality.
Conditionality is a process whereby the IMF provides loans to countries on the 
condition that they pursue goals and policies under the guidance of the IMF. The 
IMF weighs the situation and assesses economic policies of the borrowing country 
to determine if financial support is warranted. Because the IMF is an influential 
lending agency, its approval is the green light for other lenders (private and 
commercial banks included) to go ahead with their loans. The effectiveness of IMF 
conditionality is highly contested. Here, the critics of the IMF from the Left and the 
Right Join hands. Alan Reynolds remarks:
There is, in fact, no commonly recognized group of IMF ‘success stories' at all. 
Indeed, we have been unable to find a single example of IMF inten/ention 
unambiguously improving an economy's performance over a sustained period, 
though we show many examples of countries that have made dramatic improvements 
on their own. (Reynolds 1998,248)’®
Here, we take a critical approach towards conditionality practices of the IMF in 
view of the lack of unambiguous and unequivocal success stories. We will criticize 
the IMF conditionality strictures in light of the lack of considerable improvement of 
economic performance of debtor countries. In the final analysis, IMF conditionality
All Alan Reynolds' quotations are taken from Money and the Nathn-State, (where he is one of 
the constributors), edited by Kevin Dowd and Richard H. Timberlake. Jr.. Transaction Publishers, 
1998. His article (Chapter 8) is entitled The IMFs Destruct we Recipe: Rising Tax Rates and Falling 
Currencies", p.p. 247-301.
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often translates Into highertaxes, higher interest rates, higher unemployment, falling 
currencies, depressed economy, slow economic growth, accelerating inflation, 
stagnant and declining living standards, flight o f capital, loss o f investor confidence 
in a country's economy, and generally speaking, a freeze on economic activity. It 
would not be appropriate to blame the IMF for all the ills and woes that may befall a 
borrower country, but conditionality practices often contribute to or perpetuate the 
worsened economic conditions. The conversion of IMF loans into economic 
stabilization, sustained growth, and independence irom any future IMF assistance 
remains but a lofty ideal. The freedom from the dependency relationship will remain 
but an unattainable goal unless the IMF launches the reformist agenda.
Ironically, the IMF has to accept criticism from its own staff on the perceived 
failures of structural adjustment reforms and loan conditionalities in the developing 
world. Mohsin Khan writes:
Although there have been a number of studies on the [structural adjustment] 
subject over the past decade, one cannot say with certainty whether programs 
have “worked” or not... On the basis of existing studies, one certainly cannot say 
whether the adoption of programs supported by the Fund led to an improvement in 
inflation and growth performance. In fact it is often found that programs are associated 
with a rise in inflation and a fall in the growth rate. (The Macroeconomic Effects of 
Fund Supported Adjustment Programs", IMF Staff Papers 37{2), 1990,196- 222)
IMF conditionality lending is of the short-term nature, IMF performance targets 
must be met and loans repaid just within a few years: a typical loan is a stand-by 
letter of credit, which is a one-year agreement repayable in three to five years. A 
borrowing country is expected to reorient its economy most drastically in a short 
period of time and meet strict performance targets. As the empirical evidence shows, 
a typical IMF conditionality package causes recessionary tendencies and
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contractionary economy in the borrowing country. Thus, “the performance targets 
must be met and the loans repaid over the shortterm, which conflicts with the long­
term reorientation process," note Gary Woller and David Kirkwood Hart. (Woller 
and Hart 1995, 5)
It is short-sighted of the IMF officials to require that developing countries reorient 
and achieve within a few years what took industrialized countries decades to 
accomplish. Woller and Kirkwood Hart observe that “no other industrial or newly 
industrialized country has developed according to the IMF model” (Woller and 
Kirkwood Hart 1995,5). As mentioned earlier, IMF conditionality practices represent 
a form of economic intervention. The empirical evidence indicates that strong 
industrialized countries influence the conditionality attached to the loans, thus 
furthering their own agendas. If it is not the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith that 
regulates national economies and markets, it is the visible hand of great powers 
and the IMF furthering the neoliberal economic model.
In practice, what seems to be in place is the perpetuation o f a dependency 
relationship where debtor countries remain on the IMF patient, “sick care” list for 
decades without any chance of breaking the pattern. The IMF does not need to 
justify its existence by perpetuating this vicious circle. It should help the “sick” 
economies to get well by eliminating the pattern of dependency and inferiority, 
because whatever the future might bring, the IMF is likely to find a new purpose, 
and a new mandate for itself in the global economy.
A typical conditionality package includes the following requirements, which 
translate into the considerable surrender of crucial sovereign sticks. A traditional 
conditionality loan is essentially based on a macroeconomic, dememd management 
approach, with the exchange rate, the interest rate, and devaluation as the singular 
principal variables. IMF conditionality is essentially a liberal (free market) model 
which ultimately reduces the rof&ofa state in the workings o f an economy:
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1) devaluation o f the currency {often repeated rounds of devaluations), with the 
purpose of reducing trade deficits, or current-accounts deficits (which translates 
into floating exchange rates);
2) imposition of a monefansf rule - restrictions on money creation or credit, limits 
on money growth and money supply (i.e. freezes on minting of money), which 
results in government policies that cut real expenditures and reduce real wages;
3) budgetary austerity, i.e. set targets for reducing govemments budget deficits;, 
cuts in government programs (essentially, social programs), cutbacks in social- 
sectorprograms (social welfare - health, education, food, housing, etc.);
4) higher taxes and higher interest rates (a policy which often negatively affects 
employment, investment and entrepreneurship);
5) government wage controls to lower real wage rates with the purpose of 
suppressing inflation, which in fact causes deindexation o f wages and inflation;
6) reduced consumer demand, reduced consumption, contraction of demand, 
which translate into the reduction of purchasing power and shrinking of domestic 
markets. As a consequence, domestic production is replaced by imports;
7) the reallocation of resources to the export sector, export-oriented policies;
8) trade liberalization through the deregulation of domestic commodity markets, 
removal o f pnce controls, which result in higher domestic prices, dolfanzation of 
domestic prices as they are brought to the world market levels, i.e., overall 
dollarization of national economy;
9) removal o f trade restrictions, lowering barriers to imports, dismantling of foreign 
exchange restrictions and restrictions on foreign investment;
10) deregulation o f banking system;
11) privati^tion and divestiture of state-owned enterprises;
12) eliminating subsidies to local industries.
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A borrowing country is faced with an overwhelming task to achieve all these 
requirements and goals within a short period of time. It is expected to make 
improvements, reform the economy, and pay back the loans all at the same time.
The cornerstone of conditionality and structural adjustment measures seems to 
be currency devaluation. The IMFs excessive emphasis and obsession with currency 
devaluations is almost anecdotal. Is the IMFs staff out of innovative macro- or 
microeconomic ideas? Alan Reynolds points out that there is “an element of irony 
and hypocrisy in the fact that industrial countries have condoned the IMFs habit of 
promoting currency devaluations among the less developed countries, since (1 ) 
the IMF was created to prevent such devaluations, and (2) the industrial countries 
have been trying to stabilize their own exchange rates through G-7 meetings and 
the European Monetary System” (Reynolds 1998,250).
Economists and analysts have long been pointing out the IMF’s one-sided 
macroeconomic approach to conditionality. The IMF emphasis on demand-side, 
macroeconomic variables such as the interest rate and the exchange rate shows 
the bias against structural, microeconomic, supply-side reforms. Vito Tanzi, the IMF 
Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department, commented on the IMF’s bias and the 
detrimental effects that IMF one-sided approach could cause:
The design of adjustment programs should integrate stabilization with growth, 
or demand-management policies with structural, supply-side policies ... such as 
changes In various taxes and tax rates.... The more far reaching the structural 
reform agreed to by the country, the greater will be that supply response (In terms 
of output, exports, capital repatriation, and the like). Such a supply response may 
imply that a less stringent demand-management policy is necessary. Excessive 
reliance on macroeconomic ceilings may divert attention away from the quality, as 
well as the durability, of the specific measures used. ... Work effort, exports, 
productive investment, savings, capital flight, foreign Investment, and so on can be
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affected by the choice of specific fiscal instruments.... Sometimes countries have 
raised payroll taxes or taxes on interest income with undesirable repercussions on 
employment, saving, and capital flight (Tanzi 1989,15-23. Emphasis in original)’®
Let us now analyze in detail some of the effects of conditionality impositions on 
national economies. Limits on money growth and budget deficits are aimed at 
restraining domestic demand. Wage controls and devalued currency are aimed at 
making a country's exports more competitive. But these policies often cause higher 
inflation and new rounds of devaluations. The reality is that in a global economy, 
with increasing capital mobility, some states will have a surplus on the capital 
accounts (which is a net inflow of foreign investment), which translates into a deficit 
on the current account. The IMF adjustment policy often suppresses investment 
through higher taxes and higher interest rates, causing the capital account to be in 
deficit. In its zeal to fix current-account deficits by promoting a current account 
surplus, the IMF causes cutbacks on investment and a capital account deficit, which 
unfortunately means capital flight (Reynolds 1998,247-299). The IMF believes in 
its mission to improve disequilibriums in the balance of payments (which is thought 
to be synonymous with the balance of trade, neglecting capital flow) through 
devaluations. Devaluations are perceived as necessary to convert trade deficits 
into surpluses. Surpluses and export revenues are then recycled back to the IMF 
and foreign creditors and the servicing of foreign debt. Note the export-oriented 
strategies of the newly industrializing countries, which is an attempt to generate 
trade surpluses to meet strict repayment deadlines imposed by the IMF. .
Alan Reynolds points at another contradiction in IMF adjustment programs; "The 
obsession with manipulating an economy into a trade surplus through currency
"  Quoted In Alan Reynolds, The IMFs Destructive Recipe; Rising lax Rates and Falling 
Currencies", 1998, p. 293.
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devaluation invariably results in high inflation, which makes it quite impossible to 
comply with IMF limits on the growth of money or credit" (Reynolds 1998, 250). In 
their desperate attempt to meet rigid deadlines and targets, governments impose 
higher taxes, which consequently translates into hikes in prices. And to put it simply 
-  it is harder to repay the loans with devalued currencies. Furthermore, in real 
terms, adjustment therapy means cutbacks on social and welfare programs, it often 
ensures devastating consequences for the general population. In practice, it 
translates into high prices, falling real wages, shrinking savings accounts, 
dollarization of the national economy stifled consumption, falling consumer demand, 
slower economic growth, and a diminishing social safety net. It seems 
counterproductive to attempt to cure macroeconomic “ills” at the expense of the 
most vulnerable portion of the population.
Conditionality impositions seem to undermine the safety net and the social contract 
between the government and the population, the assurance of which is one of the 
essential duties of the state to its citizenry. It seems ludicrous of the IMF to ask for 
drastic cutbacks on much-needed social programs and social protections in 
developing countries when industrialized countries themselves try to strengthen 
their safety nets in the age of globalization (take, for instance, the budget surplus 
and the social security debate in the United States). It could be suggested that the 
orthodox IMF-mandated policies seem to be overly rigid, recessionary, politically 
and economically unsustainable, and socially regressive. The IMF-mandated policies 
are often myopic to the political and economic realities of the borrowing countries. 
It should be pointed out, however, in fear of appearing myopic, dogmatic, and biased, 
that the blame for the country’s predicaments could lie with poor leadership, bad 
actions, and unwise policies of politicians. These predicaments could only be further 
worsened by the IMF-sponsored shock therapies and poor policy choices of the 
country’s leadership. Poor and ineffective leadership of a borrowing country could
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be equally responsible for that country’s predicaments. It only proves the point that 
the IMF should be more attentive to various variables and conditions which 
characterize the environment of this or that borrowing country. It also shows that a 
closer cooperation between the Fund and borrowing countries is necessary.
The IMF motto is short-term pain for long-term gain. According to this vision, the 
whole society will eventually reap the economic benefits of stabilization reforms. 
Economic benefits will be balanced out against the social costs of adjustment. But 
does the end Justify the means? There is an inherent paradox or contradiction in 
the adjustment program that the IMF promotes. The current-account deficit equals 
the difference between investment and savings. To be effective, devaluation must 
boost savings by making it attractive to save or suppress investment by making it 
less attractive to invest (so that plus and minus would even each other out). What 
the IMF devaluation does achieve is detrimental — it suppresses and discourages 
BOTH savings and investment! Who wants to save a shrinking currency that is 
worth little in real terms? The public becomes unwilling (and rightly so) to hold a 
shrinking local currency, which in tum reduces demand for money and causes 
inflation (increases in prices). Devaluation causes lower investment (shrinking current 
and future income), loss of creditworthiness and loss of investor confidence.
Unfortunately, prospects for economic growth do not look promising with weak 
investment and freezes on credit. The IMF devaluation cure does not seem to heal 
effectively. By trying to bring about seemingly positive results, it causes even deeper 
dependency, inflationary cycles and perpetuates a negative lender-debtor pattern. 
The spirals of inflation and repeated devaluations perpetuate the debtor status. If a 
borrower country is not willing to make necessary sacrifices and fails to comply, it is 
punished. Its credit rating and creditworthiness fall drastically; official, private, and 
public loans are not forthcoming, in short, it is blacklisted.
129
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
We do not take issue In principle with the IMF attempting to help debtor countries 
get funding and reschedule foreign debt. We take issue with IMF’s structural 
orthodoxy, with certain corrective and adjustment measures that are aimed at 
stabilization but in the end contribute to a country’s deep social and political 
dislocations and economic disequilibrium. We take issue with what seems to be the 
IMFs bias in favor of creditors and lenders-the IMF makes sure that foreign lenders 
are paid first even though governments might not be totally responsible for policy 
failures. With increasing market integration and growing market volatility, it is 
ludicrous to favor creditors and lenders when they might be just as responsible for 
the failures.
The consequences of the IMF inten/ention are both economic and political. The 
IMF adjustment programs regulate social, economic, and political behavior of a 
borrower state, thus getting deeply entrenched into its sovereign realm. This 
interventionist framework has a deep social impact. The borrower countries forego 
their economic sovereignty, i.e., they lose considerable control over their fiscal and 
monetary policies. Furthermore, the IMF intervention bypasses the opinion of political 
community which is directly affected by the structural reforms.
Sovereign states subject themselves to conditionality and the IMF policing 
because they are indebted, because everybody else has turned them down, or 
because they are facing a deep crisis. However, the debt management offered by 
the IMF through debt rescheduling ensures that borrower countries get deeper in 
debt (sort of a vicious circle). According to this strategy, repayment of the principal 
is deferred while interest payments are enforced, debt is exchanged for equity and 
new loans are given to states on the verge of default or bankruptcy to enable them 
to pay off their interest arrears on old debts. As a result, the debt stock is increased. 
Only temporarily does this provide a solution to avert sovereign default. In exchange 
for “saving” the debtor country strict discipline is enforced through IMF conditionalities
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-  the IMF dictates its neo-liberal strictures in exchange for financial “rewards." 
However, any possibility for an independent policy course or a unique national 
strategy is eliminated (and ignored), and any chance for an endogenous 
developmental process is reduced to an unattainable ideal.
It is a sovereign prerogative of a state to decide on the course of action in its 
economic and political spheres. Heavy imposition from the IMF in the form of 
unpopular or politically unsustainable IMF-sponsored reforms undermines the 
effective exercise of sovereignty. While the IMFs “medicine” is “digested” and “re­
processed” through the actions of national governments, harsh discipline, shock 
therapies, and austerity measures can cause a deep crisis. Moderation in the IMFs 
prescription of devaluation medicine is highly advisable if governments (the IMF 
included) are to enjoy acceptance, legitimacy, and trust from the political community. 
Structural adjustment reforms could be detrimental to political stability, which might 
cause economic instability and further deepening of an economic crisis. The cause- 
effect relationship between the deepening crisis and the IMF-sponsored policies 
could be easily discerned, subjecting the IMF and national governments to harsh 
criticism for irresponsible actions (take, for instance, the case of Russia).
To sum up, to be perceived as the vehicle of stabilization and as a positive, 
constructive force, the IMF has to design new, innovative, and flexible strategies 
that will yield tangible results for the people directly affected by the structural reforms. 
It should be emphasized that we do not question the existence or good intentions of 
the IMF per se. We take issue with its track record, with its rigid conditionality 
strategies, with its one-size-fits-all approach, with the imposition of a liberal vision 
on all borrower countries indiscriminately, and with the imposition of harsh penalizing 
measures on crisis-stricken sovereign states. Is it not only democratic, the IMF 
being devoted to the spread of democratic values, that if the IMF imposes loan 
conditions and deadlines, and demands strict implementation of the structural
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reforms without deviation that it should also give some guarantee to the borrower 
states that the prescribed strategies will have a chance of success? We will offer 
our suggestions, recommendations, and possible alternative strategies at the end 
of the chapter. Let us now analyze the role of the IMF in promoting global integration 
and Its role as a vehicle of economic globalization.
The IMF In the Globalized Economy
The diminishing capacity ofthe state to regulate national economic activity in a  period ofmomiing 
conflict in the intemationai marketplace has strengthened the integrative function o f intemationai 
institutions.
Camilleri and Falk (The End o f Sovereignty? 1992,94)
The Increasing Importance of International financial Institutions (IFIs) Is part of 
the on-goIng economic globalization. As markets, regions, national economies, and 
governments become more Integrated and Interconnected, the Importance of an 
International forum, a macroeconomic “surveillance” agency and a crisis manager, 
such as the International Monetary Fund, cannot be discounted. Further shifts In 
economic power away from national bases to International and global actors will 
bring about profound shifts In traditional paradigms. These shifts. In tum, will affect 
the degree of sovereign power that states are able to exercise. In conjunction with 
the theorizing of economic globalization and shifts In the sovereignty paradigm, 
theories of International Integration offer helpful Insights and deeper understanding 
of the subject-matter at hand.
“Integration Is hypothesized to be accompanied by an increase in transactions, 
including trade, capital movement, communications, and exchange o f people and 
/dèas” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990,443). But how do economic and political 
systems gain and retain cohesiveness, and become integrated? The first explanation 
could be outlined as such -  political systems gain and retain cohesiveness because
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of widely shared values among their members and general agreement about the 
framework o f the system. Here the terms “procedural consensus” and “substantive 
consensus" are invoked to signify general agreement about the political framework 
and the legal processes by which issues are resolved, and the solutions to problems 
the political system Is called upon to solve (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, 431). 
The second explanation of integrative processes Is based on the presence, or threat, 
offeree. This view recognizes the Importance of coercive power in the Integration 
of political communities. In other words, this view posits the existence of relationships 
between conflict and the Integration of political, economic, and social units.
Here, we take an eclectic approach-we distinguish between conflict (coercion) 
and cooperation as two basic patterns of International behavior Intermittently at 
work, complementing and enriching each other. They are manifest In various 
economic, political, social, public, private, state, and non-state Interactions. However, 
the cause-effect relationships of these two patterns do not automatically translate 
Into International Integration or Integrative processes. They are not predetermined. 
Take, for Instance, economic globalization, a seem/rig/y integrative process, which 
Is also characterized by conflicting, disintegrative, and centrifugal trends.
As mentioned earlier, the IMF was created at the wake of WWII, a massive 
worldwide conflict which wrought misery and devastation to the whole world. The 
world war, a conflict on a global scale, made states yearn for cooperation, which 
manifested Itself In the conception of numerous intemationai organizations. These 
new intemationai organizations were a tribute to the growing consensus among 
states and the willingness to surrender partial sovereignty in exchange for the benefits 
of cooperation. The Integrative processes following World War II were a reaction to 
the horrors and the unprecedented destruction of that war (however, to be followed 
by the Cold War and a new world conflict). They were also a tribute to a growing 
consensus among states. David Mitrany (the proponent of functionalism and
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integration theories) noted that integrative processes were also a reaction to the 
growing complexity of governmental systems. He also suggested that due to growing 
complexity, essentially, technical and nonpolitical tasks (economic, scientific, 
environmental, social) facing governments had been greatly Increased. He 
hypothesized that complex technical problems could be better resolved by experts 
as opposed to politicians who do not have specialized knowledge In those areas. 
The resolution of these nonpolitical problems should be delegated to experts from 
the affected countries. Mitrany believed that the proliferation of common problems 
would demonstrate the logic of Interrelatedness and would require collaborative 
responses from states. He believed that growing transnational ties, the reduction of 
extreme nationalism, and International Integration could Increase the chances for a 
stable International environment.
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff thus explain the Integrative processes and the 
underlying complexity of technical tasks:
The growth In importance of technical Issues In the twentieth century Is said to 
have made necessary the creation of frameworks for International cooperation. 
Such functional organizations could be expected to expand both In their numbers 
and In scope as the technical problems confronting humankind grew In both 
Immensity and magnitude. (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990,432)
Integration consists of the emergence of new structures that may overlay, but 
not necessarily replace the older ones. Integration is, essentially, a joining together 
of states, or other political or economic units under a common authority to deal with 
common probiems and issues facing each separate unit Functionalist and other 
Integration theories focus on purposes and tasks performed by organizations; they 
emphasize an Increase In the number of international organizations as a response 
to an increase in the number of tasks and purposes requiring attention.
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/nfer-national means between states, not global. It might seem a paradox that 
sovereign states, by joining intemationai economic organizations, delegate partial 
sovereignty (willingly, by choice, by consent) to the IMF. The underlying Idea Is that 
there are certain functions and technical tasks that the IMF (or other International 
entitles) can perform more effectively than separate states or governments (see the 
preceding discussion on functionalism). States pool their resources together to 
Improve, combat, or transform certain conditions as they strive to achieve mutually 
agreed upon goals.
Charles Pentland noted that “International political Integration Is frequently 
Identified with the circumvention, reduction, or abolition of the sovereign power of 
modem nation-states.” {International Theory and European Integration, 1973,29) 
And again, partial delegation of sovereignty Is viewed as a practical necessity In 
exchange for the benefits derived from Increased cooperation and pooling together 
of jo in t resources. New Integrated structures reflect a growing sense of 
Interrelatedness between or among political and economic structures, and that Is 
the essence of Integration and. In the present context, of globalization.
The creation of the IMF, which was essentially designed to regulate exchange 
rates and promote exchange stability (a highly technical task), attributes to the 
functionalist theory. The successful Inauguration of the IMF also attributes to the 
procedural and substantive consensus among the participating states. The IMF Is 
an organization for functional collaboration, to use the functionalist term, which enjoys 
nearly universal membership -1 8 2  countries (as of March 2000). It Is crucial to 
understand that economic globalization gives rise to pressures for functional 
collaboration on banking. Insurance, tax, wage, pricing. Import-export, and monetary 
policies. Functionalist and integration theories are helpful In understanding forces 
underlying globalization. Functionalism, as an explanatory tool, focuses on schemes 
for cooperation and collaboration, whereas realism emphasizes conflict and
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competition as a principal pattern of International behavior. In light of an eclectic 
approach, collaboration and conflict are complementary patterns of International 
behavior. The proposed eclectic approach also explains conflicting trends Inherent 
In globalization -  Integrative processes and functionalist collaboration could be 
accompanied by pressure, competition, conflict, and coercion. Take, for Instance, 
IMF conditionality, ball-out packages, and structural adjustment reforms that coerce 
countries Into a drastic overhaul of national economies In exchange for financial 
assistance.
Paradoxically, /hfer-natlonal organizations such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, though comprised of sovereign member-states, serve 
as vehicles of economic globalization. The IMF promotes Integration but also helps 
member-states “manage" the negative effects of globalization during the time of 
crises (liquidity shortages, defaults on sovereign debt. Insolvency crises, debt 
rescheduling, etc.) The effectiveness of the IMF In the “management” of globalization 
has been a highly contentious Issue as I have already mentioned. But the paradox 
underlying the IMFs future Is worth exploring -  the IMF, as a vehicle of economic 
globalization, promotes substantial surrender of sovereignty but, simultaneously. 
Its actual survival Is premised on the existence of states.
The IMF As a Vehicle of Economic Globalization 
At the heart of economic globalization lie the processes of integration between 
m arkets and national economies; growing economic interdependency; 
internationalization of information, finance, banking, production, economic 
transactions, services, and communications; lowering of barriers and easing of 
government controls; and the increasing volume o f transactions outside government 
control. How significant is the Intemationai Monetary Fund In the realization of these 
trends? Indeed, its role should not be underestimated. The IMF fosters economic
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globalization by promoting international trade, through its policies of trade 
liberalization and the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions, by promoting the 
liberalization of markets and the deregulation of national economies, by promoting 
the privatization of state-owned enterprises and Industries, which, In short, are the 
tenets of a neo-liberal economic modei. Free trade, perfect competition, and 
efficiency are the Ideals of neo-llberalism; economic growth Is Its primary goal, 
where the market Is the central organizing principle of human society. In short, the 
IMF has been regarded as a force promoting a neo-llberal model, and considerably 
Influenced by US vision (the United States having the largest quota and the greatest 
voting power).
Generally speaking, the IMF plays an Important role In promoting and regulating 
the Internationalization and transnatlonallzatlon of economic activity. The Increasing 
Influence of the IMF, a powerful regulatory body, could be explained by the decline 
In the states’ economic power {economic sovereignty) to regulate their own 
economies. Such globalizing trends as free market pressures, liberalization, 
deregulation of national economies, the lowering of protectionist barriers, and the 
Increasing Interdependence and Interlinking of national economies necessitate the 
IMF’s leading role as a regulatory and Integrative body. Furthermore, such negative 
effects of globalization as the Increasing vulnerability and sensitivity of national 
economies, market volatility and global market fluctuations, and heightening capital 
mobility put the IMF In the vanguard as a powerful public safeguard Institution and 
an International regulatory force.
The IMFs strategies, strictures, and prescriptions are reprocessed and digested 
through national governments in the form of domestic economic policies. Arguably, 
governments themselves are the vehicles of economic globalization through the 
imposition of conditionality measures disguised as national policies, allowing the 
subsequent allocation of economic power and sovereignty. Tight government capital
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controls and regulations are eroded, which ultimately translates Into the partial loss 
of state sovereignty In the economic sphere. States participate In furthering and 
fostering the goals of globalization through IMF neo-llberal policies. In short, 
globalization efforts are realized and materialized within national territories, through 
national Institutions, through the leadership of national governments under the 
tutelage of the IMF.
According to Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, the IMF has become an Important 
element “of an emerging global superstructure which facilitates multilateral monetary 
and trade transactions.” They further expand on the essential elements of the 
leverage the IMF Is able to exercise:
The IMF and the World Bank ... were entmsted with the task of promoting the 
consolidation and expansion of the capitalist world economy. To this end they are 
endowed, by virtue of their statutes, with a dual capacity for global intervention. At 
one level they are able to use the substantial resources placed at their disposal by 
member countries to promote a particular pattern of intemationai trade and 
investment, and set rules or guidelines on the form of the trade and payments 
regime. But at another level they are in a position to make the provision of economic 
assistance to member countries conditional on the letter's acceptance and 
implementation of their policy prescriptions. The power to withhold economic and 
financial assistance or cut off sources of intemationai loans has enabled the World 
Bank and the IMF to exercise substantial and continuous leverage on a great many 
national economies. The key to their power lies not only in the financial resources 
at their disposal but in their capacity to influence the aid programmes of major 
govemments and the lending policies of banks and other key financial institutions. 
{The End of Sovereignty? 1992,94-95. Emphasis added)
In fact, a certain pattern of intemationai trade and investment, a certain variant 
of capitalism, is being furthered or, arguably, imposed on developing countries and
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countries in transition to market economy. It is certain that the IMF, as a facilitator of 
a neo-liberal model and as a vehicle of economic globalization, /san integral part of 
global capitalist infrastructure and a vehicle of global capitalism. It is hard to disagree 
with Michel Chossudovsky who remarks that: “The IMF, the World Bank and the 
[WTO] are administrative structures, they are regulatory bodies operating within a 
capitalist system and responding to dominant economic and financial interest” 
(Chossudovsky 1997, 16). The irrefutable empirical evidence seems to indicate 
that the IMF represents the interests of its controlling members with the largest 
quota shares. Thus, developing countries and countries in transition are coerced 
into certain patterns of trade and economic interaction, dictated by the major 
“shareholders”, and subsequently imposed on them by the IMF.
It seems that these powerful interests are served when the IMF facilitates debt- 
collection from indebted countries. The goal of the IMF as a debt collector is to 
make sure that foreign lenders and commercial banks are paid. Take, for instance, 
the 1980s debt crisis. Both creditors and borrowers shared blame for the crisis. But 
the IMF seemed favorably biased towards creditors, thus it was dubbed by Karin 
Lissakers as the “creditor community's enforcer." Jacques Polak commented that 
the institution was “being used by the commercial banks in the collection of their 
debts."’^
The costs of adjustment after the 1980s debt crisis were asymmetrically distributed 
between creditors and debtors, where debtor countries had to take on most of the 
debt burden. Needless to say, this debt-collector role taints the IMFs credibility, 
undermines its effectiveness, and renders it undemocratic. Its ardent pursuit of a 
“no-debt-relief strategy” leaves debtor countries deeply indebted whereas commercial 
creditors reap the benefits of the IMFs favoritism.
Lissakers and Polak were quoted in Devesh Kapur, The IMP: A Cure or a Curse?" 1998,
p. 118.
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Another example of IMF bias Is yielding to political pressures from major 
shareholders such as France, the US, Germany, Belgium, and such. These major 
shareholders can influence the IMF’s conditionality packages to include their own 
agenda, for instance, to be more flexible in loan conditions, or to push or not to 
push for devaluations, when certain political or economic interests are served. The 
IMF’s institutional flexibility to design suitable conditionality packages to serve the 
needs of major shareholders undermines its effectiveness, soundness, trust, and 
credibility. It also raises issues of viable international architecture for democratic 
global governance, and of effective international economic and financial 
management.
Another example of IMF bias is illustrative. The sentiment that financial 
liberalization, both domestically and internationally is a critical part of the US agenda 
is well-known. That global financial markets bring high risks and high rewards is 
well-established as well. The IMF avidly promotes capital account liberalization 
under its mandate and jurisdiction, in line with the US agenda, regardless of the 
glaring asymmetry in wealth distribution around the globe. The promotion of 
unfettered global financial markets (the IMF is a vehicle of economic globalization 
after all) seems to be on the agenda of the IMF in line with the interests of powerful 
shareholders. As Devesh Kapur notes: “...since the poor have less capacity to bear 
risk, the IMF might have been expected to move cautiously in integrating poor 
countries into global financial markets, despite the high potential rewards" (Kapur 
1998, 120-121).
The IMFs zeal and relentless effort to promote unfettered global financial markets, 
to homogenize and incorporate developing countries into global economic structures 
in light of glaring differences and uneven development seems economically myopic 
and politically short-sighted. In his neofunctionalist model, Joseph Nye hypothesized 
of the four conditions that influence the nature, the potential and the subsequent
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evolution of an integrative scheme. Beside such integrative conditions as elite vaiue 
complementarity, existence o f pluralism, and the capacity ofmember-states to adapt 
and respond, he theorized the first condition as symmetry or economic equality of 
units.^^ A relationship is said to exist among trade, integration, and level of 
development measured by per capita. Such compatibility appears to be important 
for regional, international, and global integration. He also hypothesized that 
redistribution is one of the conditions that is likely to characterize the integration 
process over time. Importantly, “central to the integrative process is the extent to 
which redistribution, benefiting some regions [states, members] more than others, 
is compensated by growth to the benefit of the unit as a whole” ( Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff 1990, 444-445). In sum, as integration theories reveal, the level o f 
integration and the success of integration are conducive to the level o f development 
of the integrating parts.
As Devesh Kapur remarks: The question is howto make openness to the world’s 
capital markets less perilous. Although LDCs undoubtedly need to open up to the 
world’s capital markets, they would be well advised to do so at a pace commensurate 
with their capacity to develop sound regulatory and institutional structures” (Kapur 
1998,124). As it stands at the present moment, the IMF has not been effective in 
protecting the developing countries from the full force of global financial flows. The 
IMF’s integration efforts often resemble coercive tactics partly instigated by pressures 
from the powerful economic and financial interests.
See more on this theory in J. S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional 
Organization, 1971, pp. 56-58.
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Conclusion: Recommendations For the Reform of the IMF
As mentioned earlier, the IMF has been able to justify and legitimize its mandate 
due to its adaptability and institutional ingenuity, which characterizes a high level of 
institutionalization. The year 1971 marked the beginning of an era of floating 
exchange rates that inaugurated the emergence of the global capital market. Critics 
of the IMF doomed the institution to death for being unable to fulfil its original purpose 
— the management of exchange rates. After the collapse of the global system of 
fixed par values. It seemed that the IMF was left with no clear mission, no clear 
purpose for existence, and no clear mandate. It displayed its institutional adaptability 
by re-inventing its mission, i.e., by becoming a crisis manager and lender of last 
resort, as well as the powerful instrument for debt rescheduling and debt repayment. 
The debt crisis of the 1980s (which especially hit hard Eastem Europe and Latin 
America) opened up a new field for the IMF by providing loans to debt-stricken 
countries, which gave the Fund a needed boost of energy and a new expanded 
mandate for its existence.
In recent years, the IMF has moved to the forefront as a crisis manager, and it 
will continue to play this essential role. The role of the IMF as a lender of last resort 
will continue to be crucial in the volatile economic environment. However, in light of 
criticisms expressed earlier in this chapter, it is high time that the IMF exhibited its 
institutional adaptability and ingenuity to better serve the needs of its “clients,” to be 
a constructive force as opposed to being a reactionary institution. It should change 
its rigid guidelines when applying the same old conditionality orthodoxy to all its 
borrower members; otherwise, institutionai rigidity could be detrimental to its 
effectiveness. It should modify its American and Euro-centric (i.e., ethnocentric) 
approach to the rest of the world in order to live up to its mission and democratic 
values. One-size-fits-all approach could hardly be democratic at best.
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What challenges does the IMF face at the present time? With globalization 
accelerating and interdependence increasing, the IMF will not be an effective 
institution in the changed world if it preserves the status quo. As Phillip R. Trimble 
notes:
As globalization accelerates, international law and institutions will inevitably be 
implicated. Currently, both are strongly oriented towards presen/ing the status quo. 
If they remain static, then market-driven “private” forces may come overwhelmingly 
to dominate the lives of the world’s people. Decisions by corporate executives, 
bankers, currency traders, and information moguls increasingly could come to 
displace the decisions by governments on such matters as mortgage interest rates, 
the types of jobs available, the content of education, and attitudes towards family 
and religion.... Perfectly responsive, democratic governments could find themselves 
unable to maintain healthy labor markets, a devout populace, or a safe environment 
because of “private” decisions outside of their control. (Trimble 1997,1946-1947)
The global financial environment has changed, and so it has been harder for the 
IMF to preserve the status quo. Capital mobility and market volatility are the tangible 
economic realities that we have to face in a globalized economy. The threats of 
financial crises and instability will be present for as long as capital is mobile. With 
this ever-present danger of market instability, the IMF will continue to play the role 
of a crisis manager and the lender of last resort in a globalized economy potentially 
susceptible to financial crises. However, the IMFs ability to supply large amounts 
of capital on short notice has diminished considerably, which might require some 
modification in the Fund’s resource management. In sum, fechno/og/(instantaneous 
transfer of funds across borders), demography (d iversification and 
internationalization of funds), and the vofatility o f capital {hedge funds, capital flight) 
pose serious challenges to the IMF (just as they challenge sovereign nation-states).
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It Is not suggested here that markets and governments can be solely entrusted 
with averting international financial crises. But the IMF could be more effective in 
performing the double role as an instrumentand as a regulatoroi states and markets. 
The 1998-1999 crises provided ample evidence that foreign financial flows should 
be regulated in some form or another. The crises demonstrated the dangers of the 
undisciplined global financial and monetary system. Market volatility becomes a 
reality when financial disturbances are transmitted so quickly, as the recent crises 
demonstrated. Due to market volatility, both markets and governments are more 
vulnerable and susceptible to failures and fluctuations. The IMF could be essential 
in diagnosing and warning against the signs of incipient crisis. In this alert-signaling 
capacity, the IMF should be given a mandate to insist on disclosure, accountability, 
and transparency on the part of government accounting as well as corporate and 
private banking. The IMF could be essential as a referee between markets and 
governments, injecting discipline in their interactions.
Just as the IMF might rely on cooperation, transparency, and disclosure from 
different public and private entities, the intemational community might expect 
reciprocity from the Fund. It should be more transparent when signing conditionality 
agreements and become less of a secretive organization. As Alan Reynolds remarks: 
“The IMF never makes public the ‘letter of intenf the borrower signs, which outlines 
the conditionality to which it agrees” (Reynolds 1998,248). In sum, it should be a 
two-way street with the IMF taking the lead, if necessary, to bring about the change.
We do not take issue with the prospect o f increased intemational regulation per 
se, in our judgment, some regulation of anarchical financial and capital flows could 
be beneficial for the stability of the intemational economic system. With the increasing 
intemationalization of economic activity, the IMF will have a role to guard against 
market excesses, unwise and irresponsible actions on the part of govemments, 
creditors, and investors. It could serve as a bufferzone between markets and national
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economies to offset market fluctuations. Thus, it should continue to perform an 
essential task of promoting financial and currency stability. The IMF should engage 
all interested parties -  govemments, investors, banks, creditors, lenders, money 
managers - in  a meaningful dialogue. Interconnectedness is a fact, and it is high 
time that economic and financial entities, both official and private, recognized each 
other and share information and perceptions on risk management. Again, some 
regulation is needed to prevent the abuses of the marketplace. And the IMF is likely 
to increase its general supervisory and regulatory role in the future.
The IMF should become more of a democratic forum itself as opposed to a 
hierarchical institution based on the dominant rule of the industrialized oligarchy. 
The voting power of members is distributed according to quota shares, which are 
determined by a country's economic importance, wealth, and the volume of its 
intemational trade. As a consequence, the industrialized nations (the US having 
the largest quota share) generally control and dictate IMF practices. Ironically, 
developing countries and countries in transition, who are most affected by IMF 
policies and who resort to the IMFs assistance most frequently, have little say in 
IMF policy formulation. The distribution of economic power and influence, counted 
in quotas, perpetuates the pattern of inequality, the pattern of dependency between 
economically weak and strong states. Furthermore, loan conditionality imposes a 
neo-liberal vision on developing countries. That invariably elim inates any 
independent course of action a sovereign state (in theory, free and independent of 
outside influence) might want to pursue.
Our recommendation to the IMF would be to infuse the democratic process in 
“bail-out” and conditionality negotiations in order to give borrower countries more 
room to maneuver and to be able to fashion a package that would suit a country's 
specific set of circumstances. As it insists on more accountability and transparency 
from govemments and lenders, it should also be willing to be more accountable
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and more responsible for its prescriptions. The continued expansion of the Fund's 
mandate in the future implies that more sovereign powers will have to be delegated 
to the Fund. It will have to live up to its expanded role. To avoid being charged with 
institutional overreach, it might increase its effectiveness by including popular review 
and more participation from governments.
By including more conditions in loans and rescue packages the IMF takes away 
more decision-making capabilities and ultimately could undermine a govemment’s 
legitimacy. Continued expansion o f the IMFs mandate should be accompanied by 
a commensurate increase in accountability and risk-sharing. Otherwise, “...the 
absence of risk sharing means that these [loan] conditions amount to a form of 
political taxation without representation," remarks Devesh Kapur. (Kapur 1998,126) 
In light of criticisms of conditionality practices, our recommendation to the IMF would 
be to lengthen the time for loan repayment and to give more flexibility on target 
performance. The IMF needs to reform its rigid conditionality orthodoxy in the 
absence of unequivocal “success" stories and try new approaches with different 
variables (supply-side vs. demand-side policies, strategies without devaluations, 
etc). The IMF should fashion and prescribe strategies and corrective measures that 
do not diminish or undermine public safety nets which protect the most vulnerable 
portion of the population, indiscriminate, sweeping imposition of shock therapies 
does not cushion the most vulnerable against the hardships, risks, fluctuations, 
and uncertainties of structural reforms and globalization.
The IMF should replace its “shock therapy" approach with a more gradual, 
moderate approach geared at sustainable political and economic development. In 
short, the IMF should move away from shock therapies towards more moderate 
prescriptions. Surely, if the IMF wants the old loans to be paid off and at the same 
time improve the economic environment of developing countries, it should adopt 
strategies that are instrumental, conducive to success and not counterproductive
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to structural adjustment goals. The development model that the IMF is trying to 
further should be beneficial to all members of the society. The IMFs policies should 
not increase the misery and misfortune of individuals or nations that are members 
of the organization. In sum, it should adopt a more humanistic approach towards its 
borrower-clients.
It has often been the case that developing countries are forced to abandon harsh 
conditionality measures because they are economically and politically unsustainable. 
Without strong domestic support, any IMF-sponsored reforms will not last. The IMF 
should take into account unfavorable external and domestic conditions when 
formulating performance targets, and not to ignore them, as has often been the 
case. The Fund should base its performance targets on realistic assumptions of 
domestic and intemational conditions. It should be willing to negotiate and adjust 
performance targets in case of unfavorable or unforeseen circumstances. In sum, 
the IMF has to undergo a profound reform to become a more democratic institution 
whereby a receiving state would have more say, leverage, and negotiating power in 
the decision-making of the institution (often the strings attached to the loan are 
rigid, whereby a country cedes so much sovereignty that the idea of the exercise of 
sovereignty is rendered void). The IMF has to remember that the intervention does 
occur in a sovereign state which has to further its national interest and maintain 
legitimacy and effectiveness.
The IMF should consider applying various “recipes" depending on the 
circumstances of a receiving country and stay away from applying the same rigid 
ethnocentric orthodoxy in each case indiscriminately. It needs to move towards 
more flexible corrective strategies to reflect realities of a particular country (certain 
unique macro- and microeconomic circumstances, cultural traditions, customs, 
political situation, leadership, etc.). The IMF has to adopt a more flexible approach
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and, if necessary, an element o f cultural relativism in its analysis of each particular 
country.
The role of the IMF as a negotiator and a coordinator of debt repayment cannot 
be discounted. The IMF has become an important tool of financial diplomacy in the 
last two decades. However, the IMF should stop favoring creditors and lenders. 
The IMF should not be the debt collector for banks that are unwilling to accept a 
share of responsibility for their bad foreign loans. Lenders should be penalized for 
irresponsible lending of foreign currencies and reckless decisions. The IMF should 
change its approach to treating governments as sole causes of crises. It should 
help institute some protection mechanisms for governments that creditors 
automatically suffer a portion of their principal, so that the debt is not rolled over or 
extended, getting national govemments deeper into debt. Finally, intemational 
bankruptcy laws should be instituted and ratified to protect govemments and markets 
against the negative effects of globalization. As Devesh Kapur points out: “...there 
should be an intemational equivalent of domestic bankruptcy codes that would create 
a legal revenue for creditors and debtors to resolve their differences, and allow both 
sides to avert financial panics and to stop shirking their responsibilities" (Kapur 
1998,124). The IMF could be instrumental in taking a leadership role in that endeavor.
The IMF should be more effective in performing its “policing" function. Under the 
original Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and restricted capital flows, 
it was impossible for govemments to run large foreign debts and deficits. National 
debt had to be financed out of tangible, official reserves. In the 1980s the global 
capital market found innovative ways to transform debt into tradable, profit-making 
instruments. Saskia Sassen explains:
Because the financial markets have invented ways of profiting from irresponsible 
borrowing, they are not disciplining govemments where and when it might count In
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the meantime, they will stretch the profit-making opportunities for as long as possible, 
no matter what the underlying damage to the national economy might be. (Sassen 
1996,46-47)
The IMF could be more effective in performing the “policing” function -disciplining 
both markets and govemments, but it should avoid laying the disproportionate share 
of political and economic risks solely on borrowing countries.
The IMF exercises enormous leverage in the intemational arena based on the 
authority vested in it by the member-states. One may just consider the fact that the 
IMF is empowered to enter into iegal and binding agreements with sovereign states. 
If current trends continue, the IMF is likely to acquire more power from borrower 
countries. The IMF applies pressure through conditionality packages and subsequent 
intervention into countries' intemal affairs. Take another instance of the IMFs exercise 
of power -  the case of the former Yugoslavia. After Yugoslavia’s dissolution, when 
the IMF declared that it “has ceased to exist”, the IMF was exercising sovereign 
powers in an economic jurisdiction by allocating assets and obligations to the new 
states.
The IMF is likely to continue to exert not just economic but political leverage, 
thus increasing the scope of its mandate to other non-economic areas. The IMFs 
anti-corruption campaign is an example of this trend. The IMF has taken an active 
stance in its opposition to corruption. The IMF is now applying new policies in its 
lending practices to tackle corruption. In August 1996, the IMF applied this new 
anti-corruption policy to Kenya-a $220 million loan was suspended accusing Nairobi 
of failing to stop widespread bribery. The IMF guidelines generally recognize the 
necessity for addressing governance issues, including instances of corruption, on 
the basis of economic considerations within its mandate. But of course, as far as 
corruption is concerned, the line between economics and politics is very fine. In
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short, the IMF will continue to increase its mandate by applying more economic and 
political pressures through its “rescue” and conditionality packages. As a result, 
sovereignty will be further ceded to the IMF, with or without formal consent of the 
sovereign states. This trend, however, raises the issues of coercion and undue 
interference in the affairs of a sovereign state.
On sovereignty issues, sovereign states do have the right to pursue an 
independent course, to choose their destiny, to mobilize national resources, and to 
determine what course should be taken to best sen/e and further national interests. 
Excessive intrusion on the part of the IMF into the internal workings of a sovereign 
state takes away autonomy and independence. It is argued that the IMF cannot 
supply political solutions, it is also well-known that the IMF was originally created to 
handle highly technical non-political tasks. I have mentioned the Fund’s institutional 
ability to adapt. But the Fund’s widening agenda makes it vulnerable to politicization 
and renders it less effective as an institution. The multiplicity of tasks undermines 
the institution's integrity and coherence, as well as “impairs bureaucratic effectiveness 
and erodes institutional autonomy” (Kapur 1998,126). As a result, its technocratic 
reputation is tarnished, its credibility suffers, and it is accused of institutional 
overreach. As for the IMF, it should exercise institutional self-restraint, to be more 
effective, it needs to clearly define its mission and be accountabieior lts performance.
It is not suggested here that our recommendations will reconcile all paradoxes 
and dilemmas facing the IMF. For instance, what should the IMF do to reconcile its 
role as a vehicle of economic globalization and the facilitator of free trade with its 
heavy impositions through conditionality practices? The neoliberal approach the 
IMF fosters (or imposes through conditionalities) centers on the wHhdrawaf o f the 
state from economy, the minimum ofgovemment intervention, and the enhancement 
o f the role o f the market in the economy. Paradoxically, the IMF promotes 
globalization, free trade, liberalization of markets and economies, and the free market
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approach by becoming more intrusive in the workings of national economies and 
national governments through its conditionality practices. The IMF’s free market 
approach discourages state inten/ention in economic affairs, while it believes in its 
institutional mandate to restructure and overhaul the entire economy of borrowing 
countries. There is subtle irony in the fact that the facilitator of globalization, 
liberalization, and the free market approach should not “lead by example" by 
enlarging its mandate and regulatory function. We are not against greater regulation 
or the IMF’s good intentions on principle, it is the cause-effect relationship that 
should be carefully reassessed. The IMF is in strong need of democratic 
accountability, risk, and burden-sharing. If it is taking on a greater role and an 
expanded mandate, it should improve its performance in general, and especially in 
its conditionality practices. In sum, a structural adjustment reform of the IMF itself 
should be a strong priority.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
A NEW NORM OF SOVEREIGNTY
It could be suggested that a new norm of sovereignty is being realized in the 
changing world. The debate over sovereignty and its significance in the modem 
world lies deep at the heart of a fundamental debate over order vs. disorder, 
community vs. anarchical individualism. As an evolving institution, sovereignty is 
not fixed in time and space; it mirrors the changes in the world. Sovereignty reflects 
historical, political, legal and social realities of the time; it is context-oriented and 
multidimensional. Our understanding of sovereignty changes with a new dynamic 
in the historical context. The content and the substance of national sovereignty are 
being transformed due to the forces of globalization, just as our perception and 
theorization of the state are changing. The state and sovereignty are changing in 
tandem. This illustrates the transitional, variable, and dynamic nature of sovereignty. 
In short, it is in flux.
If decline-of-the-state theorists see the increasing irrelevance of the state as the 
consequence of globalization, we, on the contrary, suggest an enhanced role for 
the state. The state will have to take on a hannonizing function between globalization 
and growing disparities between winners and losers of globalization. That is a new 
evolving role for the state. How can the state achieve this goal? Tangible results 
could be achieved through a more active participation in intemational organizations
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and fora, and a closer cooperation with markets, although it might necessitate further 
delegation of sovereign authority. Stronger domestic institution will be the key to 
successful management of globalization. Here lies the paradox of our time, state 
will have to strengthen their institution to better manage globalization, while 
globalization itself demands further delegation of state authority to other 
supranational entities that can more effectively perform certain tasks.
A new pluralistic framework within the paradigm of sovereignty will have to be 
developed. It signifies that we will continue to look at the world through the prism of 
transformed sovereignty, where states will have to share power, responsibility, and 
legitimacy with non-state actors. The exercise of sovereignty is not just about where 
it is located or who holds power, it underscores the effective exercise o f power. If 
the state can delegate some of its sovereignty to a body, which can be more effective 
in performing certain tasks, then we should do not decry the subsequent loss of 
sovereignty as something negative or detrimental. Apart from the issues of 
effectiveness and necessity, the issues of accountability and legitimacy will have to 
be addressed -  who will be ultimately responsible and accountable for the actions? 
In the final analysis, would accountability lie with the state or could it be delegated? 
The ultimate challenge to the state is likely to be how to stay accountable and retain 
legitimacy and credibility within the changing pattems of authority. In the foreseeable 
future, the state will still be looked upon as the basis for public trust and the unifying 
force for tjody politic.
Globalization is thought not only to diminish the relevance of the state, but to 
erode sovereignty in considerable ways. But to assume that sovereignty is being 
eroded, lost, diminished and relinquished a t üiis moment in history is to assume 
that it has been absolute until now. To assume that the transfer of sovereignty is a 
new phenomenon, concomitant with globalization, and only characteristic of our 
times is to commit fallacy. All international law requires partial delegation of
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sovereignty. The transfer of sovereign “sticks" might take new forms in the modern 
times, but the allocation of sovereignty perse  is not a new phenomenon. But the 
images of the end of history' and predictions of the death of sovereignty and the 
state indicate certain hysterical, apocalyptic tendencies at the beginning of the new 
millennium. These predictions are gross exaggerations, oversimplifications, and 
misperceptions of the current trends.
Sovereignty and the state are man-made institutions and fundamental human 
associations, which perform essential functions. The state persists and continues 
to matter; it is a social man-made unit, necessitated by human associations and 
complexities of body politic. There is simply no other entity in existence which is 
able to provide general welfare or to perform essential social functions, and there is 
no global village being formed at the present time. Though it is in vogue to speak 
with the vocabulary of globality, a lot of seemingly globalizing trends are still within 
the boundaries of the /hfer-national, state-to-state interactions. There is no global 
court, no global bank, no global currency, no global welfare institutions, and there is 
no economic body collecting global tax. The membership in the international 
community and intemational organizations, such as the UN, is predicated on the 
claims to sovereignty and statehood. The claim to sovereignty is a necessary 
condition for a state’s recognition as an equal member. (As mentioned earlier, weak 
and strong states are equal in law and in their formal claim to sovereignty, but some 
states do not in fact rule effectively.)
As the earlier discussion showed, empirical evidence indicates that sovereignty 
is always limited in nature. As an ideal, as an absolute, sovereignty requires 
absoluteness, which it has never manifested, not even during the era of monarchical 
absolutism. European monarchs even during the time of absolutism had to abide 
by the treaties they signed and by the norms of customary intemational law. Louis 
XIV of France le Roi soleil (the Sun King’, 1638-1715) came to symbolize the
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monarchical absolutism carried out to the extreme. Even the omnipotent Louis XIV 
who declared Letat, c ’estmoi, was restrained by domestic pressures and powerful 
interest groups. He had to buy the allegiance of powerful parties, interest groups, 
soldiers, bureaucrats, merchants with money and privileges; and popular demands 
had to be satisfied. By the 19th century the powers of European monarchs were 
checked by rising national assemblies, national constitutions, more inclusive suffrage, 
and the rise of the notion of popular sovereignty. Revolutions and revolts against 
the ruling sovereign bodies indicated the discontent of the population, and remained 
powerful checks on the sovereign's powers.
There has never been a sovereign body that possessed absolute sovereignty or 
absolute power, or ruled unchecked. There have always been some limitations and 
checks on sovereignty, in the form of divided and limited sovereignty, or in the form 
of dual sovereignty (as in a federal system). Sovereignty has never been absolute 
as a legal and political reality. The existence of intemational law and intemational 
organizations imply a partial transfer or “loss” of sovereignty. States have never 
been truly self-sufficing units. The complexity of political communities and states, 
diversification and interdependence of needs have put legal, moral, and physical 
limitations of the states' freedom of action. Changes in intemational environment 
and decline in the intemational freedom of action after WWII did not mean that 
sovereignty was no longer valid.
In our times, the globalizing trends and reduced economic power of the state do 
not render sovereignty irrelevant. Treaties, intemational institutions, intemational 
customary law are but a few manifestations of the so-called “erosion” of sovereignty. 
The state is still the main repository of sovereignty, despite the fact that it has 
transferred or lost some of its sovereign sticks, either by consent or not. Sovereign 
authority is largely about efficiency, legitimacy, competence, and the effectiveness 
of govemments. States delegate their authority to intemational organizations
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because those Intemational bodies can more effectively and more efficiently perform 
certain tasks in certain fields. Intemational organizations are founded and spring 
into existence to serve certain needs of member-states.
The notion of absolute sovereignty implies that the state possesses absolute 
and complete freedom to act as it chooses. An absolutist definition of sovereignty 
has to be left to rest on the shelves of history. In reality, no state has possessed this 
kind of omnipotence. In practice, sovereignty implies that there is no superior extemal 
authority over and above the state-there is no global government or ruling body 
higher than a state. It is the condition in which a “collection of states, all insisting on 
their independence, were brought to recognize that they do not exist in isolation but 
are forced to live with other states” (Hinsley 1986, 226).
Towards an Eclectic and Pluralistic Theory of Intemational Relations
An inclusive, horizontai, elastic, eclectic, and pluralistic model o f sovereignty 
should be developed. The present developments dictate that we need to move 
away from describing sovereignty with such terms as “supreme”, “superior”, 
“exclusive”, and “absolute”. According to this inclusive model, sovereignty means a 
relatively independent and final authority within a fixed territory in a dynamic 
interdependence with other state and non-state actors. This relative independence 
still reserves the state the fundamental right to determine its destiny, but of course, 
with limitations mentioned above. Rigid and static, vertical and hierarchical 
understandings of sovereignty do not fit in the modem context. Sovereign states 
understood as supreme in power, rank or authority, and fully independent of all 
others is simply a fiction. Sovereign states are relatively independent of each other, 
but they are bound together by common interests. Sovereign actors, fu lly 
independent and autonomous, bound by no authority (temporal or ecclesiastical)
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do not exist, and in fact have never existed. New rhetoric of interdependence and 
interconnectedness has to enrich our political lexicon.
The traditional understanding of sovereignty has to be modified. Traditional legal 
and political theory that holds that the state is the sole and primary actor in the 
intemational arena, and that sovereign states have an absolute authority in all matters 
within their territory has to be changed. A pluralistic and inclusive norm of sovereignty 
based on empiricism and historicism will prove a useful tool in understanding today’s 
world. If an institution is established with the purpose and this purpose changes 
overtime, the institution has to adjust. It has to be recognized that sovereignty is a 
reflection of political thought and political reality of a particular age. As Joel P. 
Trachtman remarked:
The state's power and responsibility depends on its ability to bring peopie together 
to get what they want... No single formula, no single definition of “sovereignty” can 
possibly achieve this goal. Thus, sovereignty must be dynamic and variable. 
(Trachtman 1994,415)
Thus, sovereignty can be viewed either in terms of the delegation of power or 
the loss of sovereign sticks. A state can be viewed as actively and consciously 
exercising its sovereignty by allocating certain powers to other intemational or 
supranational authorities. The sovereign state thus reserves the right to withdraw 
its membership from such an organization if it chooses to. Or a state can be viewed 
as losing its sovereign sticks, without consent, if powerful non-state actors operate 
beyond its control, thus reducing some of its power.
The Realist model of the nation-state as the exclusive and the sole legitimate 
actor on the world stage has to be modified to reflect the realities of today's world. 
The state-centric framework that endows the state with exclusivity no longer reflects 
the reality. Govemmental and non-govemmental organizations, capital-controlling
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private sector, other various state and non-state actors have to be recognized and 
included. The recognition and the inclusion of these various actors into the new 
pluralistic model is imperative for further scientific discourse. The claim that states 
are the only meaningful actors on the world state is outmoded. The state will remain, 
to paraphrase Hinsley, a viable working assumption about political authority {Hinsley 
1986,216). Sovereignty will remain the foundation and the center of gravity for the 
maintenance of law and order in the intemational community, its organizing and 
stabilizing principle. The new model will still conceive of the state as the central 
organizing feature, but other meaningful players will have to be included in this 
pluralistic paradigm. We have to recognize that the transfer of sovereignty can 
happen between states, states and intemational organizations, or state and non­
state actors. As other international and non-state actors continue to assume some 
of the “traditional” sovereign powers, we have to recognize the shift from a pure 
state-centric model to a more pluralistic model, where these other actors are 
recognized and included.
A stateless society remains an ideal in the who-knows-when future. The state 
and sovereignty display the signs of longevity and resilience. They are destined to 
play yet one of the leading parts in the on-going intemational drama. At this day and 
age, it would be short-sighted to think that we are already living in a borderless 
society where geographical boundaries ceased to matter. That kind of world at the 
current stage in history would be highly anarchical and chaotic. Though porous due 
to globalization, national borders still matter. As Oscar Schachter remarks:
The critical fact is that states alone have provided the structures of authority 
needed to cope with the incessant daims of competing societal groups and to provide 
publicjustice essential to social order and responsibility. The territorial nexus has a 
profound significance beyond natural resources. Territory. ..  is a primordial matrix. 
(Schachter 1997,22)
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In the modern political and social context, the state matters, and the national still 
matters. As Martii Koskenniemi outlines a fundamental reconciliatory function of 
the state: “Within the state, the various conceptions of economic and managerial 
effectiveness, individual rights, or just principles, meet and find reconciliation" 
(Koskenniemi 1996, 28-29).
The state offers certain essentials that neither markets nor global “networks" are 
capable or willing to provide— the territorial state promises “an arena in which all in 
the defined territory have access to common institutions and the equal protection of 
law” (Schachter 1997, 22). Generally speaking, the state offers protection, certain 
privileges and benefits that non-govemmental organizations or markets cannot 
deliver effectively. (Of course, the effectiveness of each individual state is another 
matter.) The state remains yet a basic structure of authority, capable of offering 
protection to its citizens on the basis of equity and justice. It offers a legal and 
political framework, an organizational and institutional structure. In general terms, 
the state provides order, stability, organization, and predictability as opposed to 
chaos, anarchy and uncertainty.
An eclectic approach to sovereignty allows to reconcile the dichotomy between 
political and legal theorizations of the concept. Should we view sovereignty in its 
totality, as monolithic and indivisible? Or should it be viewed in terms of “sticks" that 
can be reduced and divided? This eclectic approach is crucial in reconciling the 
distinction between the political and legal aspects of sovereignty. It can be reducible 
when we consider the political dimension and the actual exercise of sovereignty. 
The legal dimension of sovereignty views it as a totality when we talk about a formal 
claim to sovereignty.
In conclusion, in a turbulent and uncertain world, the state and sovereignty remain 
relevant; they remain a viable vitality in the world order. They retain relevance, 
substance and pertinence. Though globalization re-maps some of our familiar
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landscape, the principle of sovereignty will remain the accurate logic of the modern 
world politics. Globalization does not doom the state and sovereignty to its imminent 
death unless it can be shown that new pattems of meaningful authority have emerged 
or are being developed. Although recent developments that have just been outlined 
require that scientific discourses move from statism towards pluralism, at the present 
time in history, sovereignty and the state sen/e as the foundations of the modem 
system of international law. Changes due to globalization notwithstanding, 
sovereignty gives a meaningful and accurate description of the modern world.
The Role of the IMF for the Future 
The role of the IMF will not diminish but will increase in a globalized integrated 
economy. The IMF will continue to oversee and facilitate economic cooperation 
through its macroeconomic and, it is hoped, soon-to-be-adopted microeconomic 
approaches. It might eventually take on a more expanded economic jurisdiction in 
the performance of global surveillance in the areas of global liquidity management, 
interest rate stabilization, debt management, and capital and financial flows. This 
expanded role in the stabilization and regulation of the global economy might require 
enlarged resources and expanded power. The IMF will continue to play the role of 
lender o f last resort. It will continue to provide financial and technical assistance, 
although, it is hoped, with better results. The IMF will play the role of a mediator 
between govemments and markets in a globalized economy characterized by 
increasing volatility and high capital mobility. As a crisis managerar\d lender of last 
resort, it will continue to prescribe corrective strategies based on conditionality, 
whereby states will be forced to surrender a considerable portion of their sovereignty 
in exchange for financial support. Disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms at the 
Fund's disposal will continue to set limits to the scope and effectiveness o f national 
sovereignty. The IMFs functions as a mediator and a disciplinanan will expand as
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markets and national economies become more integrated, and as markets become 
more volatile. The IMF should continue to monitor national economies and markets 
more vigilantly to prevent panics, imprudent borrowing and market excesses.
It is argued that the IMF does not provide political solutions to political problems, 
and that it does not have any control over the quality of the state's leadership. But 
the nature of its conditionality tutelage puts the burden of responsibility on the IMF. 
It is proposed that, in the future, the IMF should expand its advisory and supervisory 
role when it comes to conditionality loans and their implementation. The IMF should 
be more actively involved in the “on-site" disbursement of conditionality loans or 
funds to avoid misappropriations or laundering of funds (a recent case of Russia is 
a sad testimonial to that effect, which necessitates IMFs direct involvement in the 
loan's appropriation in a borrowing country). The IMF should be more actively and 
directly involved in the supervision and the actual implementation of adjustment 
reforms in the receiving country.
Furthermore, the IMF should be more effective in strengthening domestic 
institutions of borrower countries if it wants its programs to succeed. Many borrower 
countries completely lack the institutions (banks, treasuries, tax collection agencies), 
necessary to implement its programs. Thus, it should play an important role in 
institution-building and the institutionalization of borrower countries' economies.
The IMF and a borrowing country form a sort of a symbiotic relationship through 
the delegation of sovereignty. The IMF cannot shirk its responsibilities when it expects 
a borrowing country to strictly follow up to 80 conditions and comply with all the 
rigid deadlines. Conditionality policies deeply affect political and social realities of 
the majority of the public on the receiving end. In sum, the Fund and its most powerful 
“shareholders” will need to take more responsibility and accountability for the 
decisions they meike and the conditions they impose.
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We do not intend to run the risk of sounding over-pessimistic or over-optimistic. 
We want to believe in the solubility of the problems we are facing; we do not subscribe 
to a pessimistic diagnosis based on the problems' intractability. Markets or 
govemments do not always know best, but neither does the IMF. No universal cure 
and no universal panacea has been found. The alleged consensus on the acceptance 
of the neoliberal approach does not depict the full picture -  economic and political 
coercion is a fact, imposition through loan conditionality is a fact. There is no 
consensus on intemational monetary and exchange rate policies for the present 
time or for the future. However, if the IMF wants to be viewed as a leader and a 
positive force, it needs to undergo a profound reform. It has to be sensitive, flexible 
in dealings with debtor countries, analyze and pay attention to a country's 
circumstances, and then tailor the programs that will improve, not worsen, already 
deplorable conditions.
A strengthened and transformed IMF will require more sovereign powers to be 
allocated to deal with challenges presented by globalization. More national 
sovereignty will be delegated (or surrendered by coercion) in the process. As a 
crisis manager, the IMF will be presented with the task of effectively countering the 
negative consequences of market-driven globalism. It will continue to play a 
leadership role of the watchdog in the world's monetary system because of increasing 
economic interdependence. It will gain more relevance as an overseer and a monitor 
of the world system. Its surveillance role to encourage the adoption of sound 
economic policies, and to foster a more orderly, stable exchange rate system will 
increase. But, again, the increase in power should be accompanied by a 
commensurate increase in accountability, responsibility, risk- and burden-sharing.
There is an urgent need for greater coordination and deeper linkages between 
intemational organizations, governments, and markets. For lack of any other 
regulatory financial agency with an almost universal membership, the IMFs role as
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a stabilizing force is essential. The negative strains and effects of globalization 
should be addressed at national, intemational, and global levels. The IMF could be 
more vocal and instrumental in this discussion, especially knowing that its structural 
adjustment measures deeply affect safety nets and public services. The IMF should 
help strengthen the state to deal with the negative effects of globalization; and it 
should help establish cost-effective social safety nets to protect the most vulnerable 
in an increasingly competitive environment.
Undoubtedly, the international multilateral institutions are only as good as the 
states that created them. Contradictions and limitations, inherent in the IMF, only 
mirror contradictions and limitations of the economic system and the structures of 
global govemance that imperfect nation-states have constructed. What entity is 
going to prevent or regulate IMF institutional excesses and abuses? The Imperfect 
states themselves? For the absence of higher authority, member-states and the 
intemational community at large have to be more outspoken and honest about the 
state of affairs. Once again, the international community and especially the powerful 
industrialized countries should not presence the status quo, which is characterized 
by the structural divide between debtors and creditors, the rich and poor, the strong 
and the weak. This structural division renders the idea of the IMF as an intemational 
cooperative ludicrous. At the present time, being the mirror reflection of the world, 
the IMF perpetuates the structural divide and the dependency relationship. The 
Fund should act promptly on its pledge to reduce (and eliminate) the poorest 
countries’ debt burden. The implementation of debt relief programs should be the 
Fund’s key priority.
What about the distant future? Let us conjure for a minute that globalization will 
eventually wipe off all boundaries and distinctions (to use the liberal terminology) 
and will bring about a homogenized society. The world will witness the creation of a 
global village, our own Paradise-on-Earth, our own Utopia. The nation-states will
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eventually wither away in a big global melting pot. Sovereignty will become obsolete 
and forgotten, only to be studied by inquisitive scientists. The existence of the IMF 
will be called into question, because its existence is predicated on the survival of 
the states. But by then it will probably be transformed into a global regulatory and 
supervisory entity with a global reach...
Until then, the international community has to face up to the challenges of 
economic globalization and change the existing status quo. The “structural” reform 
of the IMF could be the first step in that difficult endeavor.
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